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Fairness in International Climate Change                           
Regulatory Regime: An Introduction 
 
Those of us who live on small specks of land, . . . in the 
Caribbean, have not agreed to be sacrificial lambs on the altar 
of success of industrial civilization.1  
 
There is no guarantee that the Kyoto Protocol will continue 
into the next commitment period in this text . . . And we see 
there is money put before us. Can I suggest, in biblical terms, it 
looks like we are being offered 30 pieces of silver to betray our 
people and our future. Mr President, our future is not for sale. I 
regret to inform you that Tuvalu cannot accept this document.2 
 
There is broad consensus among all those who are concerned about the 
future of our planet that climate change is inevitable and, by and large, 
irreversible - a fact that has been scientifically corroborated.3 An 
overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that 
 
1  Statement by Ambassador Lionel Hurst of Antigua and Barbuda at the International Red 
Cross Conference on Climate Change and Natural Disasters, Hague, June 28, 2002 as 
quoted in Muller, Benito (2002): “Equity in Climate Change: The Great Divide”, 
available at http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/EV31.pdf 
(accessed on 21/03/2010). 
2   Statement made by the representative of the island nation Tuvalu on Copenhagen 
Accord at United Nations Climate Change Conference, 2009 held at Copenhagen. 
Incidentally Tuvalu, an island nation will be the first one to be immersed in the sea as a 
consequence of global warming. As quoted in Dimitrov, Radoslav S. (2009): “Inside 
UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference,” Review of Policy 
Research, University of Western Ontario, available at http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/ 
faculty/dimitrov/climate%20negotiations%20RPR.pdf (accessed on 20/03/2010). 
3   The IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2011 as quoted in Jaswal, 
Paramjit S. and Jolly, Stellina (2010): “Fairness and Rule of Law in Climate Discourse: 




environmental degradation in general and climate change in particular is a 
serious and urgent issue.4  “Climate change will affect the basic elements of 
life of people around the world (such as) access to water, food production, 
health and the environment.”5  Such veracity forces the decision makers at 
the national and international level to make difficult choices.6 Confronted 
with competing demands and interests, countries are now faced with 
committing resources to avoid consequences which, while beginning to be 
felt now, will only manifest themselves for decades and, in some cases, 
centuries from now.7 A study of the international efforts to combat climate 
change reveals that a key part of the discussion and controversy revolves 
around the contested concept of fairness.8 Even the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as 
UNFCCC), which is the first multilateral basis for action to combat climate 
change itself, assigns a prominent place to equity and fairness.9 In this 
context it is important to study the different contours of fairness in global 
climate change negotiations.  
 
4   Nicholas, Stern (2006): The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p. 3. 
5   Ibid. 
6   Supra note 3 at 371.  
7   Ibid. 
8   Ibid. A substantial body of scholarship and policy advocacy has been developed that 
discusses fairness in the climate change context. For example see Agarwal, Anil and 
Narain, Sunita (1991): Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental 
Colonialism, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment; Shue, Henry (1992):  
“The Unavoidability of Justice,” in Andrew Hurrel and Benedict Kingsburry (eds.), 
International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests and Institutions, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, at p. 373. 
9   Article 3 (1) of UNFCC, 1992 says, “The Parties should protect the climate system for 
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 
3 
1.1  Emergence and Expansion of Global Environment Regulatory 
Regimes10 
Global Environment Regulatory Regime (hereinafter referred to as GERR), a 
species of Global Regulatory Regime (hereinafter referred to as GRR)11, 
focuses on laying down regulatory standards in the area of environmental 
protection. Although environmental protection gained attention much earlier, 
its Regimization12, though gradually, began in the year 1972, the year in 
 
10   A detailed analysis of emergence of Global Environment Regulatory Regimes will be 
dealt with in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
11  Global Regulatory Regime (GRR) or Global Governance Regime is a phrase used by 
contemporary scholars. Traditionally, the purpose of international law and its institutions 
were to prescribe moral standards, the obedience to which is the option of the member-
states.  This category of international legal instruments may be called as Soft Law and is 
considered to be weaker when compared to the Binding Law (occasionally called as Hard 
Law), which aims at regulating and enforcing the legal standards laid at the international 
arena. The emergence of GRR primarily challenges traditional notions of state sovereignty 
and few scholars call it as the beginning of the emergence of a ‘Global State’. See 
generally Chimni, B. S. (2004): “International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global 
State in the Making,” European Journal of International Law, 15: 1.  He argues that a 
mounting network of international institutions (economic, social as well as political 
institutions) constitute a embryonic Global State for realizing the interests of an emerging 
Trans-National Capitalist Class in the international system to the disadvantage of 
subaltern classes in the third and first worlds. He further argues that the evolving Global 
State formation has an imperial character, which underpins substantive democracy at both 
inter-state and intra–state levels. According to him, this Global State or Global Regulatory 
Regime is a web of sub-national authorities and spaces that represent, along with non-
governmental organizations, other international organisations, inter-governmental 
organisations, regional organisations and sometimes even private organisations. See also 
generally Fischer-Lescano, Andreas and Teubner, Gunther (2004): “Regime Collisions: 
The Vein Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law,” Michigan Journal 
of International Law, 25, 999. 
12  According to Stephen D. Krasner “regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.” He says that international 
institutions are regarded as having a potentially positive effect on compliance with the 
rules because they expand or shrink the options available to rational state actors, which 
are constantly attempting to maximize their respective self-interests. For details see 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1982): “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables,” International Organization, 36(2): 185. Regimization to mean a 
systematic effort to create Regimes, where the political conditions and governance 




which the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment was adopted in Stockholm.  Before which environmental 
protection, essentially, remained as a subject of soft law13 and hence without 
much binding force. Pre-1972, International Environmental Law was left in 
the cold by policy makers and scholars, manifest by the fact that there were 
less than three-dozen multilateral agreements concerning environment,14 
whereas, at present, there are approximately nine hundred international legal 
instruments directly or indirectly related with environmental issues at the 
multilateral level.15 It is also certain and beyond doubt that this explosion of 
legal instruments will continue in the future.  
Without doubt prior to 1900 there were very few multilateral / 
bilateral agreements relating to the environment and its protection. The 
existing agreements primarily focused on and were formulated on the basis 
of uncontrolled sovereignty of the nation states over natural resources,16 and 
were essentially on boundary waters, navigation through international waters 
and fishing rights. These instruments did not, in its true sense address the 
 
Keun (2011): “Human Rights Regime in North East Asia and North Korea: 
Implications,” Korea Political Studies, 20 (1): 109. 
13  Soft law means the legal or policy instruments that do not have any binding force. 
Examples are the resolutions of the various organs of the United Nations. Viewed from 
this perspective even Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a soft law instrument 
though it received enforceability to a greater extent because it achieved the status of 
customary international law. See generally Boyle, Alan (1999): “Some Reflections on 
the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law,” International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 48: 901; Chinkin, C. M. (1989): “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development 
and Change in International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
38:850; Christians, Allison, “Hard Law & Soft Law,” Wisconsin International Law 
Journal, 25 (2):235.; Goldmann, Matthias (2012): “We Need to Cut Off the Head of the 
King: Past, Present, and Future Approaches to International Soft Law,” Leiden J. Int'l 
Law, 25:335; Guzman, Andrew T. & Meyer, Timothy L. (2010): “International Soft 
Law,” Journal Legal Analysis, 2:171. 
14  Weiss, Edith Brown (1993): “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues 
and the Emergence of a New World Order,” Georgetown Law Journal, 81:675. 
15   Ibid. 
16   Ibid. 
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issues of pollution or deforestation and other ecological issues of serious 
nature; and hence concerns of the contemporary world were left untouched.17 
Essentially, these legal instruments were pieces of ‘soft law’, or in other 
words, they were mere normative standards, and their enforceability 
remained as an option for the signatory States.  
Subsequently, the focus of international environmental law was 
widened post-1900 wherein nation states started making far-reaching 
international agreements with wider focus like conventions aiming to protect 
species of animals, birds and plants, etc.18 During the mid 20th century the 
states woke up to the realization of protecting natural resources. This resulted 
in numerous agreements and negotiations related to these aspects of the 
environment.19 The enforceability of these instruments again remained as an 
option for the states.  The notable aspect, however, was that for the first time 
there was felt an emergence of ‘hard law’ at the global level, wherein, in 
certain cases, customary principles of international law were used for 
enforcing international obligations against particular states. For example, in 
the famous Trail Smelter Arbitration20 between Canada and the United 
States, Canada was held responsible for the damage from copper smelter 
fumes that spread into United States territory. This decision was made on the 
 
17   There is probably only one exception to this pattern. In the United States-United 
Kingdom Boundary Waters Treaty, Article IV says that “water shall not be polluted on 
either side to the injury of health or property on the other”.  
18   Examples are the Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture 1902; the 
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States and Canada, 
1916; the Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, 1911; the London 
Convention for the Protection of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa, 1900 etc. 
19   For example the London Convention on Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their 
Natural State, 1933; the Washington Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life 
Preservation, 1940 etc. 
20   For details see Trail smelter case (United States v. Canada), 16 April 1938 and 11 
March 1941 VOLUME III pp. 1905-1982, available at 




basis of a customary principle, which says that the state is responsible to its 
neighbours for environmental damage caused by it due to the activities 
within its borders.21 It was also during this period that awareness grew about 
the need of environmental protection and subsequently emerged and 
strengthened.22 It was again during this period, in the United States, the 
waves of environmentalism led to the enactment of the National 
Environmental Policy Act in the year 1969, which for the first time 
introduced the concept of Environmental Impact Assessment. However, the 
fundamental characteristic of the international environmental law remained 
the same, as a set of soft laws.23 
The next phase in the development of international environmental 
law began with the creation of the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies since 1945. During this period various international organisations at 
the regional and international level started addressing the issues of 
environmental degradation.24 It was during this period the relationship 
between economic development and environmental protection was 
recognised at least in a limited way.25 However, none of the Articles of the 
United Nations Charter had a specific provision on environmental protection 
other than Article 1(3), which included ‘international cooperation in solving 
international economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems’ as one of 
the purposes of establishing the United Nations. In fact this has provided the 
 
21   Good Neighbourliness is a principle of international law with great relevance to 
international environmental law. It says that there is an obligation on states to reconcile 
their interests with the interests of neighbouring states. See Note (1973): "New 
Perspectives on International Environmental Law," The Yale Law Journal 82 (8): 1664.  
22   Supra note 14 at pp. 702-10. 
23   Ibid. 
24   Phillippe Sands, (2003): Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, at p 31. 
25   Ibid. 
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basis for subsequent environmental activities by the UN.26 It is also to be 
noted that the UN charter in the beginning created no specialised organ or 
agency for protecting the environment. However, in the year 1948, a 
Conference was convened with the assistance of the UNESCO, which 
resulted in the creation of the International Union for the Protection of the 
Nature (IUPN)27 with the aim of promoting the preservation of wildlife and 
the natural environment, public knowledge, education, scientific knowledge 
and research and legislation.  
 Thereafter in the year 1947, the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) took interest in convening the United Nations Conference on the 
Conservation and Utilisation of Resources (UNCCUR), which inter alia 
emphasised the need for international action to establish balanced approach 
to the management and conservation of natural resources. It also emphasised 
the competence of the United Nations over environmental matters.28 
Thereafter many resolutions were passed and conferences were convened at 
the auspices of the UN.29 Similarly in the year 1949 the International Court 
of Justice confirmed ‘every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’30. In Lac 
Lanoux Arbitration31 the arbitral tribunal affirmed the principles concerning 
the limitations on the right of States in their use of shared rivers and asserted 
the importance of cooperation among states.  
 
26   Ibid. 
27   Currently the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 
28   Supra n.24 at p. 32. 
29   Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, 1954;  International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Sea by Oil, 1954 etc. Various other 
resolutions adopted included the ones on the environmental impacts of oil pollution and 
nuclear activities. 
30   (1949) ICJ Reports 4. 




1.1.1  The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, 1972 
 The Stockholm Conference held in December 1972 under the 
auspices of the United Nations General Assembly adopted three non-
binding instruments, viz. (a) Resolution on Institutional and Financial 
Arrangements;32 (b) Declaration on the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (containing 26 Principles)33and (c) Action Plan (containing 
109 recommendations).34 As one scholar commented, “Stockholm enlarged 
and facilitated means toward international action previously limited by 
inadequate perception of environmental issues and by restrictive concepts 
of national sovereignty… There were significant elements of innovation in 
(1) the re-definition of international issues, (2) the rationale for 
cooperation, (3) the approach to international responsibility and (4) the 
conceptualisation of international organisational relationships.”35 Analysed 
from a legal perspective, the significant developments were the 
recommendations for the creation of new institutions and the establishment 
of coordinating mechanisms amongst the existing institutions (the Action 
Plan); the definition of a framework for future actions to be taken by the 
 
32   It proposed that action be taken by the UN General Assembly to establish four 
institutional arrangements, viz. an intergovernmental Governing Council for 
Environmental Programs; An environmental secretariat; an environmental fund to 
provide financing for environmental programs and also an inter-agency environmental 
coordinating board to ensure cooperation and coordination among all bodies concerned 
in the implementation of UN environmental programs.   
33   See Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis. 
34   The 109 Recommendations were generally accepted by consensus and it reflected six 
main subject areas. (1) Planning and Management of Human Settlements for 
Environmental Quality (2) Environmental Aspects of Natural Resources Management 
(3) Identification and Control of Pollutants and Nuisances of Broad International 
Significance (4) Educational, Informational, Social and Cultural Aspects of 
Environmental Issues (5) Development and Environment; and (6) International 
Organisational Implications of Action Proposals. 
35   Louis B Sohn, (1973): “The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment”, 
Harvard International Law Journal 14, 423. 
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international community (the Recommendations) and the adoption of 
general guiding principles (the Declaration).36 
 The Post-Stockholm Declaration also witnessed the emergence of 
various legal instruments like the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 1973, the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972, the World Heritage Convention 1972, etc. The principal 
characteristic of all these instruments was that they were legally non-
binding on the signatory states.  
The Stockholm Conference was the starting point for environmental 
activities at both regional and international level.37 This period witnessed 
unprecedented proliferation of international environmental organisations 
some of which were established through treaties. Again, during this period 
the existing international organisations addressed the environmental issues 
more aggressively. 38 
 It is generally believed that the creation of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the adoption of Principle 21 were 
the most significant developments of the Stockholm Conference.39 Further, 
it was during this period that many treaties were adopted by the United 
Nations, the most prominent one being the United Nations Convention on 
the Laws of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS)40. This period also witnessed the 
 
36   Phillippe Sands, 2003: Principles of International Environmental Law, New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press, at p. 37. 
37   Id. at 40. 
38   Ibid. 
39   Ibid. 
40   The UNCLOS established a comprehensive framework for the establishment of global 
rules on the protection of marine environment and marine living resources. It also 




Montevideo Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of the 
Environmental Law. Another milestone was the World Charter for Nature 
1982, which set forth ‘principles of conservation by which all human 
conduct affecting nature is to be guided and judged.’  The most important 
point to be noted is that this document deviated from the anthropocentric 
approach to environmental protection while emphasising the importance of 
protecting environment for the environment itself.  
 Another significant development of this era was the Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development 1983, commonly 
known as the Brundtland Report in honour of its chairman, the then 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The Commission, 
which was established outside the control of governments and the UN 
system had three objectives, viz. (i) to re-examine critical environment and 
development issues and formulate realistic proposals for dealing with them; 
(ii) to propose new forms of international cooperation on these issues that 
would influence policies and events in the direction of needed changes; and 
(iii) to raise levels of understanding and commitment to action of 
individuals, voluntary organisations, businesses, institutions and 
governments.41 This Report also identified six priority areas for 
legal/institutional change and identified the existing legal order as a part of 
the problem.42 They were: 
 
environmental assessment, technology transfer, liability and dispute settlement. The 
others being the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972; International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution From Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78); 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
1973 and the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 1972.  
41  Supra n. 39 at p. 48. 
42  Id. at p. 49. 
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(a) Governments, regional organisations and international organisations 
and agencies were called upon to support development which would 
be economically and ecologically sustainable, to integrate the 
environment fully into their goals and activities and also to improve 
coordination and cooperation. 
(b) It demanded a reinforcement of the roles and capacities of 
environmental protection and resource management agencies to deal 
with effects, including a strengthened UNEP as the principle source 
of data, assessment and reporting and also as the principal advocate 
for change in international cooperation. 
(c) The Report also called for an extension of the capacity of the 
international community to identify, assess and report global risks of 
irreversible environmental damage, including a new international 
programme for cooperation among non-governmental organisation, 
scientific bodies and industry groups. 
(d) It also recognised the need to expand the rights, roles and 
participation in development planning, decision–making and project 
implementation, of the public, non-governmental organisations, the 
scientific community and industry. 
(e) Fifthly and most importantly, in recognising that international law is 
being rapidly out-distanced by the accelerating pace and expanding 
scale of impacts on the ecological basis of the development, the 
Report called for filling gaps in national and international law related 




rights of present and future generations43 to an environment adequate 
for their health and well-being; to prepare a universal declaration on 
environmental protection and sustainable development and also to 
strengthen procedures for avoiding or resolving disputes on 
environment and resource management issues. 
(f) The Report also emphasised the need for investing in pollution 
control with the financial assistance from the World Bank, IMF and 
other regional development banks. It also called for the UN 
Programme for Sustainable Development and follow-up 
arrangements.  
 This period also witnessed other developments such as adoption of 
the Framework Guidelines titled as “Environmental Perspectives to the Year 
2000 and Beyond” by the UN General Assembly, which apart from the 
above six key areas, identified four more areas that require attention, viz. (i) 
Oceans and Seas; (ii) Outer Space (iii) Biological Diversity, and (iv) Security 
of the Environment. 
1.1.2  The UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De 
Janeiro (UNCED), 1992  
 The UNCED was organised by the United Nations as a follow-up 
action to the previous developments regarding environmental protection and 
with a purpose to ‘elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the 
effects of environmental degradation in the context of strengthened national 
and international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound 
 
43  In this context it defines sustainable development as “…development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”. For details see the Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, (1983): “Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable 
Development” World Commission on Sustainable Development. 
13 
developments in all countries.’44 The UNCED adopted another set of three 
non-legally binding instruments. They are (i) the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (The Rio Declaration); (ii) Statement of 
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forest (The UNCED Forest 
Principles), and (iii) Agenda 21. In addition to this, two more treaties were 
also adopted and opened for signature namely, (i) The Convention on 
Biological Diversity45, and (ii) the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.46 
The UNCED was concerned with striking a balance between 
environmental protection and economic development. The main idea was to 
integrate environmental protection into economic and development 
activities.47 The Conference of 1992 also accepted that environmental issues 
could not be effectively understood and solved in isolation without analysing 
the connected economic and political issues.48 The main focus was on taking 
stringent measures in combating environmental pollution and associated 
matters rather than merely laying down standards and prescribing 
mechanisms for monitoring and researching about the environmental risks.49 
 
44  UNGA Res. 44/228, para 3. 
45  The Convention on Biological Diversity has three main aims viz. (a) conservation of 
biological diversity (b) sustainable use of its components; and (c) fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. It aims to develop national strategies 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
46  See for detailed analysis Chapter 3. 
47  Supra n. 39 at p. 53. 
48 Ibid. 
49  For example the Protocol on Sulphur Dioxide to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (U.N.-ECE) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution aims at a 30% reduction in national annual sulphur emissions on their 
transboundary fluxes by 1993. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer requires that chlorofluorocarbons and halons, except for 




Though this Conference did not result in any binding legal instruments, it is 
generally held to be a success.50 
1.1.3 Modern Era of International Environmental Law and the 
emergence of Global Environment Regulatory Regime 
 The era after the United Nations Stockholm Conference on Human 
Environment 1972 and United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 1992, can be called the modern era of International 
Environmental Law. During this period, the focus of the international 
instruments on environmental law was totally different. There was little 
resemblance with regard to their focus between the agreements concluded 
after 1972. The earlier ones focused on subject matters that were mostly 
specific to the particular region in which it was made (like boundary rivers, 
fishing rights) or a particular subject matter (For example, as an endeavour to 
protect the endangered plants and animals from the poachers). The legal 
instruments that were negotiated and concluded after 1972 and 1992 focused 
on issues of greater importance like pollution control, deforestation, ozone 
depletion, etc. and were concluded with provisions for enforcing them.  
As the international community grew sensitive towards the fact that 
the capacity of the environment to absorb the harmful by-products of 
industrialisation and other activities is reducing day by day, the awareness 
and attempts to standardise principles of international environmental law 
were strengthened.51 The same trend was visible at regional levels too.52 For 
 
50  Supra n. 47 at p. 53. 
51  It is evident from the fact that after 1972, the international community have negotiated 
large number of agreements. Examples are the Vienna Convention on the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer, 1985; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, 1987, with the London Adjustments, 199, and other amendments; the Protocols 
on Environmental Protection (1991 and 1998, with annexes) to the Antarctic 
Treaty,1959;  the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
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example, in Europe, the European Communities Act 1972 provides clear 
authority for the European Community to act on environmental and natural 
resource related issues.  
Other notable developments during this period are the UN 
Convention on Drought and Desertification 1992; the UN Conference on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1992; Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1992; the 
2000 Bio-safety Protocol to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention 1997; Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC, etc. It may be noted that these instruments “reflect 
new thinking in the approach to international regulations and the role of new 
actors including that of private actors.”53  The key development of this 
period was the World Summit on Sustainable Development held at 
Johannesburg to mark the tenth anniversary of the UNCED. Though adopted 
the Declaration on Sustainable Development, the Summit did not adopt any 
convention or statement of principles. Though the Johannesburg Declaration 
noted that global environment continues to suffer, it proposed no specific 
actions beyond the general commitment to sustainable development.  
 
Wastes and Their Disposal, 1989; the two International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986 and on Assistance in the 
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 1986; the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,1990; the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992; the Convention on Biological 
Diversity,1992; the Principles on Forests; the Non-binding Legal Instrument of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1993; and the London Guidelines for the 
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade,1989. 
52  For example, the members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
concluded three protocols to the UN-ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution aiming at reducing trans-border fluxes of sulphur dioxides at less than 
30%. Similar examples can be seen in other continents too. 
53  Supra n. 50 at 64. For a detailed analysis of the developments during this period refer 




It is apparent that during this period the rules of international 
environmental law have become increasingly complex and technical as 
environmental considerations are being linked with economic and social 
considerations. Environmental issues are increasingly integrated into various 
aspects of economic and development and law, in particular trade, 
development lending and intellectual property. The result is that international 
environmental law is no more exclusively concerned with adoption of 
normative standards to guide the behaviour of various stakeholders. This has 
resulted in adoption of new techniques of regulation and new compliance 
mechanisms including the compliance through economic instruments.54   
1.1.4   Emergence of Global Climate Change Regulatory Regime 
 Parallelly, the Global Climate Change Regulatory Regime (hereinafter 
referred to as GCCRR) emerged in the battle against climate change. A 
consensus emerged among various stakeholders with conflicting interest that 
threats posed by the greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting climate 
change are imminent, a mention of which appeared first at the international 
policy-making level in the First Assessment Report (FAR)55 of the 
 
54 Id. at p.69. 
55  The FAR was the basis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The FAR came out in three main sections viz. (a) Scientific 
Assessment of Climate Change (b) Impacts Assessment of Climate Change, and (c) The 
IPCC Response Strategies. The FAR admits that there exists a phenomenon, which can 
be called as ‘natural greenhouse effect’, which is caused by the emissions resulting from 
human activities, which substantially increase the atmospheric concentrations of the 
greenhouse gases like CO2, methane, CFCs and nitrous oxide. The FAR says that this 
increase will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting in an additional warming of the 
earth’s surface. It further says that “…based on current models, we predict…increase of 
global mean temperature during the 21st century of about 0.3 oC per decade (with an 
uncertainty range of 0.2 to 0.5 oC per decade). This is greater than that seen over the 
past 10,000 years.” It also says that  “…there are many uncertainties in our predictions 
particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate 
change, due to our incomplete understanding of sources and sinks of GHGs; clouds; 
oceans and polar ice sheets. Our judgement is that: global mean surface air temperature 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)56 in the year 1990. The 
FAR approached the issue as a subject “in need of a political platform”.57  
These observations of the IPCC in FAR ‘spurred the beginning of the climate 
change negotiations’58 from the year 1991 onwards.59  
1.2  Regimes in International Law Making Process and Question of 
fairness in the GERR and GCCRR 
 As a consequence of the GERR and GCCRR, the question of fairness 
is of paramount importance. Consideration arises regarding the extent of 
interests of all the stakeholders including the developed, developing and 
underdeveloped nations while negotiating these instruments. Traditionally, 
scholars analysed only the sovereign right of the nation-state to exploit 
resources within its jurisdiction and their rights to shared resources.60 
 
has increased by 0.3 to 0.6 oC over the last 100 years.” For details, see the FAR 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports. 
shtml#1 (accessed on 12/03/2010). 
56   The IPCC was formed in the year 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation and 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) for providing comprehensive 
assessments of scientific, technical and socio-economic information globally with an 
intention to study about the risk of climate change caused by human activity, its 
potential environmental and socio-economic consequences, and possible options for 
adapting to these consequences or mitigating the effects. See Principles Governing 
IPCC Work (Approved at the Fourteenth Session (Vienna, 1-3 October 1998) on 1 
October 1998, amended at the Twenty-First Session (Vienna, 3 and 6-7 November 
2003), the Twenty-Fifth Session (Mauritius, 26-28 April 2006) and the Thirty-Fifth 
Session (Geneva, 6-9 June 2012). For details, see the Principles Governing IPCC Work 
as amended in June, 2012, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-
principles.pdf (accessed on 13/03/2010). 
57   King, David and Richards, Kenneth et al.(2011): International Climate Change 
Negotiations: Key Lessons and Next Steps, University of Oxford: Smith School of 
Enterprise and the Environment, at p. 7. 
58   Ibid. 
59   A detailed analysis of GCCRR has been made in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
60   Known as the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. For the 
definition of this Principle see for example Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
1972 which says that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Principles of International Law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their environmental policies…”. It further links this principle with 




However, the question of fairness has now crept in the usage of natural 
resources as well as regarding the question of sharing of burden in mitigating 
environmental pollution. Though the definition of fairness might require a 
fresh approach and perspective, it essentially involves the burden of 
equitable sharing of the resources and pollution control. The following 
aspects may be considered while analysing the concept of fairness. 
1.2.1  Sovereign Equality of the State 
 The United Nations Charter stipulates that each state should be 
sovereign and no state should violate the sovereignty of another state.61 
Though this principle assumes legal equality within its ambit, practically it 
cannot even be assumed that the states are equal in every sense. They are 
different in terms of their political and economic power. Hence, to put it 
simply, sovereignty means that a state has the capacity to govern itself. 
However, it is another disturbing fact that many states do not actually possess 
this ability. It is also true that some of the states are even weaker than a few 
corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in terms of 
wealth, while other states have more bargaining power and thus can influence 
the negotiation of international treaty making processes in particular and all 
other sectors of international relations in general. Such a disparity is evident in 
the UN Charter itself. For example, the UN Security Council comprises major 
powers that won the Second World War.62 This proves that even the UN is not 
an exception to the importance of power in the making of strategic decisions 
relating to international relations. Sometimes this power turns authoritative 
 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other states or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 
61   The United Nations Charter, 1945, Art. 2(1) & (4), available at 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter (accessed on 24/04/2010). 
62   Id. at Art. 23, Permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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and in many other cases, it lacks legitimacy but could still be effective in 
shaping the future of international order.63 
Additionally, the principle of sovereignty requires the states to 
“…refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”64 
However, exceptions are present; for example, the use of force, self 
defence65 or anticipatory defence66 have been carved out in the UN Charter 
itself. The UN Charter also prescribes that the United Nations shall not 
intervene “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state. . . . ”67 Furthermore, the International Court of Justice in the 
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees case,68 ruled that the “scope of a state’s 
domestic jurisdiction is relative and depends on the development of 
international law”.69 It may also be noted that the United Nations has 
intervened in many activities, which traditionally fell within the jurisdiction 
of a sovereign state. For instance, these include issues relating to self-
determination, racial discrimination, mass starvation, environmental 
regulation etc. 
 
63   Reisman, W. Michael (1982): “Law from the Policy Perspective,” in Myres S. 
McDougal and W. Michael Reisman (eds.) International Law Essays: A Supplement to 
International Law: Contemporary Perspectives, New York: Yale University Press. 
64   Supra n. 62 at Art. 2(4). 
65   Id. at Art. 51. 
66   McDougal, Myres S. and Feliciano, Florentino P. (1961): Law and the Minimum World 
Public Order: The Legal Regulation of Coercion, New York: Yale University Press. 
See also Jessup, Philip C. (1948): A Modern Law of Nations, New York: Orth Press; 
Schachter, Oscar (1984): “The Rights of States to Use Armed Force,” Michigan Law 
Review, 82, 1620 at p. 1633. 
67   Supra n. 65 at Art. 2(7).  
68  Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and 
Morocco, 4, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 7 February 1923, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44e5c9fc4.html (accessed on 21/04/2010). 




This shows that the international system at least informally has 
already recognised that there exists an unequal distribution of power. This 
disparity has been formalised to a great extent with the division of the globe 
into haves and have-nots and its relationship in the development of 
customary international law. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty70 recognises the customary international law, giving the powerful 
countries the right to possess nuclear weapons but at the same time prohibits 
and restricts the less powerful countries in doing so.71 
1.2.2  Club Model of International Cooperation and Resulting 
Intricacies of International Relations 
 The end of colonisation resulted in the emergence and formation of 
new states, which led to new demands and claims. An example is the claim 
of the new state’s to make the rules of environmental protection to be in sync 
with their legitimate right to development. This is more important since the 
divide amongst developed and developing states has become an established 
feature of international relations. This has intensified the demands of the 
developing nations for sharing the opportunity of wealth creation. 
Undoubtedly, the club model of international cooperation and the resulting 
intricacies of international relations have made the scenario more complex 
and complicated.   
It is an accepted fact that states do not possess equal power in 
international relations. Cooperation among states is advocated and 
encouraged, as war is not an option to resolve the differences of opinion. The 
 
70  Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, 1970, Available at 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (accessed on 12/04/2010). 
71   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, reprinted in 729 
UNTS 161. See also Miles, Edward L. (2002): “Nuclear Non-proliferation, 1945 to 
1995,” in Edward L. Miles et al., (eds), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: 
Confronting Theory with Evidence, New York: MIT Press,  p. 273. 
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result of cooperation is the establishment of groups or clubs among the 
states; for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or 
BRICS72. This club model of international cooperation, though criticised by 
many, gives an extra footage to the claims made by them.73 Some scholars 
have commented, “In the club-like institutions that emerged, cabinet 
ministers or the equivalent…from a relatively small number of rich 
countries, got together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated GATT; 
finance ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign ministers met at NATO; 
central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). They 
negotiated in secret, then reported their agreements to national legislatures 
and public.”74 Further, it is said that under this model “…lack of 
transparency to functional outsiders was a key to political efficacy. 
Protected by lack of transparency, ministers could make package deals that 
were difficult to disaggregate or even sometimes to understand.”75 Such 
cooperation is more critical in cases of environmental problems, which are 
trans-border in nature. This has strengthened the efforts of cooperation since 
the states have understood that common rules and common standards are 
more effective than any unilateral action.  
1.2.3   Participation of Non-State Actors in the Lawmaking Process 
 The question of fairness in the international law-making process is 
also important in the context of recognition of the role of non-state actors 
 
72   BRICS is a club of emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa.  
73   For a detailed analysis on Club model of multilateral cooperation and the resulting 
intricacies see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., (2001): “Between 
Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and 
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of 
Government Faculty Research Working Papers Series. 
74   Id at p. 4. 




such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and For-Profit 
Organisations in such a process. The role of NGOs in the law making 
process was recognised particularly during the UNCED and thereafter.76 A 
particular case is that of the UNFCCC which recognised the role of NGOs in 
the adoption and implementation of laws.77  For example, NGOs were 
actively involved in the preparatory processes in the capacity of experts in 
working groups and thereby contributed to the drafting of texts of the legal 
instruments that were adopted at the UNCED.   
 Similarly, the For-Profit organisations also have their stake in the 
law-making process. The business organisations had an important role in the 
negotiation processes at par with NGOs, the Kyoto Protocol is a very good 
example.78 It is said: “…many of them used the same methods of action in 
their attempts first to thwart the chances of reaching an agreement and then 
to influence the form and contents of the commitments.”79 
 However, such involvements are criticised by many for multiple 
reasons. The main criticism is that the legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency of such non-state actors are complex and open to questioning.80 
The legitimacy of these actors are questionable particularly because they are 
‘unelected elite organisations’ which are many a times without any 
 
76   H. French, (1996): “The Role of Non-State Actors” in J Werksman (ed.), Greening 
International Institutions, London; Erathscan, at p. 254. 
77   See UNFCCC Articles 4(1); 7.2 (1) and 7.6. 
78   C. Giorgetti, (1997): “From Rio to Kyoto: A study of the Involvement of Non-
Governmental Organisations in the Negotiations of Climate Change” NYU 
Environmental law Journal 7: 201 at p.220. 
79   Grubb et al, (1999): The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment, United Kingdom, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, at p. 261. 
80   P.J. Spiro, (1997): “New Players in the International Stage,” Hofstra law and Policy 
Symposium 2: 19 at p. 53. 
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legitimacy from the civil society whom they claim to represent.81  In the 
opinion of a writer, the following are the problems in integrating Non-State 
Actors in the international law-making processes:82  
First, the vast number of NGOs makes deeper participation 
impractical. Second, because many NGOs are from 
industrial countries, they amplify certain views -- for 
example, on human rights or the environment -- that may 
not be reflective of the views of developing countries. 
NGOs from developing countries may also be less financed 
than their industrial country counterparts and therefore may 
not be able to participate effectively. Third, and more 
fundamentally, some government officials argue that NGO 
involvement in International organisations is unnecessary 
because NGOs can seek influence through their own 
governments. 
The case being so, it is also important to analyse the question of fairness in 
the international environmental governance.  
 1.3  Conceptual Analysis of Fairness 
 Various philosophers from the distant past have attempted to define 
the concept of fairness. Those philosophers have used terms like justice, 
equity or fairness interchangeably83 to mean ‘the quality of being fair or 
 
81   K. Anderson, (2000): “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of 
International Non-Governmental Organisations and the Idea of International Civil 
Society”, European Journal of International Law 11: 91 at pp. 117-118. 
82  S. Charnovitz, (1997): “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance”, Michigan Journal of International Law 18:183, at  pp. 275-276. 
83   Shue, Henry (1999): “Global Environment and International Inequality,” International 
Affairs, 75(3): 531. Here the author says that what diplomats and lawyers call equity is 




impartial,’ or ‘something that is fair and just.’84 For some of them, justness 
relates to the lawfulness and fairness, while unjustness is unfairness.85 
For Aristotle, fairness could be equated with equity and higher 
justice, and also as an essential element of law.86 In Chapter V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, he defines justice as a state of character, which makes 
people to act justly.87  Similarly, the concept of equity by H. L. A. Hart 
assumes that equity is subjective and arbitrary unlike legal justice, which is 
objective and reasonable.88 He asserts that fairness is basically important in 
two circumstances; firstly when distributing the burden or benefit amongst a 
class of persons and secondly where compensation or redress is claimed for 
an injury or wrong.89 The first circumstance is normally referred to as 
‘distributive justice’ or ‘distributive fairness’ and the second instance is 
known as ‘corrective fairness’ or ‘corrective justice’. According to him, it is 
also important to treat like cases alike, an aspect Aristotle also emphasied.90 
The crux of this principle is that fundamentally, impartiality and consistency 
are the underlying philosophy of fairness and justice. However, it does not 
give any coherent advice as to when cases are to be treated as like or alike.  
 
84   Banuri, Tariq, (1996): “Equity and Social Considerations in Climate Change”, in James 
P.Bruce et al. (eds.), Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at p. 85.  
85   Padjen, I.L. (1996), “Fairness as an Essential Element of Law,” Politika misao , 33: 
108.   
86   Jaswal, Paramjit S. and Jolly, Stellina (2010): “Fairness and Rule of Law in Climate 
Discourse: A Critical Analysis,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 52, 366 at p. 368. 
87   Id. at p. 369. 
88   Ibid. 
89   Hart, HLA (2012): The Concept of Law, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, at p. 154. 
90   Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, W. D. Ross Trans, at. Book 5, Chap. 9, available at 
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/artistotle.html (accessed on 23/05/2010).    
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Like distributive justice, equity also includes the idea of providing 
individualized justice.91 Aristotle considers equity as a factor that mitigates 
the excesses implied by law’s absoluteness to facilitate the application of the 
law to an actual case.92 In this regard equity serves as a corrective measure to 
the harshness or injustice that may result from the rigid application of a law. 
Hence, the basic purpose of equity is to prevent injustice and promote 
fairness.  
Similarly Ronald Dworkin attributes fairness as an essential element 
of law. He points out: “Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist 
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.”93 Needless to 
add, fairness, unlike discretion is not comparable to a hole!94 Dworkin 
distinguishes to account for the fact that discretion is also guided by the 
expediency between the two standards that guides the exercise of discretion, 
viz., principles, which are the requirements of justice or fairness and morality 
or policies in setting out economic or similar goals to be attained.95 These 
approaches are criticized as they fail to bring out the contents of fairness.96 
For Lon L. Fuller, to a great extent, law is built in on the contents of 
fairness through his requirement of Inner morality of law.97 He wrote about 
 
91   Shelton, Dinah  (2007): “Equity,” in Daniel Badonsky, Jutta Brunnee et al. (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press at 639, 640.  
92   Supra note 90 at Book 5, Chap. 10. 
93   Dworkin, Ronald (1998): Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press at p. 369-71. 
94   Supra n. 86. 
95   Ibid. 
96   Ibid. 




Eight Routes for Failure of any Legal system, which included the 
following:98 
(a) The lack of rules or law, which leads to ad-hoc and inconsistent 
adjudication; 
(b) Failure to publicize or make known the rules of law;  
(c) Unclear or obscure legislation that is impossible to understand; 
(d) Retroactive legislation; 
(e) Contradictions in the law; 
(f) Demands that are beyond the power of the subjects and the ruled; 
(g) Unstable legislation or frequent revision of laws; 
(h) Divergence between adjudication/administration and legislation. 
According to Fuller, any legal system to be called fair, needs to satisfy these 
eight conditions of inner morality.  
Similarly, Utilitarianism, whose chief proponent is Jeremy Bentham, 
places morally right act or policy as the one that leads to the greatest 
happiness or utility for the members of the society99 and further maximum 
happiness to maximum number of people.100 The advantage of utilitarianism 
is that it measures the merit of an action based on consequences and not on 
abstract moral theories.101 In this way, it contradicts moral theories that 
primarily require compliance with certain abstract standards, giving only 
 
98   Ibid. 
99  Soltau, Friedrich, (2009): Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p.10. 
100   Ibid. 
101   Id. at 11.  
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secondary importance to consequences.102 Because of the ways in which 
utilitarianism estimates utility, it is often criticized for being 
unaccommodative to the notion of justice or fairness.103 Utilitarianism 
justifies the policies that maximize collective good or aggregate utility, but is 
not sensitive to the distribution of burdens and benefits across individuals or 
countries.104 As for example, it engages economic approach to resource 
allocation and thus pulls back debates on the costs and benefits of various 
non-economic proposals made to combat climate change.105 The claims of 
inhabitants of small, low-lying island nations for equal consideration; 
appeals of conservationists for the protection of species and ecosystems free 
from their value on economic terms and right of future generations to enjoy 
the benefits of nature as the present generation etc. are not supported by 
utilitarianism if they are not converted into economic terms.106 
John Rawls and his Difference Principle of Distributive Justice is one 
of the most influential theories of justice or fairness. According to him, there 
are two fundamental principles of justice:  
 
 
102   Moral theories based on rules are generally known as deontological theories.  
103   Soltau, Friedrich, (2009): Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at pp. 41–45. For defences of Utilitarianism, 
See Lyons, David, (1965): Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; and Hare, R. M. (1981): Moral Thinking. For an Attempt to Apply Utilitarianism 
to a Range of Global Problems Including Climate Change, United States of America: 
Harvard University Press; Singer, Peter (2002): One World: The Ethics of 
Globalization, United States of America: Yale University Press. 
104   Supra note 103 at 138. 
105   Bert Metz et al. (eds.) (2007): Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate 
Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at p.144.  
106   Weiss, Edith Brown (1992): “In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable 




(i)   Every individual in a just society has an equal right to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties consistent with a similar 
scheme for everyone; 
(ii)   Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions; firstly 
that such inequalities must be attached to offices and positions open 
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and secondly, 
that they must be to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged 
members of society.107  
 Amongst these, the latter is known as Difference Principle, according 
to which the primary objective is “…not to eradicate all inequality, but 
instead to permit only those inequalities that benefit everyone in society by 
promoting socially useful talent and initiatives.”108This principle does not 
allow unequal distributive outcomes not compatible with the principles of 
equality of opportunity, that in itself, a foundational belief concerning 
justice.109 
Further Robert Nozick in his Entitlement Theory holds that a 
distribution is just and fair if everyone is entitled to the goods that they 
currently possess.110 According to him, just distribution flows from the free 
exchange of goods originally acquired and then successively transferred by 
legitimate means.111 If the goods are unjustly acquired or transferred, a 
Principle of Rectification of these violations operates. Broadly, his theory 
stipulates that countries have legitimately acquired a share of the 
atmosphere’s capacity to serve as a sink for pollution. There are two 
 
107   Schwarzschild, Maimon (1999): “Constitutional Law and Equality,” in Dennis 
Patterson (ed.) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Australia: 
Blackwell Publishing, at pp 156- 165. 
108   Supra n. 104. 
109   Ibid.  
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observations made by him viz. (a) the world is initially not owned by anyone 
and the atmospheric sink is a terra nullius; (b) an unjust acquisition, for 
example by force taints the title and is subject to rectification.112   
However, most of these analyses were concerned only about fairness 
in the domestic laws and not in international law, the reason being that those 
scholars lived in an era during which the law meant just municipal or 
domestic law and definitely not the international law. For some of them, 
international law was nothing more than a ‘positive morality.’113 
1.4   Conceptual Analysis of Fairness in International Law 
 Subsequently, it was Thomas M. Franck who initiated the concept of 
fairness in international law. For him, international law has entered a ‘post-
ontological’ age, an era in which it is no longer necessary to defend the 
status of international law as a law, but where the vital task is to analyze its 
fairness.114 In attempting an answer to the question ‘Is international law 
fair?’, Franck invoked a broad notion of fairness that encompasses two 
distinct and sometimes competing values; legitimacy (procedural fairness) 
and distributive justice (substantive fairness).115  The former expresses the 
idea that ‘for a system of rules to be fair, it must be firmly rooted in a 
framework of formal requirements about how those rules are made, 
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interpreted and applied’116 The latter is defined, initially, as amounting to 
‘moral rightness’ in general. When he said that fairness is ‘not out there’ 
waiting to be discovered, he brings in the sociological aspect of fairness.117 
In this context an Indian author states that “what the deep contextuality of all 
notions of fairness does tell us is that fairness is relative and subjective118; 
not as St. Thomas Aquinas hoped, a divine given inculcated into the nature 
of things to be discovered or intuited by right thinking humans.”119 He 
further adds that “If fairness is not a rationally detectable dictum woven into 
the fabric of the universe, it does not follow that all judgements about it are 
simply arbitrary expressions of individual or collective preferences and 
prejudices.”120 In this context, Franck says that ‘fairness is a human, 
subjective, contingent quality which merely captures in one word, a process 
of discourse, reasoning and negotiation leading, if successful to an agreed 
formula located at a conceptual intersection between various plausible 
formulas for allocation.”121 
Franck attaches the Right Process to legitimacy i.e. the outcome of a 
fair process to decisions or allocations that are legitimate.122 Applying the 
same logic, if a rule is legitimate, it necessarily implies that the rule was 
made in accordance with the right process and because it is legitimate, it 
requires voluntary compliance.123 Franck further states that “any analysis of 
fairness must include consideration of the consequential effects of a law: its 
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distributive justice.”124 Franck considers the “growing awareness of 
irrefutable interdependence” as a proof of the emergence of global 
community.125 As various rules apply in a global community for allocation of 
resources, arriving at a common consensus for rule of fairness is a tedious 
task. He concludes by saying that there is no single conception of fairness, 
but rather that fairness “is a product of social context and history” that 
“captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning and negotiation.”126 
For deciding what is fair, Franck postulates two assumptions. The first 
stipulates that there is no trumping rule, which says that no participant may 
raise a principle (whether religious, philosophical, or ideological) that is non-
negotiable and the second rule postulates about the maximin principle, which 
holds that “unequal distribution is justifiable only if it narrows, or does not 
widen, the existing inequality of persons’ and/or states’ entitlements.”127 
Both the developed and the developing countries criticize Franck and his 
postulates while stating that fairness is too narrow to serve as a standard for 
an ethical evaluation of the international law.128  
1.4.1  Conceptual Analysis of Fairness in International Law and its 
Relevance in GERR and GCCRR129 
 When matters of environmental protection arise at international as 
well as national negotiations, one of the most important questions that arises 
is generally about fairness and justice.  From what we have discussed earlier, 
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it is determinable that there is no single definition for it; rather, it cannot be 
contained and defined in a single definition.  As is rightly said by an author, 
“…it is a deeply contested concept, one that reasonable persons can 
understand it in inconsistent and even incompatible ways.”130 The greatest 
dilemma of scholars and policy makers is that fairness is an abstract concept 
whereas the climate change involves the ‘practical and real world 
questions’.131 It is in this context that a scrutiny of the concept of fairness is 
important for analyzing the international environmental negotiations.  
1.4.2  Fairness for Whom? 
 While making norms in the area of climate change at the international 
level, the question of ‘fairness to whom?’ generally crops up. The answer 
often relates to the ‘fairness between nations’ or the ‘international justice’.132 
However, the ‘international justice’ involves the paradigm of various sub-
national groups and tribes who have different levels of exposure to climate 
change. Another important feature is that relates the question as to how far 
the concept of fairness and justice among the various nations can be 
extended to  the international level where not many institutions can sustain 
the elements of fairness evolved in a sub national set up.133  
The liberal concepts of justice and fairness emphasize that the 
‘naturally arbitrary circumstances of birth like race, sex, class etc’ should not 
decide the fate of any individual. Fairness in such a situation is ensured by 
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the State at the national level by offering a ‘level playing field.’ In India, for 
example, reservation policies under Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution aim 
at offering this level-playing field. There are now many policies 
implemented by the national governments aimed at providing ‘equality of 
opportunity’. The important question as to what extent such 
conceptualization of justice or efforts to achieve justice can be taken to the 
international level. This question is yet more significant in the light of the 
fact that the geographic location of the country such as island or a coastal 
country134 or the economic growth of the country is critically vulnerable to 
the aftermaths of climate change. Thus, a serious effort to conceptualize the 
international justice is imperative to overcome the effects of these naturally 
arbitrary circumstances.   
1.4.3  International Relations and International Law-Making 
 Such an analysis is furthermore important, particularly in the context 
that most of the international agreements are deliberated and concluded at 
the behest of an economically powerful State or group of States or by 
International Organizations led by them. It is not necessary that they look 
into the interest of the developing and underdeveloped countries.  As 
Thomas Franck observed:135 
The questions to which the international lawyer must now be 
prepared to respond are different from traditional inquiry: 
(like) whether international law is law. Instead, we are now 
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asked: Is International law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it 
understood? and, the most important question: Is International 
Law fair? 
Friedrich Soltau adds, “…international climate law may be many things, but 
it arguably does not aspire simply to set the rules of the game, demarcate 
minimum standards, or express the raw reality of power politics.”136   
Also, issues of fairness regarding the GERR and the GCCRR require 
two-dimensional answers. The answers should essentially put fairness in the 
general background of these regimes and look into the challenges that are 
specific to the problem at hand.137 If the parties are in unequal bargaining 
positions, the basic presumption is in favor of unfairness.  As stated by some 
scholars, “…it could be argued that relations between states are not 
structured in a neutral fashion, and there does exist a ‘Global Basic 
Structure’ of economic and political rules and relationships, which has 
distributional effects on states inter se as well as on individuals within 
states”.138 But unfortunately a similar ‘Global Basic Structure’ does not exist 
in the case of fairness and justice.  Scholars in the field also contend that this 
lack of ‘Global Basic Structure’ in fairness and justice is particularly 
revealed in the context of ‘unequal relations between the states, with the key 
aspects of the international system skewed in favor of the affluent and the 
powerful states.’139  
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Any analysis of fairness has to take into account the role being played 
by the vested interests in negotiations and formation of international 
agreements. Parties would accept the terms of the agreement only if it 
satisfies their own national interest whether be it political, economical or 
even religious. This in essence, makes the references to fairness a futile 
exercise.140  So it is not far from the truth when scholars argue that vested 
interest “…holds as a key tenet that the basic laws of the international system 
flows from the relative distribution of capabilities (power) across the 
system.”141 In this context, it is necessary to comprehend how different 
schools of International Relations understand the role of international law 
making processes. 
Amongst the Positivist theories of International Relations, Realism 
holds that States are power oriented. The basic assumption of realism is that 
states are rational actors and they seek to further their interests ultimately 
with little regard for the international law. Realists are skeptical of the idea 
that states can cooperate in international institutions to advance the common 
interests.142 Proponents of this school say that states are self-interested, 
power-seeking rational actors. Classical positivist realists like E.H. Carr 
argue that international relations are struggle amongst the economically 
powerful (have powers) and the economically disadvantaged (have not 
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powers).143 They say that, “the statesman must think in terms of the national 
interest, conceived as power among the other powers.”144  
Similarly, the Liberal Theory of International Relations maintains 
that the states get benefits from cooperation and non-cooperation.145 But the 
liberalism has been criticised by scholars like E.H. Carr who called it as 
idealism. At the same time, another school, the Neo-liberalism proposes that 
states are the key actors in international relations. However, they also 
maintain that the non-state actors such as Non-Governmental Organisations 
and also For-Profit Corporations and Inter-Governmental Organisations are 
also important in the international law-making processes.   
Another approach is the regime theory,146which lays minimum 
emphasis on the power disparity, and instead draws attention to the role of 
international regimes and institutions in assisting the states to realize their 
common interests. The proponents of this theory share the realism’s 
commitment to a theory of rational, self-interested actors, but favor regimes 
and institutions stating that it helps the states in coordinating their behavior 
and achieving the mutually beneficial outcomes.147  
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1.4.4  Adaptation of Fairness Requirements in the various Principles 
Related to GERR and GCCRR 
 Any use of natural resources both for subsistence and for 
industrialization involves the issues of distribution. If the distribution is to be 
fair, it has to take into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders. 
Similarly, allocating costs of mitigation and adaptation measures among the 
countries including developed, underdeveloped and developing is also a 
dilemma in the analysis of fairness, as these measures raise concerns 
regarding both the procedural and the substantive fairness.148 Fairness issues 
are relevant while sharing the burden and benefits among the States and 
while studying the conditions under which distributions or allocation are 
made.  
Similarly, it is under the background of procedural fairness that any 
international law-making processes must take place. Any condition 
restricting participation of all stakeholders, their access to information, 
exclusion of coercive tactics, etc. should be avoided. The general ability of 
all the parties to bargain on roughly equal terms should be encouraged.149 
These rules are recognized by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration150 as 
important procedural rights. They are again recognized by the Aarhus 
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Convention,151which establishes comprehensive and binding standards.152 
Even though Aarhus Convention is criticized for its Euro-centric core, it is 
also true that it provides standards that can be applied at the global level.153  
The elements of procedural fairness are also derived from the 
Doctrine of Sovereign Equality of states, according to which each and every 
member country is equally entitled to participate in the treaty-making 
process at the international level. However, such a substantive equality is 
grossly affected by the inequalities among the states. It is true that developed 
countries have “…superior ability to design and analyze the policy 
proposals, availability of the technical expertise, and negotiating experience. 
The negotiating structure and bargaining process can be structured to 
incorporate the various aspects of procedural justice, for instance, by 
formulating a broad and inclusive agenda, choosing clear and transparent 
rules, and giving all parties a say in selecting procedures.”154 It is not only the 
developed countries that achieve the national interest using their strength but 
the groups of developing countries also. They try to achieve common aims by 
lobbying at international negotiations. They compete with the industrialized 
countries that “…possess advantages in terms of resources – size of 
delegations, experts, and ability to design and evaluate technical proposals – 
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that most developing countries generally cannot match.”155 These factors make 
an international treaty-making process, comprehensive of a number of 
inordinately technical and complex issues that weaken the effective 
participation by all, and the ultimate object of achieving the standards of 
global justice.  Though the importance of information creation and its sharing 
done by various UN agencies, Non Governmental Organizations, Research 
Organizations, etc. cannot be undermined, very often, its impartial analyses are 
missing. “Especially with respect to adaptation, poor and vulnerable countries 
need to have access to reliable data to formulate policies and then seek 
international assistance to support their implementation.”156 These issues 
plaguing fairness in the negotiating processes will ultimately decline trust and 
affect compliance of the agreement. 
It is in this context that the following Principles related to GERR and 
GCCRR are gaining importance. It may be seen that there have been efforts 
to include conceptually the elements of fairness in the various principles at 
the minimum level.  
1.4.5  Egalitarian Principles 
 Egalitarian principles such as the sustainable development157, the 
inter-generational equity and the intra-generational equity158, mandate equal 
entitlement of persons to a good, opportunity to avail the good and to enjoy 
them.  In the context of climate change, the egalitarian principles hold that 
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all humans have an equal right in the good of nature; it prescribes an equal 
share in the total atmospheric capacity to safely absorb Greenhouse Gas 
(hereinafter referred to as GHG) emissions. But “…the formal rule of equal 
treatment or equal shares alone is insufficient because that very much 
depends on the substantive rule by which one is entitled to equal treatment 
and in what circumstances.”159 As discussed in the earlier part of this 
chapter, this is primarily because natural factors relating to weather, location, 
and level of social and economic development differ between nations, 
thereby resulting in varied costs and gains, which in turn make a strict and 
fair allocation very difficult. In such a context, “one possibility is to interpret 
equality as equality of opportunity, thus giving all persons an equal 
possibility of benefiting from the absorptive or sink capacity of the 
biosphere. Such a conception moves away from an insistence on equal shares 
toward a definition of a share in the atmosphere that is commensurate with 
setting a fair starting point.”160 This line of thinking recognizes that the 
unequal access to the atmospheric sink prevents countries from having a fair 
opportunity to develop and prosper.161  
1.4.6  Need-Based Principle 
 The need-based principle argues that distribution of benefits and 
burden shall give priority to countries that are the poorest and/or at most risk. 
According to this principle, a distribution is fair only to the extent that it 
benefits the most disadvantaged. Unlike egalitarianism, this approach is not 
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concerned with the comparative properties of distributive outcomes; but says 
that it is morally relevant that some persons are disadvantaged as such.162 In 
this regard, a few scholars say that such a position is “…insensitive to the 
origin of the unfair distribution, as it is not concerned with making good 
inequality resulting from some wrong.”163 In the case of GCCRR, the 
contention will be that every one has the right to emit GHG to the least level 
to secure their basic human needs. This will result in a larger share of 
resources to the most vulnerable countries and to the poorest populations.164 
Hence, this theory essentially says that a fair GCCRR should, at a minimum, 
help the efforts of the poorest countries in meeting the basic needs of their 
citizens.165  
1.4.7  Responsibility-Based Principles or Polluter Pays Principle 
 According to the IPCC, 20% of the population of the developed 
countries emits 46 percentage of GHG while 80% in the developing 
countries are responsible for only 54 percentage.166 This disparity in GHG 
emissions is frequently raised in global climate change negotiations.167 In 
this context, the proposition can be that those who have caused a problem 
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shall be responsible for it. This is, in effect, reflected in the Polluter Pays 
Principle.168 Nevertheless, there exist criticisms against the responsibility 
principle as well.169  
The first criticism to this line of argument is in relation to the 
‘responsibility across generations’. Fairness with respect to the future 
generations faces many problems. It includes (a) Non-identity Problem, 
which argues that policies that may harm the future generations will infact 
harm only a few of them. It is because the same policies are necessary 
conditions for the future generation to come into existence.170 In the context 
of climate change, it can be said that “the emissions that contributed to the 
emergence of climate change as a global problem originated in the acts and 
policies that have affected the size and composition of the subsequent 
generations, such that a very few members of the present generation can 
plausibly argue that they have been harmed, or made worse off, by the 
historical greenhouse gas emissions associated with industrialization.”171 “In 
short, individuals of a future generation cannot argue that climate change has 
harmed them because without it, they (that particular group of persons) 
would not have been born.”172 Though this argument seems to be just, it 
essentially questions the fundamental Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity.   
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Another criticism raises a question viz.; “Is it fair to assign 
responsibility for consequences of actions that were not considered harmful 
at the time they took place?”173  The main reason for the increased GHG 
emissions is social and economic development. Even if there was ignorance 
or no knowledge of fact that the GHG emissions were harmful, when 
subsequently it is proved harmful can the innocent victims claim remedial 
action including compensation? For example, the pesticide Endosulphan has 
been widely used and aerially sprayed in the cashew farms of the Plantation 
Corporation of Kerala for increasing the productivity. Consequently, it 
resulted in various health hazards for the innocent people inhabiting in that 
area. It is a widely acknowledged fact that Endosulfan is one of the most 
toxic pesticides present in the market today, responsible for many fatal 
pesticide-poisoning incidents around the world.  It is also a xenoestrogen, a 
synthetic substance that imitates or enhances the effect of estrogens and it 
can act as an endocrine disruptor, causing reproductive and developmental 
damage in both animals and humans. Despite constant demands from the 
public and the various social action groups, the Government has not yet 
taken any concrete steps to ensure a total ban of the product even in the 
affected areas. 
Here, the pertinent issue is that, by applying the non-identity rule to 
this problem, can the polluter claim exemption from the liability for the total 
and irreparable loss caused to the environment.  Further, in such a scenario, 
to what extent is it justifiable in saying that the Plantation Corporation of 
Kerala, a public sector undertaking, is not accountable and responsible for 
compensating the consequential loss?    
 




1.4.8  Capability-Based Principles  
 Capability as the basis of distributing the burden of mitigation and 
adaptation in climate change forms the pillar of another set of philosophical 
argument. This is evident in UNFCCC approach, when it says that the 
developed countries should take the lead in adaptation and mitigation 
activities. It says that in securing the global public good, countries that are 
most able in terms of technologically, financially and in terms of human 
resources should contribute more when compared to the less able 
countries.174 The basis of such an approach is an implicit assumption that 
those who have the capability to address the global environmental problems 
are also the ones that caused them.175 
  The Per Capita Income or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are the 
commonly used yardstick of capability. The indices such as the UN 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index may also be used.176 
Scholars also argue for defining the capability in non-economic terms like 
health and education, enjoyment of economic and social security, and the 
freedom to engage in economic interchange and social decision-making.177 
An analysis of capability as fairness might be important when the able and 
the developed countries are given more responsibility in combating climate 
change. 
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1.4.9  Principles of Welfare Economics 
 The aim of welfare economics is to frame policies that would 
maximize the ‘maximum social welfare.’178 As already stated, the 
developing countries will be the hardest hit by climate change as a 
consequence, particularly of their lack of wealth. Climate change will also 
strengthen the existing global inequalities in welfare. In this context, it is the 
purpose of welfare economics to convert the impacts of climate change into 
economic terms and evenly distribute it among all countries according to 
their capabilities. But this approach has its own demerits.179 Firstly, it is not 
clear as to how the impacts on different countries can be compared and 
aggregated and a blanket measure of global welfare can be arrived at. 
Normally, economists calculate the aggregate measure in terms of the real 
income,180 but in climate change, such a process would also involve 
summing the well being of diverse people and valuing the effects of the 
utility of consumption for these individuals. This approach is, however, not 
devoid of any demerit. As put aptly by a scholar: expressing well-being in 
terms of income raises the question of how to value impacts on the 
environment and health, especially human life.181 Such a problem arises 
because in order to make a cost-benefit comparison, a monetary value must 
be assigned to human life, usually arrived at in relation to per capita GDP, 
yielding the result that the life of a person in a developed country is usually 
‘worth’ more than that of a person living in a developing country.182 In 
economic terms, it may not be objectionable since the cost of sustaining life 
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would be practically different in different places, as for example; a poor 
country cannot afford to spend the same amount on medical care as a rich 
country. There is, however, a concern over the fairness in such a calculation. 
Such a problem is more complex if the value of non-market goods is taken 
into account; like, how the value of the lost coral reefs or cultural practices 
associated with a way of life can be calculated? 183  
Intergenerational equity is another concern in relation to economics 
and climate change. Questions as to how much the present generation should 
pay to save the future generations from the impacts of climate change arise 
here.184 Put in other words, climate change is to involve mitigation costs to 
the present generation for preventing disastrous consequences to the future 
generations. However, a method of comparing these distant benefits and 
present costs are not available as of today. According to a few scholars 
“…economics applies a discount rate to determine at what point it is socially 
more beneficial to spend money on, say, education, rather than increasing the 
share of renewable energy to avoid emissions of carbon dioxide, and 
therefore future damages from the climate change. A low discount rate 
results in a higher net present value for future damages, justifying more 
mitigation action; a high discount rate favours allocating the resources to 
other socially useful priorities over climate change mitigation.”185 But such 
an approach has far-reaching implications on the principles of equity and 
fairness.186 An economic analysis of climate change policies is a must for 
estimating its cost-effectiveness and for evaluating the overall economic 
 
183  Weiss, Edith Brown (1993): “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues 
and the Emergence of a New World Order,” Georgetown Law Journal, 81,  at pp. 675-84. 
184  Supra note 182  at 145. 
185  Id. at p 145. 
186  Supra n. 4 at 31. The Human Development Report at Supra 176, provides an excellent 
and accessible overview of the issues.  
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impact. However such an approach may give rise to serious ethical concerns 
as well.187  
  The following table188 serves as an easy reference of these principles 
in its relations to the environmental protection. 
Table 1: Principles of fairness in Relation to Environmental Protection 
Fairness Principle Contents of the Principle 
Egalitarian Principle Every Individual has an equal right to pollute or to be 
protected from pollution. 
Sovereignty based 
Principle 
Current level of emission constitutes a status quo right; every 
country has an equal right to pollute or be protected from 
pollution. 
Capability based Principle The greater the ability to pollute, the greater the economic 
burden to recoup the loss. 
Needs based Principle Prioritize and maximize benefits for the poorest nations. 
Responsibility based 
Principles 
Economic burden is proportional to emissions, thus polluter 
pays. Narrow version of this approach covers current acts of 
emission only. But the broader one covers past acts of 
emission also 
 
1.5  Conclusion  
 Looking at the current international scenario, it can be seen that the 
scholars from the developing and the underdeveloped countries have further 
expanded the scope of objectivity being applied to the subject of climate 
change. This is being done primarily to bring about an order and structure for 
the international law based on fairness and for it to be not influenced by the 
powerful states. Third World Scholars like Prof. B.S. Chimni say that it is 
 
187  Ibid. 
188  Soltau, Friiedrich, (2009): Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 




extremely significant to analyse the role of capitalist economist structure in 
supporting or distorting the operation of the international law.189 According 
to him, an analysis of fairness is a question as to ‘what constitutes a good 
law?’ A special emphasis on allocation of the natural resources and sharing 
the burden of causing the pollution makes this question more relevant. There 
are two important truths that have to be considered by the policy makers at 
this level: (a) there is not enough resources on this planet to satisfy every 
one’s desire to the fullest extent; (b) the very existence of greed amongst 
human beings threats the earth’s environment.190 
It is widely accepted that environmental issues are of global nature 
and they cannot be resolved by a single State or a small group of States. In 
this context, Edith Brown Weiss says that there should be “an incentive for 
all the countries to reach to a consensus on an equitable and effective basis 
for allocating responsibility for maintaining the planet”191. This is indeed a 
fact that has now been universally accepted. It is imperative that 
International Environmental Law should lay down standards to effectively 
allocate natural resources not only within the boundaries of specific countries 
but also globally. Hence, the need of the hour is to evolve an International 
Regulatory Regime that can act as a social tool for regulating 
 
189   Chimni, B.S. (1993): International Law and World Order, A Critique of Contemporary 
Approaches, New Delhi: Sage Publications, at pp. 11-12. 
190  Bishop, Kirsten (1998): “Liberalised Trade and International Environmental Law and 
Policy: Australia’s Negotiations under Kyoto Protocol,” Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law, 16: 181,  185. Also see the unpublished paper by the same author 
“Fairness in International Environmental Law: Accommodation of the concerns of the 
Developing Countries in Climate Change Regime,” Institute of Comparative Law, 
McGill University, Montrael, available at http://www.mcgill.ca/icl/kirsten/fairness 
(accessed 12/08/2011). 
191  Weiss, Edith Brown (1993): “International Environmental Law, Contemporary Issues 
and the Emergence of a New World Order,” Geo. L.J., 18: 675 at 706. 
49 
environmentally harmful behaviours in a fair manner. As Thomas Franck 
says: 192   
Between the polarities of plenitude and deprivation is a vast 
spectrum of conditions in which everyone cannot have 
everything they want, but where there is enough to meet 
‘reasonable’ expectations, if the goods are allocated by an 
agreed rule which is perceived to be fair.  
It is a fact that any mode of allocation of resources without a mutual 
agreement among all the stakeholders viz., developed, developing and 
underdeveloped countries cannot be fair. The question hence arises as to why 
the developing and underdeveloped countries need to be given such a special 
consideration. The reasons could be many. It includes that (a) these countries 
are already highly populated and are at a rapid pace of increase in its 
population. An increase in population will naturally increase the scale of 
human suffering, thereby resulting in unrest in the society, therein laying its 
stress on the environment;193 (b) There are also arguments that the present 
‘Global Regulatory Regime’ are not as flat as it is claimed to be.194 The 
developing countries may have to bear the impact of climate change 
particularly due to their dependence on agriculture and limited capacity in 
terms of various other factors including the technology and the finance. 
Infact this has been acknowledged by the Executive Secretary of the 
UNFCCC Fourth Assessment Report in the year 2007.195 Another UN 
 
192  Supra note 54 at 11. 
193  Supra note 150 at 185.  
194  Friedman, Thomas (2007): The World Is Flat: A Brief History of Twenty First 
Centuary, New Delhi: Penguin. 
195  Yvo de Boer (2007): “Briefing on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” 




Document196 in this connection says “…the global nature of the problem of 
climate change…requires the equitable participation of all countries in a 
global strategy to deal with it.”  It is also important to note that majority of 
the nations located below the sea level and island nations fall under the 
category of developing nations. Climate Change and Global Warming is 
again crucial because it is linked to the most other environmental 
concerns.197 This is also recognised by the UNFCCC when it acknowledged 
“… that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all the countries and their participation in an effective and 
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and 
economic conditions.”198 
 The practical considerations are based on two factors as already 
stated in this chapter. Firstly, there are simply not enough resources on earth 
to satisfy everyone’s desire to satisfy his full greed and secondly, the threat 
due to climate change is global.199 No single country or even small groups of 
countries can handle the situation alone and infact this should encourage 
what has already been stated viz., that all the countries should reach a 
 
Bonn, available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/pdf/ 
070512_ipcc_statement_ydb.pdf. (accessed on 08/06/2012). 
196  Report Of The Conference Of The Parties On Its Fourth Session, Held At Buenos Aires 
from 2 to 14 November 1998 FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1. 
197  For a detailed analysis of the negative effects of climate change see, generally Stone, 
Christopher D. (1992): “Beyond Rio: ‘Insuring’ Against Global Warming,” AJIL, 86: 
445 at 448-449 and also Panjabi, Ranee Khooshie Lal (1993): “Can International Law 
Improve the Climate? An analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Signed at Rio Summit in 1992,” N.C.J. In’t Law & Com. Reg., 18: 491 
at 497-500. 
198  See the preamble of the UNFCCC. 
199  See Supra note 192 at 9 where he also refers to the condition of ‘moderate scarcity’ as 
described by Rawls in John Rawls, (1971): A Theory of Justice, New York: Harvard 
University Press at 127. As Franck notes, ‘we may by now have progressed beyond 
moderate scarcity into a situation of more urgency’. 
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consensus on an equitable and effective basis for allocating the responsibility 
for maintaining the planet”.200 To achieve this goal, the international legal 
system should contain effective regulatory mechanism to control the 
behaviour of the users in a ‘morally acceptable and fair way.’201However, 
even while measuring this morally acceptable or fair step, the system needs 
to take into consideration the concerns of developing and underdeveloped 
countries and their specific needs among the other issues.202 This is because 




200  Supra note 151 at 706. 
201  Supra note 193. 
202  See Brunnée, Jutta (1995): “Environmental Security in the Twenty-First Century: New 
Momentum for the Development of International Environmental Law?,” Fordham 




Global Environment Regulatory Regime: An Analysis 
 
The question of legitimacy would emerge from the shadows and 
become a central issue in international environmental law.1   
 
International Law was all about war and peace before the two World Wars, 
and before the World War I, hence the States had the liberty to choose 
between war and peace.2 After World War I, the League of Nations was 
established but was unsuccessful in preventing war and it eventually failed. 
However, it may be noted that the League of Nations condemned any form of 
external aggression against the territorial integrity of its members.3 After the  
(hereinafter referred to as UN) World War II, the United Nations Organisation 
was established to restore peace and harmony among nations. When it was 
established, its primary objective was to sustain peace and outlaw war.4 
 
1  Bodansky, Daniel (1999):  “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International 
Law, 93: 596, at p.596. 
2  Louka, Elli (2006): International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness and 
World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p. 5. 
3   Another contribution of this system was the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Labour Organisation. 
4   United Nations Charter, Article 1 reads thus: “(1) To maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (2) To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace; (3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion; and (4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations in the attainment of these common ends.” Though this Article of the UN Charter 
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Today, after 67 years of its establishment, it can be seen that maintenance of 
peace and prevention of war is just one of the many objectives of the UN. The 
other objectives are to “...achieve international co-operation in solving 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.5 
Later on, with the passage of time, these objectives of the UN were further 
extended to other areas. Now it is the UN and its associate bodies that are 
taking special interest in international standard setting process in areas, which 
are not expressly stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter. Examples include the 
efforts to strengthen international trade law or intellectual property rights law 
through various legal instruments. To administer and supervise these 
standards, many specialized organizations and agencies were established. In 
the area of environmental protection also similar international standards and 
organizations were established.6 In the course of time, substantial changes 
were brought into the general characteristics of International law. For instance, 
the question of ‘Subjects of International Law’ previously covered only 
sovereign States, whereas now ‘persons7 including individuals and 
corporations’ are also the subjects of international law. The following part of 
this thesis attempts a brief analysis of some of these subjects of International 
Law, whose involvement and participation is relevant for environmental 
protection. 
 
speaks about objectives such as ‘encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms’, the general language is intended at resolving problems without 
resorting to war.  
5   UN Charter, Article 1(3). 
6  Starke, J.G (1999): An Introduction to International Law, New Delhi: Butterworths, at 
pp.78–81. 
7   Includes all types of legal persons covering individuals, corporations and others. 
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2.1 Actors/Stakeholders in International Environmental Law 
Any analysis of the involvement of various stakeholders in 
international environmental law would include three broad categories, viz. (i) 
the international organisatio8 including the intergovernmental organisations9 
and regional organisations;10 (ii) the state actors, and; (iii) the non-state 
actors.11 Selected on the basis of importance, the following part of the 
chapter examines their role and describes their practical potentials. 
 The Security Council of the United Nations, which comprises the 
victor states of World War II and China as permanent members having veto 
power, is one of the primary organs of the UN, whose main task is to deal 
with matters of war and peace.12 It may also be noted that the Security 
Council is conferred with extensive powers and its decisions are binding on 
the States.13 Though the Security Council is not normally involved in 
environmental matters, there were exceptions too. For example, when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, the Security Council held the former liable on various 
grounds including damage to the environment.14 Now, considering the 
following facts, any concern pertaining to fairness is justified when looked 
from the perspective of a less-industrialised State.  
 
8   For example the various organs and agencies under the United Nations System. 
9  Such as Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee (AALCO).  
10  Such as European Union (EU) or African Union (AU). 
11  Which includes various legal persons such as Individuals, Non Governmental 
Organisations, For Profit Organisations etc. 
12   UN Charter, Article 24 (1). It reads thus: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action 
by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security…”. 
13   Id. at article 25 which reads thus: “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.” Similarly article 103 says that “In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail. 
14   UN (1991): UN Security Council Resolution, 687, S/RES/687, April 3, 1991. 
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(a) The permanent members of the Security Council are also heavily 
industrialised, whose per capita pollution rates are higher than those 
of the other states; 
(b) they have the veto power in the UN Security Council; 
(c) the decisions of the Security Council are binding on all States; and  
(d) most importantly, the Security Council also has started addressing the 
issues of environmental protection. 
If this indicates the growth of International Law, where the UN Security 
Council will have a major stake in international environmental law making, 
it surely raises a few issues of fairness from the perspective of non-
permanent and non-members of the UN Security Council. 
 Similarly, the General Assembly of the United Nations (hereinafter 
referred to as UNGA) is a democratic institution comprising all the members 
of United Nations as its members with one vote each. The UNGA issues 
resolutions and recommendations that are generally binding, but are definitely 
sources of international law. The powers of the UNGA include the powers to 
deal with matters pertaining to economic, social, educational, cultural, health 
and human rights related issues. The UNGA have been involving itself in a 
number of environmental issues since its establishment. The Stockholm 
Conference 1972; the Rio Conference 1992; the Johannesburg Conference 
2002, etc. were all convened under the auspices of the UNGA. The UNGA 
also has created two organs, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(hereinafter referred to as UNEP) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (hereinafter referred to as UNDP).  Both these organisations have 
played important roles in the development of international environmental law. 
The Commission on Sustainable Development, which was created in the 
UNCED 1992 also functions under the auspices of the UNGA.  
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 Another important organ of the UN is the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter referred to as ICJ). The ICJ is the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations and all State parties are ipso facto parties to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice. In the past, the ICJ had decided on 
many disputes pertaining to environmental issues including in the matter of 
UNGA Advisory Opinion in the Matter of Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.15 
 Apart from these organs of the UN, other international organisations 
such as the UNEP, the International Maritime Organisation (also known as 
IMO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (also known as IAEA), the 
World Meteorological Organisation (also known as WMO), the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (also known as FAO), the World Health 
Organisation (also known as WHO), etc. have different roles in the 
development of international environmental law.  They coordinate various 
conferences and create various venues where environmental issues are 
deliberated upon and various stakeholders could attempt consensus. The best 
example would be the case of UNEP, which has provided venues for 
negotiating many international treaties such as the Basel Convention16, the 
Biodiversity Convention,17 etc. Apart from these organisations whose main 
area of function is closely related to environmental protection, there are other 
organisations or institutions for whom the policy of environmental protection 
is only incidental. Examples include the World Bank, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (also known as IBRD), the World 
Trade Organisation (hereinafter referred to as WTO), etc. This abundance of 
 
15   International Court of Justice, (1996): Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996, ICJ Reports 226. 
16   The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, 1989. 
17   The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992. 
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international organisations with overlapping capacities and responsibilities 
has in fact generated varying demands as to rationalise the international 
system for the protection of the environment.18 Here lies also an associated 
issue of overlapping jurisdiction, which invariably results in forum shopping 
in many cases involving the resolution of environmental disputes.19 Such 
cases of overlapping jurisdiction and opportunity for forum shopping could 
sometimes be disadvantageous for the weaker party.  
 The list of stakeholders in the development of international 
environmental law also includes various non-state actors, the categories of 
‘persons’ to whom the law has vested various legal rights and duties akin to 
those of natural person. The examples for such legal persons are 
corporations, societies or trusts, which are incorporated under the laws of 
that particular country.  Once they are incorporated, they will enjoy all the 
legal rights and privileges unless those rights and privileges are specified to 
the citizens. The non-governmental organisations (in India they are generally 
incorporated under the Societies Registration Act, 1860) and the for-profit 
corporations (in India they are incorporated under the Companies Act 1956) 
are the two major kinds of non-state actors who has stake in the international 
environmental issues. The non-governmental organisations (hereinafter 
referred to as NGOs) may also be further divided into (a) mainstream 
environmentalists who try to balance environmental protection with that of 
other interests including that of economics and (b) the deep ecologists for 
 
18   Supra n. 2 at p. 15. 
19   Various judicial forums vested with jurisdiction to resolve environmental dispute 
resolution are as follows; (i) International Court of Justice, (ii) International Tribunal 
for Law of the Sea; (iii) World Bank Administrative Tribunal (iv) European Court of 
Justice (v) WTO Dispute Resolution system (vi) European Patent Office (vii) European 
Court/Commission of Human Rights (viii) Inter American Commission on Human 
Rights and numerous other tribunals established under the various multilateral and 
bilateral treaties and the national courts. 
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whom the requirement of environmental protection is absolute and ‘the 
environment is protected for the environment’ itself’.20 The deep ecology 
approach is also reflected in the process of international environmental law 
making. The absolute ban on trading in animals that are on the verge of 
extinction,21 or laws and policies that prohibit animal hunting even if it might 
be the sole source of income for the local or indigenous communities are 
some of the finest examples in this regard. Some scholars argue that such 
deep-ecology approach to environmental protection may also raise question 
of fairness in some cases, particularly when poor the countries are in the 
process of industrialisation.22  
 Another issue pertaining to the NGOs is the lack of transparency in 
their financial arrangements.  It is stated, “…much of the funding for the 
NGOs in developing countries comes from the developed country 
foundations.”23 Economists like Jagdish Bhagwati contend that the NGOs 
from the developed countries have been able to set the agenda for the 
developing country NGOs and thus such agenda have little to do with the 
interests of the developing countries whom those NGOs represent. As a 
result, the issues specific to the developing countries such as inadequate 
supply of drinking water and malnutrition are not adequately addressed in 
the international law-making process.24 This is a pertinent issue while 
dealing with fairness in international environmental law. 
 
20  Supra n. 18 at 16. 
21   See, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, 1973. 
22   See, Kay, James (1993): “On the Nature of Ecological Integrity: Some Closing 
Comments,” in Stephen Woodley, James Kay et al. (eds.) Ecological Integrity and 
Management of Ecosystems, United States of America: St.Lucie Press. 
23   Supra n. 20 at p. 18.  
24   Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004): In Defense of Globalisation, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, at p. 47. 
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2.2 Sources of International Environmental Law 
 Before going into the specific topic of the growth of Global 
Environment Regulatory Regime, an analysis of the various sources of 
international law is very crucial. This would help in identifying the role 
played by each of these sources in developing the GERR. The sources of 
international law according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice are as follows;25  
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
b. International custom, as evidence of general practice and accepted as 
law; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by the civilized nations;  
d. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law. 
2.2.1 International Conventions 
An international Convention,26 which is a source of international law 
according Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
can be either bilateral27 or multilateral. In the case of a multilateral treaty 
usually, the states will request an international organization having 
specialized knowledge in the area to establish a working group to draft a 
 
25   The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article. 38(d). 
26   Also known as treaties, covenants or charters. 
27   Bilateral treaties are treated more or less like contracts in domestic law, as having 
binding effect between the parties that signed them. 
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treaty on any issue of international importance. Once it is drafted28, 
negotiations will start among the States to reach a consensus on each issue in 
the draft treaty.29 Lack of consensus weakens the objectives of the treaty, as 
it would lead to refusal by the states to ratify it or at least delay the 
ratification. 30  
Sovereign states are also at liberty to make reservations on any 
specific article or articles in the treaty.31 But it is opined that these 
reservations might affect the ‘authoritative character of the treaty’.32 This has 
resulted in another situation, wherein the reservations are prohibited for 
enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty. But at the same time it indicates, as 
some of the authors call it, a democracy deficit in the treaty. 33  
Once a treaty is signed by the States, it has to be ratified34 by those 
States. A convention would also specify the number of states whose 
 
28   The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969 is the document used 
frequently to interpret the text of many international treaties. The Vienna Convention 
has codified some of the general principles that are enshrined in the law of the treaties 
such as pacta sunt servanda and that treaties must not in principle have retroactive 
character. The Vienna Convention demonstrates a preference for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and requires the parties to perform their treaty. 
29   Supra n. 23 at p.21. 
30  Ratification is a process through which it is implemented or at least statutory provisions 
has been made for such implementation. Where as signing a treaty implies the act of 
signing the treaty document immediately after the negotiation for such treaty is over. 
31   The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 2(9).   
32   Supra n. 29 at p. 22. 
33   Shearman, David and Wayne Smith, Joseph, (2007): The Climate Change Challenge 
and the Failure of Democracy, London: Praeger. The authors argue that “it is fair to say 
that whatever environmental parameter is being assessed is a remorseless deterioration. 
Degradation is the express train, remediation is the slow train, stopping and starting and 
never catching up.” The reason being the current complex democratic process where, 
“everyday decisions are made to delay the slow train even further…”due to complex 
decision making processes in democracy “…based on values and cultural, political, and 
corporate influence.” 
34   This means that states must ask their legislative organs (e.g., a parliament) to adopt the 
convention and to incorporate it into the domestic legal order. Unless a state ratifies a 
convention, the convention does not have binding effects on that state provided that the 
rules included in the convention have not become a rule of customary law. 
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ratification is required to make the treaty an enforceable one.35 The act of 
ratification is mostly the result of diplomacy and international relations 
among the States.36 It also happens that some of these treaties act as umbrella 
framework that sets out the parameters for action at the international as well 
as at the municipal level. In such cases, a treaty may also be followed by 
protocols that set the parameters of further specific action. The best example 
for this would be the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It has been stated 
that the“…rationale behind the framework-protocol approach is for states to 
commit to engage, initially, in cooperative behavior to manage what seems 
to be an emerging environmental problem through a framework convention. 
As scientific evidence accumulates or the political will manifests to tackle 
the problem more decisively, further specific regulatory protocols can be 
adopted.”37 
In the case of an international convention, there are two models 
available to be adopted. The first one is the command and control model,38 
where there is a centralized regulatory body, which administers and 
supervises the convention. The second one is the soft law model where there 
is a declaration, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948,39 or 
an umbrella convention like the United Nations Framework Convention on 
 
35  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 24.  
36   For example for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force, a total 55 developed countries 
and all countries who are contributing to 55 per cent of the developed country pollution 
were required to sign. Though the Protocol was adopted in 1997, it entered into force 
only after the Russian Federation signed it in the year 2004. To reach this level much of 
the negotiation took place between 1997 and 2004. 
37   Supra n. 32 at pp. 22-23. 
38   In domestic arenas, significant emphasis has been placed on regulatory approaches, 
called Command-and-Control approach, that specify the standards and often the 
procedures that should be adopted in order to be in compliance. 
39   Commonly referred to as the UDHR. 
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Climate Change 197240 or a model law which sovereign states may follow 
with or without changes like the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce 1996. 
It was the soft law model that was traditionally used in the 
international law. States were encouraged to obey the provisions of the law. 
The ‘state reporting mechanism’ under some conventions is an example for 
how the states are encouraged to incorporate the provisions of the 
convention. If any state, which is a party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ICCPR) does not 
effectively incorporate its provisions into their municipal law, it will be 
‘shamed’ when it submits the State Reports at the review meetings. During 
these meetings, various international NGOs also might come up with more 
elaborate counter reports about the human rights scenario in that particular 
state.  It may also be possible that the international media also give wide 
publicity to it. This is infact an encouragement through the ‘sanction of 
shame’. So basically in this model the international instruments are usually 
encouraged obedience through various incentives including monetary as well 
as political. An example for economic incentive for industries to adopt an 
environment friendly technology is tradable emission allowances that have 
been implemented in some of the developed countries as a way to reduce the 
costs of pollution prevention techniques\.41  
Many international environmental treaties are umbrella framework 
treaties that establish parameters of international environmental action and 
would be followed by protocols that define specific standards of behavior 
from the state parties. “The rationale behind the framework-protocol 
 
40   For a detailed analysis of the Convention , see chapter 3. 
41   Supra n. 37 at p. 27. 
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approach is for states to commit to reengage, initially, in cooperative 
behavior to manage what seems to be an emerging environmental problem 
through a framework convention. As scientific evidence accumulates or the 
political will manifests to tackle the problem more decisively, further 
specific regulatory protocols can be adopted.”42 It also may be noted that the 
Framework-Protocol approach is not the only regulatory process for the 
management of environmental problems. There are specific conventions 
adopted such as the London Dumping Convention, 1972.43 
2.2.2 Custom or ‘Customary Principles of International Law’ as a source 
of law 
There are differences among the scholars about custom as an 
authoritative source of international law. One school of thought argues that it 
is an authoritative source of international law, whereas the other group 
argues “custom is anachronistic and even hard to prove in bilateral and 
multilateral agreements among states.”44 
For establishing an international custom, there are two requirements, 
viz; General Practice and Opinio Juris.45 General practice of a custom at 
international level requires the observance and propagation in domestic law 
and policy, whereas Opinio Juris mandates the states to “behave in a certain 
way under the stated belief, which does not have to be a genuine belief, that 
 
42   Id. at pp. 22-23. 
43   It is one of the first global conventions to protect the marine environment from human 
activities and has been in force since 1975. Its objective is to promote the effective 
control of all sources of marine pollution and to take all practicable steps to prevent 
pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes and other matter.  
44   D’Amato, Anthony (1971): The Concept of Custom in International Law, United States 
of America: Cornell University Press. 
45   The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38. 
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their behavior is law or is becoming law.46” Normally, if a number of states 
consistently follow a pattern and such observance has an “impact on the 
international relations because of the authoritative influence of these 
states”,47 it can be said to be a valid custom. Best examples are the role of 
maritime states in establishing the customary principles of the law of the sea 
and the role of the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union in the 
development of space law.48 It is also said that for the practice of a state to 
develop into custom, it is not necessary for it to believe that its behavior 
constitutes law but that its behavior remains unchallenged by the other 
states.49 The Doctrine of Persistent Objector, at the same time, says that if a 
state had consistently objected to the creation of a customary principle of 
international law, then normally the applicability of such custom to that state 
is invalid.50  
It is also to be noted that if half of the states of the world observes a 
certain custom, then it is sufficient for establishing its force. This raises 
another serious concern. In the modern day ‘club model of multilateral 
cooperation’, any group of states may create a custom so that it could be a 
valid defence against another state or other states. There are scholars who 
opine that the customary sources of international law also as a set of informal 
rules.51 According to them, such rules are usually unwritten and they do not 
 
46    Shaw, Malcom (2003): International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at 
p. 71-73. 
47  Supra n. 42 at p. 23 
48   Id. at p 24. 
49   Akehust, Michael (1974-75): “Custom as a Source of International Law,” British 
Yearbook of International Law, 47:1. 
50   Brownlie, Ian (1998): Principles of Public International Law, London: Oxford 
University Press, at p. 10. 
51   Supra n. 48 at p. 60. 
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change even when formal rules change.52 Thus it would be misguiding for a 
scholar to focus on the formal rules and to neglect the informal rules of 
conduct. Michel Reisman says that one must verify words against practice 
before pretending to understand the norms according to which social groups, 
including the international society, operate.53  
2.2.3  General Principles of Law Observed by Civilized Nations 
 It also has been said that the general principles of law that are observed 
by civilized nations have become a part of the international law. A question that 
can be raised in this context is regarding the requirement of observance by the 
‘civilized nations’ i.e. whether civility has any connection with economic 
development? If a general principle of law is observed by an economically 
underdeveloped country in Asia or Africa, will it be a general principle of law 
observed by the civilized nations? For example, equity or fairness as a principle 
of international law is not accepted by the same developed nations where as it 
can be found in the legal principles of certain other states.54 Economically 
developed States often argue that the fairness or equity is an all-encompassing 
concept and if that is accepted, as a source of international law that would 
introduce unacceptable amount of uncertainty in international law.55  
2.2.4 Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law 
 The decisions of the various forums such as the International Court of 
Justice, various tribunals including arbitral tribunal are also considered as a 
 
52   Ibid. 
53   Reisman, W.M (1981): “Law from the Policy Perspective,’ in Myres S McDougal and 
W. Michael Reisman, (eds.), International Law Essays: A Supplement to International 
Law in Contemporary Perspective, at pp. 1-3. 
54   Franck, Thomas M. (1998): Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, at pp. 15-75. 
55   Higgins, Royal (1991): International Trade law and Avoidance, Containment and 
Resolution of Disputes, General Course in Public International Law: Hague Academy of 
International Law. 
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source of international law though they act as subsidiary sources of 
international law with only persuasive value. But, at the same time they are 
important in creating legitimacy while increasing the chances of winning the 
case in various claims made by the different parties before these tribunals. 
Though the international law is not bound by the Principle of Stare Decisis, 
the parties to the disputes frequently refer to precedents, so that the court 
may be persuaded to decide similarly in the subsequent disputes. 
 Another issue pertaining to judicial decisions as a source of 
international law is the multiplicity of judicial forums. There exist a large 
number of judicial forums with varying jurisdiction to resolve environmental 
disputes. The list includes (i) the International Court of Justice, (ii) the 
International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, (iii) the World Bank 
Administrative Tribunal, (iv) the European Court of Justice, (v) the WTO 
Dispute Resolution System, (vi) the European Patent Office, (vii) the 
European Court/Commission of Human Rights, (viii) the Inter American 
Commission on Human Rights, and numerous other tribunals established 
under the various multilateral and bilateral treaties and the national courts. 
Some of these forums have overlapping jurisdiction which prima-facie raises 
the question of fairness. This scenario also gives an opportunity of forum 
shopping for the parties. 
2.3 Global Environmental Regulatory Regime and Sector Specific 
Regulatory Regimes 
International environmental aw is an interdisciplinary area as it 
overlaps with other areas of research such as economics, political science 
and international relations, ecology, human rights, etc. As seen in chapter 1, 
until 1972 this field of law narrowly defined the term environment and its 
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scope and ambit for its protection was for specific purposes. 56 However, 
from the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment 1972 onwards the focus of international environmental 
law was widened. This branch of law also started reflecting a desire to limit 
environmental damages. There are many international agreements that were 
concluded with such a changed focus. The above stated sources of 
standards57 (may be evolved through international treaties, customary 
principles of international law, judicial decisions, or any other standard 
setting processes) have created the GERR, which includes various other 
Issue Specific Regulatory Regimes (ISRRs). Various actors/stakeholders of 
International law/ International environmental law also have got their roles in 
these ISRRs. Some of the key ISRRs are as follows:  
(a) The 'Marine Pollution Regime as articulated in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1973; the Convention on Pollution 
from Ships (also known as MARPOL 73/78); the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter 1972; and many other regional conventions. 
(b) The Shared Watercourses Regime that evolved as a result of the UN 
Convention on International Watercourses and Integrated Water 
Management 1997. This also includes other sources of international 
environmental law related to the specific sector. 
(c) The Fisheries Resources Regime that focuses on a number of 
instruments such as the UNCLOS and the UN Straddling Fish Stocks 
 
56   Kiss, Alexandre and Shelton, Dinah (2007): Guide to International Environmental Law, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p. 32. 
57  It may be noted that these Standards need not be legal standards always. It could be 
economical, scientifical or any other standards. 
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Agreement 1995 and other sources. 
(d) The Plant Genetic Resources Regime that is evolved around the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 and various other 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreements and Principles. 
(e) The Waste Management Regime that has evolved after the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1992 and other relevant 
sources. 
(f) The Climate Change Regime that is evolved through the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 and various other 
agreements and Protocols including the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, the main emphasis of the study is on analysing the GERR in 
general and GCCRR in particular.  This would also include an indepth 
analysis of the various concepts including the fairness in international 
environmental law. 
2.3.1 Evolution and Growth of Global Environmental Regulatory Regimes 
As already observed, the GERR comprises many Issue Specific 
Regulatory Regimes (hereinafter referred to as ISSRs). However, these 
ISSRs are complex and involve many sub-regulatory regimes focusing on 
various sub-issues. For example, the GCCRR though prima facie appears to 
be issue focused, includes many sub-issues such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism, Joint Implementation, Tradable Allowances, etc. that makes the 
system so complex and complicated.58 Similarly, there are other regimes, 
which are complex because they are highly interrelated to the other regimes 
 
58  Supra n. 52 at p.62. 
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or are highly interdisciplinary in nature. The best example would be the 
Plant Genetic Resources Regime that is primarily developed as a result of the 
Biodiversity Convention, 1992. However, this Regime is closely connected 
to various other Regimes, stakeholders and soft norms and hard laws such as 
the Global Intellectual Property Regime, the International Trade Regime, and 
the International Human Rights Regime and consequently to actors such as 
the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade Organization, 
etc. The situation becomes more complex given the fact that many regional 
conventions have also been adopted, which make the Plant Genetic 
Resources Regime extremely complex. The situation further becomes tragic 
when the actors dissatisfied with the outcome on an international issue or 
dispute engage in Regime Shifting or Forum Shopping.59 
It is in this context that the political processes of international 
lawmaking, particularly in the area of environment and sustainable 
development become so complex and the weaker parties increasingly 
become susceptible to be the victims of unfairness.60 The contribution of the 
UN in standard setting in the event of such a crisis is unparallel. To cite an 
example, the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm has 
taken measures to create awareness about environmental degradation at a 
higher level where the underlining principle was in favor of regulating the 
use of natural resources with a requirement of providing developmental 
 
59   See, Raustiala, Kal and Victor, David G (2004): “The Regime Complex for Plant 
Genetic Resources,” International Organisation, 58: 277-309. 
60  Soltau, Friedrich (2009): Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p.172. 
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opportunities for the developing countries.61 The same has been discussed in 
detail in the following part of the study. 
 
2.4 United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 
1972 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 
was a milestone in the development of international environmental law and 
also in the development of international environmental politics.62 The 
Conference was convened with the objective to “create a basis for a 
comprehensive consideration within the United Nations of the problems of 
human environment” and to “focus the attention of governments and public 
opinion in various countries on the importance of the problem.”63 
Representatives from 113 countries, 19 inter-governmental agencies and 
approximately 400 non-governmental organizations participated in the 
Conference. The major absentees included the Communist countries such as 
the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Eastern European countries with the 
exceptions of Romania and Yugoslavia.64 The Conference was concluded 
with a Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment containing 26 Principles and an Action Plan with 109 
Recommendations. At Stockholm the representatives from the developed 
countries argued for a deep ecology based approach, putting environment in 
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63  UN ECOSOC, Agenda Item 12 (doc. E/4466/Add.I) at 2 (1968). 
64  Sohn, Louis  (1973): “The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment”, 
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the focal point.65 But, against such an argument, the declaration adopted an 
anthropocentric approach as demanded by the representatives from the 
developing countries. This is evident from the full title of the Declaration, 
which reads: “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment.”66 Through such an anthropocentric approach, an open linkage 
has been formulated between the human rights and the conditions of living in 
an environment of quality.67  
 The greatest contribution of the Stockholm Conference is the 
Stockholm Declaration, which is hailed as “a first step toward the 
development of international environmental law”68. It contains a set of 
‘common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the 
preservation and enhancement of the human environment’.69 The Declaration 
was prepared by an ‘Inter-governmental Working Group for the Preparation 
of the Draft Declaration’ headed by the Italian scholar Migliuolo. From the 
very beginning, it was pointed out that the Declaration by its very nature 
should not formulate any legally binding provisions especially in relation to 
states with that of the individual.70 Once the final Draft of the Declaration 
was finalized, it was forwarded to all the delegates of the Conference who 
were free to submit any drafting suggestions, interpretative statements or 
even substantive amendments. Some delegations, particularly from the 
developed countries urged that the Draft Declaration be adopted “without 
any amendments, in order not imperil the fragile consensus achieved in Pre-
 
65  Supra n. 58 at p.30. 
66   The Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment, 1972.  
67   Ibid. According to Principle 1; “Man has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of life in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being.” 
68   U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, at 113-19 and Annex II (1972). 
69   Supra n. 64. 
70   See, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/PC/Paras. 27-32 (1971). 
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Conference consultations.”71 But, many other parties expressed 
dissatisfaction with its inadequate treatment of the needs of the developing 
countries.72 They also expressed that they were not given a chance to express 
their views during the preparatory processes.73 Hence, during the 
negotiations many countries raised their opinions, concerns, objections and 
amendments, which were deliberated, and the final Declaration was adopted 
with 103 votes in favor, 12 abstentions (the Soviet bloc and South Africa74) 
and without any negative votes. 
The Declaration consists of a detailed preamble and a set of 26 
principles.   As noted in the Preamble,75 the object of the Declaration was to 
provide both inspiration and guidelines for the governments and the people 
of the world. While the Declaration was being drafted, the main concern for 
the Committee was whether it should contain, as argued by the 
representatives from developing countries, a ‘fairly concise text which could 
easily be disseminated by mass media and could also serve as a convenient 
instrument of education’ or it should contain more ‘elaborate statement, 
couched in a more legalistic language, with consequent loss of public appeal’ 
as advocated by the representatives from the developed countries.76 Finally, a 
balanced approach was adopted by finalizing a ‘more literate preamble’ and 
other ‘legalistic principles’. However, it has been criticized that in doing so 
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76   Supra n. 71 at p. 435. 
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‘neither of the two goal was really achieved.’77 
 Another dilemma before the drafting committee was regarding the 
addressees of the Declaration. The specific question was, should it be 
addressed to the governments of the world or to the people of the world? 
Consequently, should it take man as its measure and speak of his rights and 
duties or should it in a traditional fashion deal only with the governments, 
their shortcomings, their responsibilities and their rights? The representatives 
from the developing countries preferred the addressees to be the 
governments, whereas the delegates from the developed world were in favor 
of addressing it to the people directly.78  Finally, apart from Paragraph 7 of 
the Preamble, which uses individuals, organizations, local and national 
governments and international institutions, the rest is addressed to the 
‘people of the world’.79 Nonetheless the same line of debate persisted 
throughout the negotiation processes of the Declaration. 
Principle 1 of the Declaration says that “man has the fundamental 
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment 
of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a 
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating 
apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of 
oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be 
eliminated.”  
During the negotiation processes, the main points of debate were as 
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follows; “should the Principles be limited to interstate relations, or should 
they also deal with relations between the individuals and the states, or even 
between the individuals themselves?  Or, in other words, should they spell 
out the rights and duties of man, states and the international community 
respectively? Should they stress on the environmental rights or should they 
emphasise on the responsibilities with regard to the protection and 
enhancement of human environment?”80  To answer these questions, various 
actors had responded in different ways. The developed countries demanded 
the recognition of every human being’s ‘right to a wholesome environment.’ 
They asserted that such a right is already recognised by the UDHR.81 
Thereafter, the usage ‘right to a wholesome environment’ was substituted 
with the phrase ‘working environment’, to which the International Labour 
Organisation (hereinafter referred to as ILO) had objected. The ILO wanted 
it to be substituted with ‘physical working conditions’ as the earlier phrase 
was too wide. At the same time, a new draft was presented jointly by Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Zambia, which, instead of the aforesaid 
phrases, included “an environment of a quality”.82 After all the deliberations, 
the final text was adopted.  
2.4.1 Responsibility to Conserve Nature and Fairness 
Similarly, the finalization of the language of Principle 2 of the 
Declaration was also not easy. Principle 2, which reads: “the natural 
resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and 
especially the representative samples of the natural ecosystems, must be 
 
80   Supra n.78 at p.452. 
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82   U.N. Doc.A/Conf.48/4, Annex, at 2 (1972). 
76 
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful 
planning or management as appropriate”, also saw frictions between the 
developed and developing countries regarding assigning of duty to protect 
the environment.  Before reaching this final version of the principle, severe 
negotiation took place amongst various stakeholders. The original draft of 
the principle said that it is the “…duty of all nations to carefully husband 
their natural resources …”83, which was objected to by the representatives of 
the developing countries, who demanded the omission of any such specific 
obligation. 84 They contended that it was ‘unduly restrictive of the concept of 
national sovereignty’ and is discriminative against the developing countries, 
which are now only entering upon their development processes.85 After such 
debates the final version was adopted, which is more neutral. There is no 
emphasis on the duty of the Nation States to protect the environment. At the 
same time, the most striking omission in the final text is the vague notion of 
‘unspecified somebody’ protecting the environment instead of assigning the 
responsibility to any specific group.  
2.4.2 Low Prices for the Environmental Products from the Developing 
Countries and Fairness 
  Another question pertained to the capacity of the earth to produce vital 
renewable resources. Though there was consensus that the earth’s resources 
are depleting and are non-renewable, the debate was pertaining to the nature of 
the duty to conserve those resources. The Declaration in its Principle 3 says 
that “The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must be 
maintained and, wherever practicable, restored or improved.” During the 
negotiation stages the developing countries argued that the degradation of the 
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environment in the developing countries is because of the low prices for their 
products.86 Their claim was that the developing countries are over-exploiting 
the resources because of the fact that the developed countries are exploiting 
them by paying low prices for their products. Though there is veracity in their 
argument, somehow it was not included in the final version of the Declaration. 
2.4.3 Control of Environmental Pollution and Fairness  
The Stockholm Declaration in its Principle 6 mandates the reduction 
of pollution. In this regard it says, “The discharge of toxic substances or of 
other substances and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations 
as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must 
be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not 
inflicted upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the people of all countries 
against pollution should be supported.” Though there was a general 
agreement amongst all the stakeholders on the special danger to human 
health and eco-systems due to pollution, there was no attempt to embody a 
stronger obligation on the states for the reduction of the same. It merely 
stated that pollution must be stopped to ensure that serious and irreversible 
damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems.  
At the same time, Principle 7 says that, “States shall take all possible 
steps to prevent pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create 
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage 
amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” This 
Principle, unlike Principle 6, imposes an obligation on the states by the use 
of the word ‘shall’, though its scope is limited by the word ‘possible steps.’ 
 
86   It was mooted by Algeria. See, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/WG.I/CRP.17 (1972). 
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When Principles 6 and 7 are compared there exists a difference.87 While 
Principle 6 is limited to pollution which might inflict serious or irreversible 
damage upon eco-systems, Principle 7 applies more broadly to pollution 
caused by substances not only liable to create hazards to human health, to 
harm living resources and marine life but also anything that is likely to 
damage amenities or to interfere with the legitimate uses of the sea.88  
Looking at the fact that it is the industrialised developed countries that have 
various technological amenities at the sea, this also might go against the 
interest of the developing countries. Given this scenario, there is a high 
chance that the developing countries could be absolutely made responsible 
for any harm caused to those amenities. 
2.4.4 Economic Development vis a vis Social Development 
           It was argued that the major environmental problems of the 
developing countries are not so much caused by the economic development 
but by the lack of it. It is not merely the quality of life but life itself is 
endangered by poor water, housing, sanitation and nutrition, sickness and 
diseases and by other natural disasters. Hence, as far as developing 
countries are concerned, economic “development has become essentially a 
cure for their major environmental problems.”89 This was recognized by 
Principle 8 of the Declaration that “economic and social development is 
essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment for man 
and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement 
of the quality of life.”  
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 This also has been recognised by Principle 9 of the Declaration, that 
environmental deficiencies generated by under-development and natural 
disasters pose grave problems. Further, this principle suggests that such 
problems must be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer 
of financial and technological assistance to the developing countries. This 
Principle is further supported by the Principle 12, which says that resources 
should be made available to the developing countries to preserve and 
improve the environment so that the international environmental standards 
can be adequately incorporated into their developmental planning, but upon 
their request. 
2.4.5 Population, Urbanisation and Environment 
 Principles 1590 and 1691 of the Declaration speak about population 
explosion, urbanisation and the consequential environmental degradation. It 
advocates for implementing demographic policies that will not prejudice the 
basic human rights if the population explosion is likely to have adverse effects 
on the environment or development. In this context, the developing countries 
contended that on many occasions it is not over population; but, low 
population density that prevents improvement of the human environment and 
impede development.92 Principle 15 says that as planning would obtain 
maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for all; it must be 
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applied to human settlements and urbanisation as well.  In this regard, it 
condemns any projects that are designed for colonialist and racist domination 
such as the Bantustans93 in South Africa. Against this, the South Africa 
abstained itself from the voting of the Declaration alleging that such wordings 
of the Declaration unnecessarily interferes with the internal policies of South 
Africa.  
 The requirement that the demographic policies should be in 
consonance with the basic human rights requirement safeguards the rights of 
individuals to decide on the size of their families and protects them against 
governmental interferences compelling, families to restrict the number of 
members.  
2.4.6 Role of Scientific Research and Education in Planning, Managing 
and Controlling of Environmental Resources 
 Principles 17 to 20 of the Declaration speak about the planning of 
environmental resources with a view to enhancing its quality.94 It further 
speaks about the role of scientific research95 and education96 in planning. It 
 
93   Bantustans is the term for referring to territories, set aside for black inhabitants of South 
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also says that scientific research must be promoted for striking a balance 
between the environmental problems and the development, both at national 
and international level.97 Further, it advocates the free flow of up-to-date 
scientific information and transfer of technology and experience from 
developed countries to developing countries for solving the environmental 
problems.98 At the same time, there exists strong criticism that the present day 
international patent regime frustrates any such transfer of technology and the 
know-how or experience from the developed country to the developing 
country.99 
2.4.7 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Principle 
of Good Neighborliness 
  The Principle 21 of the Declaration, which, is hailed as one of the 
most important contributions of the Stockholm Conference, says that “states 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.” This principle is the formal recognition of two principles that 
were previously part of the customary international law, viz. the Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Principle of Good 
Neighborliness, which are briefly discussed below.  
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 The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources is 
one of the fundamental principles of international environmental law. The 
said principle actually emerged in the 1950’s in parallel with the beginning 
of decolonisation as the basic constituent of the right to self-determination, a 
right that is essential and inherent in the element of state sovereignty.100 The 
developing nations, rich with natural resources, wished to avoid the 
inequitable and onerous arrangements imposed upon their unwary and 
vulnerable governments during the colonial period.101 It necessarily invoked 
major concerns about the relationship between the developing states rich 
with natural resources and the multinational corporations, which are 
exploiting such resources. The United Nations102 declares that the “right of 
people and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and 
for the well-being of the people of the State concerned.” It further says, “The 
exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the 
import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in 
conformity with the rules and conditions of the host state.  
Thus it makes an inherent and overriding right of a state to control the 
exploitation and the use of its natural resources for ensuring the welfare of its 
citizens.103 The multinational corporations claimed that their right to exploit 
another nation’s natural resources, already acquired during the colonial period, 
continued after the independence of the formerly colonized nations.104 In 
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opposition, the developing nations argued that permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is necessary to protect their economic sovereignty. Further, 
developing nations claimed that the permanent sovereignty includes the right 
to take expropriate action against the foreign enterprises.  
 This principle was for the first time recognised in the landmark case 
of Trail Smelter between the United States and Canada, which was regarding 
the question of damage to United States caused by Canada by trans-border 
emission of sulphur dioxide. When the dispute arose, both the parties agreed 
to submit the dispute to arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that: 
“…under the principles of international law . . . no State has the right to use 
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes 
into the territory of another or to the properties or persons therein, when the 
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”105 
Here, the tribunal had stated that the liability arises only if “the case is 
of serious consequence” and when the injury can be proved by “… clear and 
convincing evidence.” These requirements set a high threshold level for a state 
to be liable for trans-boundary emissions of pollutants.  In this case, the 
tribunal awarded damages for the specific injury suffered by the United States, 
but not for the injury suffered by the environment. The tribunal held it as too 
remote.  However, for the purpose of the implication of the decision it is stated 
that, “although the tribunal was conservative in the award of damages, it 
played a more decisive and regulatory role. The tribunal ordered Canada to 
establish controls on the emissions of sulphur dioxide by providing for 
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maximum permissible sulfur emissions including the detailed requirements for 
hourly emissions.”106  This principle has been expressly recognised by 
Principle 21 of the Declaration. However, such a right is restricted by another 
principle, which is known as the Principle of Good Neighbourliness.   
 Good Neighbourliness as general principle of international law has 
got particular importance in the field of international environmental law. 
According to this principle, there is an obligation on states to try to reconcile 
their interests with the interests of the neighbouring states. In Trail Smelter 
case when the Tribunal decided that Canada’s right to exploit its natural 
resources is subject to its negative consequences on the United States, this 
Principle was also recognised.  
 Various other international judicial forums and tribunals have also 
recognised this principle on various occasions. For example, in Lac Lanoux 
case, a river known as Carol passed through France and Spain. France was 
the upstream state and Spain the downstream state. France decided to build a 
dam across the river for hydroelectricity generation. Thereafter according to 
plans, France would divert the water back to the river so that it could be used 
by Spain for irrigation. Spain alleged that this was against their interest as 
diversion of water back to the river was to be done at the discretion of 
France. Spain alleged that this was against some of the treaties between the 
two states. The Court held that France was entitled to the right to water 
without ignoring the interests of Spain. It was held that “subjecting a state’s 
right to use its watercourses to the completion of a prior agreement with 
another state would give that other state essentially ‘a right to veto’ that 
paralyzes the exercise of territorial competence of one state at the discretion 
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of another state.”107 It was further held that “the rule according to which 
States may utilize the hydraulic force of international watercourses only on 
condition of a prior agreement between the interested States can neither be 
established as a custom, nor even less as a general principle of international 
law.”108 One of the issues involved in this case was the issue of fairness 
among the riparian states. In this regard, the Court upheld the sovereignty 
and the ensuing rights of upstream states, though it held that such 
sovereignty is not absolute as an upstream state should take care of the 
interests of downstream state.  
 Further, in Behring Sea Seals cases between the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom, the important question of law was 
whether a particular state can extend its jurisdiction to high seas to protect 
marine animals which are in danger of extinction or not. While, declaring the 
freedom of high seas, the tribunal rejected the claims of the United States. 
The tribunal held that there are no property rights over common property 
resources in the high sea. But the tribunal mandated the regulatory standards 
for the protection of seals.109 
 Similarly in Oder110 case, which involved the questions relating to 
the use of trans-boundary rivers, the upheld the equal right of all riparian 
states and “the exclusion of any preferential privilege to any one riparian 
state in relation to the others.”111 Regarding the main issue, the court held 
that the jurisdiction of the International Oder Commission is extended to the 
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sections of Oder located within the Polish territory. This decision is in fact 
seen as the precursor of the principle of equitable utilization of water 
resources. 
 
 Another instance of judicial interference was the Meuse case, which 
involved the question of apportionment of shared water resources. A treaty 
was signed by the Netherlands and Belgium regarding the use of the river 
Meuse for irrigation and navigation. According to the treaty, each state could 
have one canal that would feed all the other canals. But when the water 
shortage became acute, both the Netherlands and Belgium began the 
construction of new canals. Both the states went against each other and 
claimed the act of the other as the violation of the treaty. Rejecting the 
claims of the parties, the Court held thus: “As regards such canals, each of 
the two States is at liberty, in its own territory, to modify them…provided 
that the diversion of water and the volume of water to be discharged there 
from to maintain the normal level and flow is not affected…..”Judge 
Hudson, who also concurred with the majority, but based on the principles of 
equity, said thus: “A sharp division between law and equity . . . should find 
no place in international jurisprudence.”112 He said that based on equity, the 
states generally cannot ask the other to discontinue their act. Though the 
principle of equity is fluid since it depends on the circumstances of the case, 
it has played a crucial role in shaping the perceptions of legitimacy in 
sharing of international waters. 
Another case, where the said principles were again emphasized by 
 
112  The Division of Water from the Meuse Case, June 28, 1937, (1937) PCIJ Series A/B, 
No.70. 
87 
the Court was the famous Corfu Channel Case.113 This case came up 
immediately after the World War II before the International Court of Justice 
was between the United Kingdom and Albania. The case was related to the 
alleged damage to ships and injuries to British Naval officers by mines 
planted by Albania in the Corfu Strait. The UK alleged that Albania should 
have notified the UK about such landmines, which prevented them from 
exercising their right to innocent passage. Albania, however, claimed that it 
had not planted the landmines and they were innocent. However, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the basis of evidence decided that 
Albania should have notified the UK warships of the existence of land-
minefield.  
The ICJ held that such obligations need not always be based on an 
international treaty. It can also be based on the recognized principles of law 
at the international level like the considerations of humanity. It also 
considered the principles of freedom of maritime communication and every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.114 Hence, the ratio decidendi of this 
case was that every state has an obligation not to allow its territory to be used 
for acts contrary to the rights of other states. This ratio has been frequently 
relied on in various other cases related to environmental pollution. In the 
case of environmental law, this “…implies a duty of a polluting state to 
notify other states of the acts that it knows happen within its territory and can 
adversely affect other states.”115  
 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration attempts to balance these 
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two principles. The second part of Principle 21 was considered very 
important by many delegations. For example, the Canadian delegation 
commented that this principle reflected the existing rules of international law 
with the first element stressing on the rights of States while the second 
element making it clear that those rights must be limited or balanced by the 
responsibility to ensure that the exercise of rights did not result in damage to 
others.116 The balancing of rights and responsibility was essential “to 
reconcile the national interests and those of the international community.”117 
Principle 21 makes it clear that the rule of responsibility applies not only to 
the damage caused to the environment of other states but also to any injury 
inflicted on the environment of ‘areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction’ such as high seas or Antarctica. Principle 22, though it does not 
prescribe compensation as a right, says that the states shall further cooperate 
to develop the international law regarding the liability and compensation for 
the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities 
within the jurisdiction or control of such States or to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.  
2.4.8 International Cooperation in Environmental Matters with due 
Respect to the Values of Each Country 
Principles 23 to 25 of the Declaration emphasize the requirement of 
cooperative spirit by all countries, big or small, on equal footing.118 At the 
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same time, it notes that when a particular country attempts to determine the 
domestic legal standards, it has to consider the systems of values prevailing 
in each country.119    
2.4.9 Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment 
Principle 26 says that the States should strive to reach an agreement 
to save man and environment from the effects of nuclear weapons and all 
other means of mass destruction.120 In this context it may be relevant to 
examine the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the use of Nuclear Weapons.  
In this case the UN General Assembly requested the ICJ to give its 
advice on the legality of use of nuclear weapons.121  Rejecting the contention 
that the use of nuclear weapons violated the right to life as enshrined in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Court held 
that “…arbitrary deprivation of life cannot be judged by simply using the 
Covenant but also by referring to the law applicable in armed conflict.”122 It 
also said that the right to self-defense does not prevent the use of nuclear 
weapons.  
Regarding the environmental protection, the ICJ held that “…the 
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environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could 
constitute a catastrophe for the environment.”123 It further said, “…the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality 
of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. 
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment.”124 The Court also said: “…although 
environmental treaties do not deprive the states of their right to self-defence, 
the states must take environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate 
military objectives. Respect for environment is one of the elements that go to 
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity 
and proportionality.”125 The Court concluded that international 
environmental law does not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons 
but provides important environmental factors to be taken into account in the 
implementation of principles that apply to armed conflict.126 
2.4.10 Effects of the Stockholm Declaration 
Many scholars have criticized the Stockholm Declaration. It is said 
that while one could not quarrel with the sequence of idea, it would have 
been better if the rights and duties of men had been enumerated.127 As far as 
the form is concerned, only Principles 7, 22, and 25 are stated in an 
obligatory form using the word ‘shall’. Most of the Principles use, the next 
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best ‘should’ or ‘must’ in their language. However, taking the Declaration as 
a whole, it is surprising that despite the generality of some provisions and 
their uncertain phrasing, the general tone is one of a strong sense of 
dedication to the idea of establishing the basic rules of international 
environmental law. The United States Report on the Stockholm Conference 
states that, though the Declaration ‘preserves a number of extremely 
important principles of conduct for States in dealing with environmental 
problems of international significance’, it is, however, less balanced and less 
focused on international environmental concerns.128 It also lays down the 
idea that international law should no longer be purely an interstate system 
but should bring both the individuals and the international organizations into 
picture.129 
2.5 World Charter for Nature and Brundtland Commission and 
Publication of “Our Common Future”130 
 The World Charter for Nature sponsored by thirty-four developing 
nations was drafted by the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (hereinafter referred to as IUCN) and the other independent experts. 
It was adopted by the General Assembly in the year 1982. General Principles 
of this Charter says that that nature must be respected and the habitat and life 
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forms must be safeguarded to ensure their survival.131 It recommends 
regulating economic development to support long-term capacity of 
ecosystems to support human use.132 It further encourages the states to adopt 
measures such as municipal and international legal framework for 
environmental awareness and public participation, for establishing 
administrative regulations and machineries; for assessing the impact of 
military activities on the environment etc.  Most importantly, it also 
recommends for the ‘Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter referred 
to as EIA)’ before any project is initiated. Some developing countries were 
against the inclusion of EIA on the ground that they do not have the 
necessary technologies to conduct EIA to the extent of developed 
countries.133 Their claim was that it makes the developing countries 
dependant on the developed countries for the technology transfer.134   
 The constitution of Brundtland Commission and the publication of its 
report “Our Common Future” was another milestone in the development of 
the international environmental law. It gives a detailed overview of the 
various international environmental issues. The most important concept that 
was forwarded by ‘Our Common Future’ was the ‘Sustainable 
Development’. It is defined as: “the development that satisfies the needs of 
present generations without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs.”135  
2.6 UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, Rio de 
Janeiro 
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The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(hereinafter referred to as the UNCED), 1992, is also known as the Rio 
Summit or the Rio Conference or the Earth Summit. Representatives of 172 
states, more than 2000 representatives from non-governmental organizations 
attended the Summit. The main issues that were discussed at the Conference 
are as follows; 
(a) Systematic scrutiny of patterns of production, particularly the 
production of toxic components, such as lead or poisonous waste 
including the radioactive chemicals 
(b) Alternative sources of energy to replace the use of fossil fuels, which 
are linked to the climate change. 
(c) Reliance on public transportation systems in order to reduce the 
vehicle emissions, congestion in cities and the health problems 
caused by pollution. 
(d) Growing water scarcity.  
 The results of the Rio Conference are inter alia (a) the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development; (b) the Agenda 21; and (c) 
the Forest Principles. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity and The 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (also known as UNFCCC) were 
also opened for signature at the Summit.  
 Similar to the Stockholm Conference, the UNCED was also 
concerned with the balance between the environmental protection and the 
economic development. Since the environmental concerns have been 
marginal in the broader scheme of the international legal and institutional 
arrangements, the main idea was to influence and create behaviour to 
integrate environmental protection into the economical and the 
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developmental activities.  
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which 
consists of 27 principles, represents a series of compromises between the 
developed and the developing countries and also a balance between the 
objectives of the environmental protection and the economic development.136 
Unlike the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration was not opened for 
negotiation at the Rio Conference. The final draft prepared by the Fourth 
Preparatory Committee in April 1992 was adopted without negotiation, thus 
not giving an opportunity for the countries to raise their concerns.137 The 
following are the key features of the Declaration: 
2.6.1 Shift from Anthropocentric Approach to Environmental and 
Developmental Issues 
The Rio Declaration says that human beings are at the centre of 
concerns for sustainable development and that they are entitled to a healthy 
and productive life only in harmony with the nature. 138 Though like 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration139 reiterated the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources and Principle of Good Neighborliness, it added the word 
development to it. It is criticized that the addition of this word to Principle 2 
is for stronger emphasis on development and this ‘upsets the delicate balance 
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struck in Stockholm Declaration between the sovereign use of natural 
resources and the duty of care for the environment.”140  
 Principle 3 provides that the right to development must be fulfilled so 
as to equitably meet the developmental and other environmental needs of the 
present and the future generations.’141This has been held to be a victory for 
the developing countries since their claim that development is a prerequisite 
for environmental protection was recognized. However, the developed 
countries also had their share of joy. In return to Principle 3, the developed 
countries extracted Principle 4, which provides that in order to achieve the 
sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral part of the development processes and cannot be considered in 
isolation from it.142 In practical terms, Principle 4 can be read as permission 
or a condition that has to be satisfied for any developmental activities.143  
2.6.2 Principles of Environmental Law Recognized in the Rio 
Declaration 
The Rio Declaration expressly recognizes many principles of 
international environmental law, which were earlier regarded as a part of 
only the customary principles. By doing so, it intends to create the 
procedural support to the substantive principles adopted in the Stockholm 
Declaration. Those principles are explained below; 
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 The principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
(hereinafter referred to as CBDR) is one of the principles of international 
environmental law, which, has its foundation in the concept of equity. It has 
two levels of approach. The first one is the idea of ‘common responsibility’ 
based on the ‘common heritage and common concern of humankind’ where 
States have a duty to equally share the resources and protect the 
environment. The second is of Differentiated Responsibility that speaks 
about substantive equality. It is accepted that issues like unequal resources; 
social and economic situations, etc. prevent states from having the same 
effectiveness in combating the environmental degradation. Thus, it demands 
an equitable allocation of the costs of the environmental protection. The 
CBDR also has been expressly recognized by the Rio Declaration in its 
Principle 7, which says: 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's 
ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies 
place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command. 
Hence Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration commits all states to enact 
‘effective environmental legislation’ for the standards, objectives and 
priorities, which should reflect the environmental and developmental 
97 
context in which they apply.144  It also recognizes that standards applied by 
some countries ‘may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and 
social cost to other countries, in particular the developing countries.’ 
 
 The next important contribution of the Rio Conference is the 
Principles of Preventive Action and Precaution.145 The basic idea of the 
preventive approach is the idea of the saying that ‘Prevention is better than 
Cure.’ It says that it is always better to prevent harm to environment than 
thinking about the ways in which it can be restored later. This is also known 
as the Precautionary Principle. The Precautionary Principle generally says 
that every “action on environmental matters should be taken even if there is a 
lack of total scientific certainty, often reversing the burden of proof and 
placing it on those who claim that an activity is not damaging.”146 In most 
cases, a harm done to environment due to an action may not be visible 
immediately. For example, in the case of use of hazardous substances and its 
impact on the environment, it often happens that scientific evidence may not 
be conclusive to prove the harm done to the environment. In such cases, the 
precautionary principle advocates for preventing the harm rather than 
mitigating the harm subsequently. The development of this principle was in 
response to the arguments earlier raised by some states that their action was 
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due to “the lack of scientific certainty”. The United States has taken a 
skeptical approach towards the precautionary principle viewing it almost as a 
protectionist principle, a new non-tariff barrier to trade.147 The European 
Union, on the other extreme, has transformed the principle into a 
constitutional principle,148 favouring a strong version of the principle.149 
 Similarly, the Rio Declaration also recognizes “the polluter pays 
principle” in its Principle 16 which says that, “national authorities should 
endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use 
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment” 
The polluter pays principle demands the person who is in charge 
of polluting activities to be financially responsible for the damage that he 
causes. Some scholars contented that the argument has merely a rhetoric 
value because most of the polluters will be able to pass the costs of 
pollution onto the consumers.150 In many cases of pollution it will also be 
difficult to identify the polluter.151 The International Law Commission 
guidelines on the prevention of trans-boundary harm from hazardous 
activities not prohibited by international law, refer to the factors that 
must be taken into account for an equitable balance of interests between a 
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polluting State and a State that is the recipient of that trans-boundary 
pollution. In more detail, it is provided that for an equitable balance of 
interests between these two States to be achieved, “the degree to which 
the State of origin and, as appropriate, the State likely to be affected are 
prepared to contribute to the costs of prevention” must be taken into 
account.”152 This equitable balance of interests between the polluting 
State and the affected States seems to contradict the polluter pays 
principle.153 
 Though the term sustainable development154 is included in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, it was for the first time 
expressed in the Brundtland Report. It says that Sustainable Development 
means development that satisfies the needs of present generations without 
jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.155 
Thereafter in the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, it was 
further articulated that sustainable development has three pillars, viz. the 
economic development, the social development, and the environmental 
protection.156 
 Similarly, the Principle of Equitable Utilization157 of resources has 
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been developed through judicial decisions such as the Lac Lanoux case158. 
As already discussed, in this case it was held that each and every State has a 
duty to take into account the interests of other States before any attempt is 
made to exploit resources through negotiations and consultations. Similarly 
in the Oder and Meuse cases, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
referred to the right to equality of riparian states in sharing river water. The 
UN Watercourses Convention 1997 also refers to the principle of equitable 
utilization of watercourses.  
However, what is ‘equity’ remains an unanswered question as 
discussed in the previous chapter. A few scholars have viewed it as a 
defining concept of international law.159 But a few others have argued that 
equity considerations introduce the subjective element while interpreting 
international law160and should be avoided. Some others have also stated that 
“…equity would mean a fifty-fifty allocation of the resources; to others, 
those with priority in use must be protected; to still others, equitable 
allocation must be based on the needs independent of the extent to which a 
resource is located within the national boundaries.”161 
2.7 The Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration: A Comparative 
Analysis 
The following part analyses the Stockholm Declaration and Rio 
Declaration in a comparative perspective to facilitate an easy reference. 
(i)  Anthropocentricism in Rio Declaration and Stockholm Declaration: 
Theoretically both Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration are 
 
158   France v. Spain; 24.I.L.R. 101. 
159   Franck, Thomas M. (1998): Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, at p. 79. 
160   Rosalyn Higgins, (1999): “International Trade Law and Avoidance, Containment and 
Resolution of Disputes,” General Crouse in Public International Law, 230. 
161   Supra n. 156 at p. 53. 
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not binding documents, but it is widely accepted that the principles 
enunciated in these Declarations were already in existence as the part 
of the customary principles of international law. Both the documents 
exhibit a strong anthropocentric approach to environmental protection, 
though the Rio Declaration places the “human beings … at the centre 
of concerns for sustainable development”.  
(ii)  Prevention of Environmental Harm: The Stockholm Declaration in 
Principle 21 and Rio Declaration in Principle 2 recognize that a state 
has a responsibility to ensure that any activity within its jurisdiction 
does not cause damage to the environment of other States or to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction or control. The only difference is that Rio 
Declaration places more prominence on balancing of environment and 
the development.162  
(iii)  Right to Development in an Environmental Context: At both Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations, the relationship between the environment and 
development was one of the most sensitive challenges.163 Initially the 
developed countries came up with more ‘ecology oriented’ drafts, 
which was successfully opposed by the developing countries, who 
wanted the Declarations to be made from a developmental perspective. 
In this regard, the Principle 8 of the Stockholm Declaration says that 
“the economic and social development” is essential. Here it is pertinent 
to note that Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration emphasizes that the 
 
162  This obligation is balanced by the declarations’ recognition, in the first part of the 
respective principles, of a State’s sovereign right to “exploit” its natural resources 
according to its “environmental” (Stockholm Declaration) and “environmental and 
developmental” policies (Rio Declaration). 
163  Gunther Handl, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
and Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/ 
avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html (accessed on 23/08/2011). 
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“right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet the 
developmental and environmental needs of the present and the future 
generations”.  
 (iv)  Precautionary Action: Though the Rio Declaration in its Principle 15 
provides that “the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
the States according to their capabilities”, there is no parallel to it in the 
Stockholm Declaration. This principle says that “whenever there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, a lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not excuse States from taking cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.”164Though it is accepted as a 
principle of the international law, some of the states still question its 
status as a principle of international law on the ground that there is no 
authoritative definition for this.165  
 (v)  Common But Differentiated Responsibilities:  Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration says that “in view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradations, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. Since then, this has been a matter of controversy. 
Gunther Handl says that “specifically, taken at face value the formula 
seems to imply a causal relationship between the environmental 
degradation and the degree of responsibility. However, the “differential 
responsibilities” has also been considered as a function of “capability” 
that is reflective of a state’s developmental status. Unlike the 
essentially contemporaneous provision in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, which refers to the 
“States’ common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
 
164  Ibid. 
165  Ibid. 
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capabilities”, Principle, 7 omits any reference to the capabilities in 
relation to developing countries”.166 What remains unclear, at any rate, 
is whether CBRD implies that ‘developing country status’ in and of 
itself entails a potential diminution of environmental legal obligations 
beyond, what a contextually determined due diligence standard would 
indicate as appropriate for the particular country concerned.167  
 (vi) Procedural Safeguards: The Stockholm Declaration modestly 
emphasizes the need for environmental and developmental planning.168 
On the contrary, the Rio Declaration unequivocally calls upon States to 
assess and to inform and consult with the other potentially affected 
States, whenever there is a risk of significantly harmful effects on the 
environment.169 
 (vii)  Public Participation: Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration says that 
“environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level”. Thereafter it calls upon 
States to ensure that each individual has access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and justice in environmental 
matters.170  
 (viii) The Interface of Trade and Environment: Principle 12 of the Rio 
Declaration seeks to address the issues pertaining to the 
interrelationship between international trade and environmental 
conservation and protection. After exhorting the States to avoid trade 
 
166  Ibid. 
167  Ibid. 
168   Rio Declaration, Principles 13 to 15 and 17-18.  
169   Principle 17 calls for environmental impact assessment; Principle 18 for emergency 
notification and Principle 19 for (routine) notification and consultation. 
170  Supra n. 167. 
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policy measures for environmental purposes as “a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade,” it goes against the extra-jurisdictional unilateral action of the 
states. 171 It says that “unilateral actions to deal with environmental 
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided”. As a response to the adoption of the Principle 12, the “United 
States offered an interpretative statement that asserted that in certain 
circumstances, trade measures could be an effective and appropriate 
means of addressing environmental concerns outside the national 
jurisdiction. This US position has now been fully vindicated. As the 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body first acknowledged in 
the Shrimp-Turtle case172, unilateral trade measures to address 
extraterritorial environmental problems may indeed be a “common 
aspect” of measures in restraint of international trade exceptionally 
authorized by the Article XX of the GATT.”173 
 (ix)  Indigenous People: Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration recognizes the 
role of indigenous people in the environmental protection. It says that the 
“vital role of indigenous people and their communities and other local 
communities” in the conservation and sustainable management of the 
environment, given their knowledge and traditional practices is 
important. Thereafter, it recommends that the “States shall recognize and 
duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective 
 
171   Language that closely follows Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT, 1994). 
172  India etc. v. United States of America (Case relating to import prohibition of shrimp and 
shrimp products by the USA); WTO case No 58 and 61 (1998). 
173  Supra n. 170. 
105 
participation in the achievement of sustainable development”. 174 
 (x)  Women in Development: The Rio Declaration in its Principle 20 says that 
the empowerment of women and their ability to effectively participate in 
their countries’ economic and social processes is an essential condition for 
sustainable development. It also says that women have a “vital role in the 
environmental management and development” and hence, there is a 
consequent need for “their full participation.” 
 (xi)  Environmental Liability and Compensation: Another important aspect 
of both Rio Declaration and the Stockholm Declaration is their call for 
the further development of the law bearing on environmental liability 
and compensation. Though Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration 
speaks about the commitment in international law only, Principle 13 of 
the Rio Declaration speaks about both national and international law. 
2.8 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that with the evolution of 
the Global Environment Law, the regulatory regimes have become 
increasingly complex and technical. It is mainly because of the fact that the 
environmental considerations are coupled with various other social issues 
such as development, poverty, human rights, technology, etc. It is certain that 
GERR is no more laying down mere normative standards but demonstrates 
the vital implications of the environmental degradation and the need for 
responsive action by the member countries. 
 However, the major challenge for international environmental law is 
globalization. The notion of globalization has formally entered the vocabulary of 
international environmental law with the World Summit on Sustainable 
 
174  Supra n.170. 
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Development in the year 2002 (hereinafter referred to as WSSD). It says that 
“globalization offers opportunities and challenges for the sustainable 
development…globalization and interdependence are offering new opportunities 
to trade, investment capital flows and advances in technology, including 
information technology, for the growth of the world economy, development and 
the improvement of living standards around the world.”175   
 
 Further, the WSSD says that “globalization should be fully inclusive 
and equitable, and there is a strong need for policies and measures at the 
national and international levels, formulated and implemented with the full 
and effective participation of the developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition, to help them to respond effectively to those 
challenges and opportunities.”176  The international law, especially GERR 
when it comes to climate change and global environmental governance, 
should be one, capable of dealing the problem of increasing ‘gap between 
rich and the poor’, the unfair labor standards in the developing world, and 
the deterioration of the environment.   
 
 
175  The World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, Plan of Implementation: 
Sustainable Development in a Globalised World, Para 45. 
176  Ibid. 
107 
Chapter III 
Fairness in Global Climate Change Regulatory                           
Regime: An Analysis 
 
The economy is a wholly owned subsidiary of the environment 
and not the other way around.1 
 
The threat of climate change was sufficiently established through scientific 
evidence by the 1980’s, which pressurized the policy makers around the world 
to search for various options. 2  They were also aware that, as a global 
phenomenon, climate change would hit both the developing and the developed 
countries with no particular preference. It is also a documented fact that the 
developing countries are likely to be the most vulnerable to the impact of 
climate change due to their general dependence on agriculture and more 
significantly for their limited capacity to adapt to the changed environmental 
demands.3  The fact that the majority of low-lying and island nations fall 
within the Third World also entails a more obvious susceptibility to climate 
change for developing countries. 4  It also appears that the international 
 
1  Nelson, Gaylord (2002): Beyond the Earth Day: Fulfilling the Promise, Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, at p. 16. 
2  The Impact of Climate Change has been described as quite broad ranging, covering sea 
level rise, changes in weather patterns and the various adverse effects on living conditions 
such as dessertification and disease migration. The causes and effects of the greenhouse 
effect are multiple and complex and hence a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For an overview of the problems of climate change, see, Horsch, Richard and 
Richards, Joseph (1998): “Does Kyoto Protocol fall Short of the Mark?,”  New York Law 
Journal 4:22. 
3  In fact this has been acknowledged by the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Fourth 
Conference of Parties. See Statement by the Executive Secretary, (1998): “Report of the 
Conference of the Parties,” Fourth Session of COP (Buneoos Aires). U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1998/16 (1998). 
4  Panjabi, Rani Khooshie Lal (1993):  “Can International Law Improve the Climate? An 
Analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change signed at the 
Rio Summit in 1992”, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 18: 491, at pp. 532-536. 
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response to climate change will have major impact on life-style choices of 
individuals to the extent that it would require significant modifications in 
practices relating to consumption of resources. All of this will incur huge cost 
and would therefore have impact on international trade and the state of 
economy worldwide.5 
Responding to these concerns, the UN General Assembly (hereinafter 
referred to as UNGA) established the ‘Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee’ (hereinafter referred to as INC) for drafting a global legal 
standard in December 1990. The INC submitted the draft UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to the UNGA, which was adopted 
and opened for signature at the UNCED, 1992.6 The UNFCCC fundamentally 
aims at stabilizing the concentration of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere of the earth at a level that will prevent irreversible or dangerous 
interference with the global climate.7 A timeframe is also set for such a 
stabilization so as to be “sufficient to allow the ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”8    
However, the non-binding nature of the language of UFCCC has been a 
reason for many authors to criticize it. For some scholars, the UNFCCC was 
disappointing9 because it had failed to include binding stabilization and reduction 
 
5  Bodansky, Daniel (1993): “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: A Commentary” Yale Journal of International law 18: 451 at pp. 475-476.  
6  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on May 9, 
1992, [1771 UNTS 164, 31 ILM 851]. Hereinafter referred to as UNFCCC. 
7  The UNFCCC, Article 9. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Supra n. 5 at pp. 458-71. 
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commitment and suggests only vague commitments.10 They also pointed  out its 
failure to include a global climate change mitigation fund and a mechanism for 
transferring technology as sought by the developing nations. However it was also 
supported by many authors as a success mainly because of the fact that it 
unambiguously recognized the climate change as a threat.11 Another merit of 
UNFCCC was that it set long-term goals to stabilize GHG emissions ‘at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.’ 12   Thus in the making of the GCCRR, 13  there was a visible 
confrontation between the developed countries and the developing countries.14  
This chapter aims at analyzing this confrontation through the lenses of fairness.15 
 
10  See also, Kerr, Richard (1991): “U.S. Bites Greenhouse Bullet and Gags,” Science 251: 
868; Gutfeld, Rose (1991): “Climate Change Pact is Reached by 143 Nations-Treaty 
Begins Initial Attack on Global Warming,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, at p. A7. 
11  Soltau, Friedrich (2009): Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p.51. 
12  The UNFCCC, Article 2. 
13  The Global Climate Change Regulatory Regime includes the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992; the Kyoto Protocol, 1997 and other relevant and 
related documentation that lays down the normative standards in this area.   
14  In fact it has been suggested, “It is virtually impossible to analyse any international law 
today without considering the North-South confrontation and examining how the 
particular treaty fits into that context. The relationship between the developed and the 
developing nations has become the most important global issue since end of cold war.” 
Says, Panjabi. See Supra n. 4 at p. 515. See also, Marc Williams, (1993): “Rearticulating 
the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda,” Third World Quarterly, 
14:7, at p. 25. It says that “the North-South issues are inscribed in the international 
environmental agenda at two structural levels. In the equality of responsibility for 
environmental degradation and in the relative abilities to cope with these problems…the 
central issue concerns the way in which North-South issues are raised, the prominence 
given to them and their impact on the bargaining process.”  
15  International law being subjected to a fairness test might be selfishly motivated to the 
extent that it helps to maintain a level of international and national peace and security and 
may result in an improved standard of living for particular states/individuals. Selfless 
motivations stem from a desire to see the international law regulate and implement what 
is right and just, for the sake of global community, irrespective of the particular outcome 
for the state/individual in question. On the issue of environmental concern as an issue of 
international security, see, Gunther Handl, (1991): “Environmental Security and Global 
Change: The Challenge to International Law,” Year Book of International Environmental 
Law 1: 3. 
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3.1  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 (UNFCCC), 1992 
 The negotiating history of the UNFCCC roughly began in the year 
1988 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (hereinafter 
referred to as IPCC) was created under the joint patronage of the World 
Meteorological Organization (hereinafter referred to as WMO) and the UN 
Environment Programme (hereinafter referred to as UNEP).16 The purposes of 
the creation of the IPCC were aptly identified by the UNGA in its resolution 
endorsing the establishment of IPCC. It said that “the identification and 
possible strengthening of the relevant existing international legal instruments 
having a bearing on climate . . . (and) elements for inclusion in a possible 
future international convention on climate change” were the purposes of 
IPCC. 17  However, the IPCC was severely also criticized from the very 
beginning. Since the majority of the members of the IPCC were from 
developed countries, the developing countries opposed the new climate 
convention being negotiated and drafted under the auspices of IPCC.18   
The year 1989 was another milestone in the history of GCCRR.  It was 
during this period that many powerful industrial houses in the USA, worried 
about the ill consequences of climate change on their business, started 
lobbying and pressurizing the USA for supporting the creation of new climate 
change regime. 19  As a consequence of the efforts of USA, the UNEP 
Governing Council adopted a resolution mandating the UNEP to commence 
 
16  Supra n. 11. 
17  UNGA Res. 53, UN GAOR, Forty-Third Session, UN Doc. A/RES/43/53/(1988). 
18  UNGA Res. 207, UN GAOR, Forty-Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/RES/44/207 (1989), at 
preamble para. 9. 
19  Bodansky, Daniel (1994): “Prologue to the Climate Change Convention,” in Irving 
L.Minzer and J. Amber Leonard (eds.,) Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of 
Rio Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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the preparations for negotiating an international convention on climate 
change. However, because of the depth and ambit of the problem known as 
climate change, there was soon a consensus that such a negotiation should take 
place under the auspices of the UNGA and not under a specialized 
agency/organ like the UNEP or the WMO.20 It was mainly because of the 
concerns of the developing countries that the IPCC ‘did not ensure their 
participation in the process and did not adequately represent their interests’.21  
The negotiating history also shows that there were two options 
available for the stakeholders. One was to have a framework convention with 
additional binding protocols and the other one was to have a specific binding 
convention. The UN, under pressure from the developed countries, supported 
the former and called on states to “prepare, as a matter of urgency, a 
framework convention on climate change and associated protocols containing 
concrete commitments in the light of priorities that may be authoritatively 
identified on the basis of sound scientific knowledge, and taking into account 
the specific developmental needs of the developing countries.”22 Thereafter 
the UNGA established the INC with a mandate to pursue “a single 
intergovernmental negotiating process under the auspices of the General 
Assembly.”23  
 
20  Delphine Borione and Jean Ripert, (1994): “Exercising Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility,” in Irving L. Minzer & J. Amber Leonard (eds.,) Negotiating Climate 
Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
21  See, Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, GA 
Res. 44/207, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.49, UN Doc. A/res/44/207 (1989) 130. 
22  UNGA Res. 207, UN GAOR, Forty-Fourth Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/44/207 (1989), at 
preamble para. 9. 
23  UNGA Res. 212, UN GAOR, Forty-Fifth Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/45/212 (1990). See 
also, Ahmed Djoghlaf, (1994): “The Beginnings of an International Climate Law,” in 
Irving L. Minzer & J. Amber Leonard (eds.,) Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside 
Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Throughout the negotiations, the USA, as supported by the various 
European States, opposed the inclusion of any binding targets for stabilization 
and reduction of emission. The various clubs of developed countries 
demanded that the rule of ‘Common Responsibility’24 should be the basis of 
emission reduction under the UNFCCC. Their main contention was that 
climate change is a global threat and all the countries have an equal 
responsibility towards its mitigation and prevention.  However, the 
developing nations demanded a different treatment altogether. Instead of 
‘Common Responsibility’, they demanded ‘Common But Differentiated 
Responsibility’ (CBDR) to be the foundational rule of UNFCCC. They also 
urged that the responsibility should be fixed after considering, (i) each state’s 
contribution to environmental harm in the past, and (ii) their respective 
capabilities based on equitable grounds of fairness and justice.  This continued 
until the last session of the INC, during which a compromise was reached and 
CBDR was opted to be the foundational principle. However as part of the 
compromise, targets and timetables were replaced by a more soft, non-binding 
language, according to which the industrialized countries need to report on 
their policies and measures to reduce emissions, with the aim of returning 
emissions to their base-year levels, i.e., the year 1990.25  
 
24  The term ‘Common Responsibility’ derived its meaning from the notions of ‘Common 
Concerns’ or ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’. In this sense, the ‘Common 
Responsibility’ gives all parties the right as well as obligations in the collective and 
individual interest in the enforcement of a treaty. This further indicates the existence of an 
erga omnes obligations (obligation towards all) and thus creates greater accountability in 
the regime building process. For a detailed analysis on this topic; see, Rajamani, L. 
(2006): Differential Treatment in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
Rajamani, L. (2007): “The Nature, Promise and Limits of Differential Treatment in the 
Climate Change Regime”, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 16:81.; Joyner, 
C.C. (2002): “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”, American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, 96:358. 
25  Supra n. 16 at p. 53. 
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Nevertheless, during this stage the developing countries contended that 
they have no sufficient resources and hence the proposed convention should give 
priority to their economic development. In this regard, they demanded the 
transfer of technology and the transfer of finance to bring in the idea of 
distributive fairness or equitable sharing of the burden of environmental 
protection. The developed countries opposed this requirement since they were 
well aware of the financial burden and other related liabilities this would attach 
with them.  Instead they pleaded for a contributory funding mechanism, which 
they called the ‘Global Environment Facility (hereinafter referred to as GEF)’. 
But the developing countries were skeptical of this suggestion as the governance 
structure of the GEF was proposed to be under the control of the developed 
countries.26 However, there was no consensus among the developing countries 
during this period also. For instance, the island and small low-lying states formed 
a club of their own known as the ‘Alliance of Small Island States’ and demanded 
more stringent provisions for financial support and transfer of technology in the 
proposed GCCRR. 
 Though the UNFCCC27 is referred to as an umbrella convention, it 
according to some authors, ‘falls somewhere between a framework and a 
substantive convention’. That is because it establishes more comprehensive 
obligations than the usual umbrella conventions and at the same time, ‘falling 
short of the detailed commitments’.28 The provisions of UNFCCC, which 
contains a total of twenty-six articles and three Annexes, may be roughly 
clubbed under the following four headings: 
 
26  Elizabeth Dowdeswell and Richard J. Kinley (1994): “Constructive Damage to the Status 
Quo,” in Irving L. Minzer & J. Amber Leonard (eds.,) Negotiating Climate Change: The 
Inside Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
27  The UNFCCC was adopted at UNCED, 1992 at Rio De Janeiro in it entered into force in 
March 1994. 
28  Supra n. 5 at pp. 458-71. 
114 
i. Introductory Provisions;  
ii. Commitments and Associated Provisions;  
iii. Institutions established by UNFCCC; and  
iv. Provisions relating to amendments etc.  
The Introductory Provisions consist of the preamble, definitions29, objective 
of the UNFCCC 30  and the principles guiding the implementation of 
UNFCCC.31 The Preamble of the UNFCCC notes “…that the largest share of 
the historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated 
in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are 
still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in 
developing countries will grow to meet their social and developmental needs.” 
Thus it places an important space for the issue of fairness. Importance is also 
given to the principle of CBDR32 and the special vulnerability to the impacts 
of climate change of low-lying, small island developing countries.33 Though 
the language of the Preamble is only inspirational, it definitely forms part of 
the context in which the other provisions of the UNFCCC could be interpreted 
and particularly, in the light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1969.34  
 
29  The UNFCCC Article 1. 
30  Id. at Article 2. 
31  Id. at Article 3. 
32  Id. at Preamble , paras. 6 and 23. 
33  Id. at Preamble, para 24. Paragraphs 25 and 26 also speak about the special vulnerability 
of countries ‘whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production,’ like 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states. 
34  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Article 31 states, “(1) A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. (2) The context for 
the purposes of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes….’ 
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 In this context, it is interesting to note that sovereign equality of states, 
which is the hallmark of international law, stipulates that states are bound as 
equals (at least theoretically 35 ) as far as the international agreements are 
concerned. The UNFCCC is an exception to this rule, by providing varied rights 
and obligations, 36  though it is not the first international environmental 
instrument that provides such a differentiated treatment.37The principles that are 
recognized under the UNFCCC include:38  
(i) The principle of protection of the climate system for the benefit of the 
present and the future generations of humankind (Inter-generational 
and Intra-generational Equity);39  
(ii) The Principle of Equity (Equitable Distribution);40 
 
35  In realty states vary with respect to their economic power, military might and the strength of 
their institutions. 
36  But such exceptions existed earlier also. For example, the General Agreements of Tariffs 
and Trade, 1947 which recognised the disadvantaged position of less developed countries, 
stating in Article XXXVI, sub-para.8 that “the developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs 
and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.”  
37  The Stockholm Declaration stressed on the need to consider, “the applicability of standards 
which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and 
unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.” See, the Report of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Conference n the Human 
Environment, 26th Session Princ. 23, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972); 11cILM 1416, 142. 
Similarly Ri Conference, 1992 was conspicuous for its endorsement of the differentiated 
responsibilities between the developed and the developing countries.  
38  For a detailed analysis of these Principles; see, chapter 2. This Chapter focuses on the 
Principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility’ as applicable to GCCRR from a 
fairness perspective. 
39  Supra n. 29 at Article 3 (1) which reads thus: “ The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 
40  Id. at Article 3 (2) reads thus: “The specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have 
to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full 
consideration.” 
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(iii) The Principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ 
(CBDR)41;  
(iv) The Principle of Sustainable Development;42 and  
(v) The Precautionary Principle.43 
Regarding these Principles as enunciated in the UNFCCC, it has been opined 
that “considered overall, the phrasing of the principles reveals several, 
sometimes opposing strands. For example, phrases emphasizing 
environmental integrity are linked to the cost-effectiveness of measures. 
Similarly, the mitigation measures should not come at the cost of development 
for the developing countries, and mitigation measures should not constitute an 
unjustifiable restriction on the international trade.”44  
 
41   Id. at Article 3 (5) reads thus: “The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them 
better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, 
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” 
42   Id. at Article 3 (4) reads thus: “The Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against 
human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party 
and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that 
economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.” 
43   Id. at Article 3 (3) says that “The Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into 
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies 
and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be 
comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and 
adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be 
carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.” 
44   Supra n. 25 at p.55. 
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Further the scope of CBDR as recognized by article 3 of UNFCCC45, 
is different from the CBDR that is recognized in Articles 6 and 7 of Rio 
Declaration.46 The CBDR recognized under Rio assigns a leadership role to 
the developed countries based on their enhanced contribution to 
environmental degradation in the past. But the CBDR under UNFCCC 
contains no reference to such enhanced contributions from developed 
countries based on environmental degradation that they have caused in the 
past. As noted by a writer, the “…ambiguity created in the notion of CBDR 
due to differing terms of the UNFCCC Article 3 and Rio Principle 7 has 
resulted in two incompatible views on the basis on which responsibilities 
between Parties are ‘differentiated’. One, that the CBDR principle is based on 
the differences that exist with regard to the level of economic development 
alone’. And, the other that the CBDR principle is based on ‘differing 
contributions to global environmental degradation and not in different levels 
of development’.”47At the same time it could be argued that the CBDR under 
 
45   The UNFCCC, 1992. Article 3 says that ‘(1) The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse impacts thereof.” Clause 2 further says that 
“The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially 
those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, and those 
parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate 
or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.”  
46   See Rio Declaration, 1992. Article 6 states that “the special situation and needs of 
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally 
vulnerable, shall be given priority. Similarly Principle 7 says that the States shall 
cooperate in the spirit of global partnership t conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In the view of different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international 
pursuit of sustainable development in view of pressures their societies place on the global 
environment and the technologies and financial resources they command.”   
47   Rajamani, L. (2012): “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”, in Navroz K. 
Dubash, Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, at p. 121. 
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UNFCCC is enriched by the CBDR under Rio Declaration, resulting in 
contribution based responsibility even under the former. However, despite the 
possibility of broad interpretation of CBDR under UNFCCC, the language 
used in Article 3 ensures that it is applied only to parties and only in relation to 
UNFCCC, not as a general law.48  
 Further, the use of the world should in UNFCCC Article 3, rather than 
shall indicates that the obligation of the developed countries should not be 
misunderstood in binding legal terms.  Even at the time of drafting, 
developing countries had argued that developed countries should assume 
leadership in climate actions because they, through their high per capita 
energy consumption, historically bear the main responsibility for rising 
concentrations of GHGs.49 However, the unsuccessful attempt to include a 
language to this effect and the reference to ‘respective capabilities’ that was 
inserted to underline that capabilities, instead of the differential contribution 
to global emissions, are the main reasons for the developed countries taking 
the lead in combating climate change.50  
 Article 2 of the UNFCCC, which the IPCC calls as Ultimate Objective 
of UNFCCC,51 states its objectives as “the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. It is also mandated that this level 
“should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
 
48   Supra n. 28 at p.451. 
49   Supra n. 44 at p.191. 
50   Ibid. 
51  See IPCC Working Group III (2007): Mitigation of Climate Change, available at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch1s1-2.html (accessed on 22/ 
06/ 2011). 
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manner.” However, it is not clear as to whether the wordings of Article 2 cast 
as an obligation on the polluting states or as a collective commitment of all 
states to strive, in good faith, to stabilize GHG concentrations through the 
implementation of UNFCCC and subsequent protocols.52  However, even 
after two decades of the adoption of UNFCCC, it remains a fact that, 
‘anthropogenic climate change’ still adversely affects the environment. But at 
the same time, any costly mitigation measures might also adversely effect the 
economic development. Since the inception of the UNFCCC, this has been 
remaining as the major dilemma for the policymakers around the world.  
3.1.1  Commitments of State Parties under the UNFCCC and Fairness 
 Divide  
 Towards achieving the objective enunciated in Article 2, but based on 
the Principle of CBDR, the UNFCCC classifies its signatories mainly into two 
groups. However, the countries that do not fall in either of these two groups 
are generally considered as the third group. The following table shows the 
classification in detail. 




1 Annex I countries Industrialized countries and economies in transition 
2 Annex II Countries Developed countries who pay for the costs of developing 
countries 
3 Non-Annex I 
countries  
Developing Countries and the Least Developed Countries 
 
 
52   Supra n. 48 at p. 500. 
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 This classification aims at bridging the economic divide amongst 
signatories by stipulating the common but differentiated responsibility as the 
foundational rule of global emission reduction.  Differentiation exists with 
respect to emission reduction and reporting obligations of Annex I countries. 
UNFCCC also provides that Annex II countries (a subset of Annex I countries, 
essentially the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development known as OECD) have special responsibilities to assist the 
developing countries in meeting their commitments. Article 4(3) provides that 
Annex II parties “shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by the developing country Parties” in complying 
with their reporting obligations.  Annex-II countries are also required to take 
all practicable measures, to promote and finance the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies to the developing countries. The notion is 
that in the absence of such differentiated responsibility, it would not be fair to 
expect the developing countries to shoulder their share of the mitigation 
burden. 
 According to the UNFCCC, the following are the general 
commitments,53 i.e. the common responsibility of all the signatory states. 
However, such a commitment is subject to the ‘differentiated responsibility’ 
after considering each country’s specific national as well as regional 
developmental priorities and objectives.54  
(a) To prepare a ‘National Inventory of Anthropogenic Emissions’ for 
identifying the sources from which this emissions takes place. 
However, such a calculation has to be done by the ‘Comparable 
 
53   Supra n. 43 at Article 4. 
54   Id. at Article 4(1). 
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Methodologies’ that is agreed by the parties to the UNFCCC.55 
(b) The State parties also have a responsibility to formulate, implement, 
publish and regularly update the various measures taken by them to 
mitigate the anthropogenic emissions.56 
(c) Promote practices that would mitigate anthropogenic emissions 
including the transfer of technology57 
(d) Promote and cooperate in the sustainable management and 
conservation and the enhancement of sinks and reservoirs such as 
biomass, forests and oceans.58 
(e)  Cooperate in preparing for the adaptation strategies to the impacts of 
climate change by developing the appropriate and integrated plans.59 
(f) Take the climate change considerations into account, in their relevant 
social, economic and environmental policies and actions. 
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, 
socio-economic and other research 60  and exchange the relevant 
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal 
information related to the climate system and climate change.61  
(h) Promote education, training and public awareness relating to the 
climate change. 
However, as already noted above, the article 4(2) of the UNFCCC assigns to 
 
55   Id. at Article 4(1) (a).  
56   Id. at Article 4(1)(b). 
57  Id. at Article 4(1) (c). 
58  Id. at Article 4 (1)(d). 
59  Id. at Article 4 (1)(e). 
60   Id. at Article 4 (1)(f). 
61   Id. at Article 4 (1)(g). 
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the developed countries listed in Annex 2, special commitments towards this 
end and they also have a responsibility to lead with their own commitment. 
They are committed to adopting national policies and taking corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs and protecting the sinks. The Annex I countries are also 
required to report periodically on the preceding policies undertaken by them, 
“with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.” 62 It 
is commented that though it is a binding obligation, it is rather a weak and 
diluted one.63 According to another view, even when these countries met the 
record, it was not because of their commitment to the UNFCCC, but because 
of the economic factors that were unrelated to the mitigation measures, such as 
economic collapse and recession that eventually lead to the closure of many 
industries in those countries.64 
 With regard to the reporting mechanism, similar to other international 
conventions such as the ICCPR, the UNFCCC also has an inbuilt State 
Reporting and Communication Mechanism.65 Under this mechanism, each 
state is required to report the inventories and the applicable methodologies 
that reinforce the Conference of Parties (hereinafter referred to as COP) 
through the Secretariat. While the requirement of reporting is on all parties, 
the Annex I countries must also include in their reports and communications, 
the detailed descriptions of policies and measures to mitigate climate 
change. 66  However, the developing countries have a ‘Differentiated 
 
62   Id. at Article 4 (2)(b). 
63   Supra n. 52 at p. 516. 
64  For example the collapse of USSR led to the closure of many industries which eventually 
resulted in reduction in emission.  
65   Supra n. 62 at Article 12. 
66   Id. at Article 12 (2). 
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Responsibility’. They are required to submit their first national 
communication either within three years of the entry into force of the 
UNFCCC or when sufficient financial resources are available with them. 
However, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) may submit their national 
communications at their discretion.67 This mechanism forms a fundamental 
part of the UNFCCC, as reporting and monitoring mechanisms are vital for 
measuring the progress. They also facilitate the development of common 
standards and build trust among the parties. Reporting and monitoring 
mechanism has become the notable feature of multilateral environmental 
agreements, like treaties relating to human rights. While the UNFCCC does 
not explicitly empower any of its institutions to review compliance with its 
provisions, the COP has elaborated a process of in-depth expert review of 
Annex I and Annex II Parties’ Reports.68 However, concerns still exist about 
the effectiveness of the reporting procedures also. It can be seen that, very 
often, countries tend to submit their reports concealing the actual facts that 
would go against their interest.69 
 The commitment to transfer technology from the developed countries 
to the developing countries and the least developed countries (hereinafter 
referred to as LDC) includes “…processes covering the flows of know-how, 
experience, and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change 
among the different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, 
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, and research/ 
education institutions.”70 Questions pertaining to transfer of technology are 
 
67   Id. at Article 12 (5). 
68   Jacob Werksman, (1999): “Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone 
into a Flexible Regime,” in Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hay (eds.) Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law, 9:48 at pp.65-66. 
69   Supra n. 16 at p.191. 
70   Id. at p. 194. 
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related to the international environmental law and the principle of CBDR in a 
number of ways. Firstly, to manage the emission of GHGs at minimum, it is 
critical that resource-intensive, less polluting technologies are used in 
economic and industrial activities globally. If the developing countries 
continue to use the polluting technology, contending that the developed 
countries used such polluting technologies in the past, its impact on global 
climate would be disastrous.  It would again be unfair and inequitable, if the 
developing countries were asked to reduce/stop their economic activities 
simply because their technology is out-dated and polluting. Transfer of 
technology is the only answer to such a problem. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the UNFCCC requires the Annex II countries to transfer 
Environmentally Sound Technologies (hereinafter referred to as ESTs) to 
developing countries. 71 Prior to the emergence of GCCRR, the GERR also 
contained provisions regarding transferring the ESTs.71aThese commitments 
are generally casted in terms of a commitment by the developed countries to 
promote, facilitate, or finance the transfer of technology to the developing 
countries.72  But it appears that generally, these commitments have seldom 
gone beyond the rhetorical to the real transfer of ESTs.73 The provision of 
technology transfer under the UNFCCC does not even mandate the transfer of 
 
71   The UNFCCC, 1992. Article 4(5) provides that the “…developed country parties…shall 
take all practicable steps t promote and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access 
to, environmentally sound technologies and know –how to other parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions  of the 
Convention. In this processes, the developed country parties shall support the 
development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing 
country parties.”    
71a  See for example Principle 20 of the Stockholm Declaration, 1972; Principle 9 of the Rio 
Declaration, 1992, and chapter 34 of the Agenda 21). 
72   Verhoosel, Gatan (1998): “Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development:  
Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies”, Georgetown International and 
Environmental Law Review, 11: 49.   
73   Id. at pp. 49-51. 
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technology as a binding obligation, rather requires the parties to take ‘all 
practicable’ steps. Similarly, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (also known as TRIPS), which sets out the 
standards of protection for intellectual property, have also proved to be an 
obstacle in the effective transfer of ESTs. 
 In such a grossly unfair move, the USA filed a case at the WTO 
challenging India’s use of subsidies and ‘stipulations to buy domestic 
products’ in its solar programme under its National Solar Mission.74 Prior to 
2013, India had permitted the use of imported ‘thin film solar cells’ to be used 
in large-scale solar projects owing to the low domestic capacity to 
manufacture such cells. The USA was the largest beneficiary of such a policy 
and its exports of thin film solar cells had dominated the solar markets in 
India. Meanwhile, India changed its policy and stipulated that even the ‘thin 
film solar cells’ used in solar projects should be manufactured domestically 
and cannot be imported from other countries to avail the subsidies. The US 
with a fear to lose the largest solar energy market in the world75, filed the case 
with WTO alleging that India have violated the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (hereinafter referred to as GATT), 76  the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (also known as TRIMS) 77 , and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (also known as 
 
74   USA v. India (On Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, filed on 
11 February 2013) WT/DS456/1, G/L/1023, G/TRIMS/D/35, G/SCM/D96/1.  
75   India aims at developing 20,000 megawatts of solar power capacity by 2022. 
76   Under Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994. The USA alleges that India’s acts appear to 
provide less favourable treatment to imported solar cells and solar modules than that 
accorded to like products originating in India. 
77   Under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. The allegation is that because the measures 
appear to be trade-related investment measures inconsistent with Article III of the GATT 
1994. 
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SCMs),78  while providing a more favourable treatment to domestic solar 
producers and products than to foreign ones. This undoubtedly goes against 
the fundamentals of international climate change law.  
3.1.2  Institutional Arrangements under the UNFCCC 
 While analyzing the fairness in the climate change regime, it is also 
important to consider the nature of its supplementing institutions.  The is 
mainly because of the fact that once a new set of rules are established in a 
regime, the ongoing level of fairness will be greatly influenced by the 
structure and functioning of its various organizational, administrative and 
advisory bodies.79 Thomas Franck, in this regard states thus:80  
The extent to which institutions …are able t do these things [i.e. 
identifying issues, negotiating terms, monitoring compliance, 
reporting violations, adjudicating disputes etc.] will help shape the 
texture of the normative system and the capacity of the rules to pull 
towards compliance. The capacity of an institution to support a 
system of norms will depend, significantly, on whether it is 
perceived as a legitimate institution operating fairly. 
In this regard the UNFCCC establishes various organs such as the COP, the 
Secretariat, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (also 
 
78   Under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because the measures appear to 
provide a subsidy contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods; and Articles 
5(c), 6.3(a), and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement because the measures appear to cause 
serious prejudice to the interests of the United States through displacement or impedance 
of imports of U.S. solar cells and solar modules into India and through lost sales of U.S. 
solar cells and solar modules in India. 
79   Kirsten Bishop, (2000): “Fairness in International Environmental Law: Accommodation 
of the Concerns of Developing Countries in the Climate Change Regime”, Institute of 
Comparative Law: McGill University, at p. 36. 
80   Franck, Thomas M (1995): Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, at p. 35. 
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known as SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, and the Financial 
Mechanism and the Global Environmental Facility (also known as GEF). The 
COP was created under article 7 of the UNFCCC as the supreme body of the 
UNFCCC, which shall meet every year. The COP is empowered to make 
decisions to promote the effective implementation of the UNFCCC, including 
“exercising such other functions as are required for the achievement of the 
objectives of the Convention.” 81   The COP is also entrusted with such 
open-ended powers necessary to implement the UNFCCC. It is also provided 
that the COP shall take decisions on the basis of consensus.82 However, this has 
resulted in a situation where parties who do not support a particular decision 
could block the consensus. This was the case at the COP-I, with the result that 
the rules of procedure have, at every meeting, been applied, without ever having 
been formally adopted.83 In this context it is commented that the, “exponents of 
delay and obfuscation were thus handed a veto because the rule of consensus 
applies.”84 The COP is beneficial, as it involves the parties in an ongoing 
multilateral, quasi-legislative process that is time-efficient, flexible and 
effective. Kirsten Bishop also says that these meetings are useful as they 
provide a regular forum for the elaboration of climate change policy, providing 
an avenue for involvement by NGOs and a focal point for public attention.85 At 
the same time, fairness in the decisions made by the COP are to be ensured 
because as has been stated, “the institutional dynamics of multilateral 
regimes…, may be such as to de-couple decision making within the regime 
 
81   Supra n. 67 at Article 7 (2)(m). 
82   Id. at Article 7 (2) (k). 
83   Sebastian Oberthur and Hermann E. Ott (1999): “The Kyoto Protocol: International 
Climate Policy for the 21st Century,” International and European Environmental Policy 
Studies, Heidelberg: Springer. 
84   Supra n. 69 at p.59. 
85   Kirsten Bishop, (2000): “Fairness in International Environmental Law: Accommodation 
of the Concerns of Developing Countries in the Climate Change Regime”, Institute of 
Comparative Law: McGill University, at p. 37. 
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from the traditional national processes of control and supervision.  In this sense, 
the new type of environmental regime may signal an emerging democratic 
deficit”86   
 Similarly, the UNFCCC under article 8 creates a Secretariat, which 
will act under the COP. The main functions of the secretariat are to make 
arrangements for the sessions of the COP and also to provide all other 
assistance and coordination. The UNFCCC is committed to make a 
contribution to the sustainable development through the support for action to 
mitigate and to adapt to climate change at the global, regional and national 
level. It also provides the support to the intergovernmental process in the 
context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol for creating and maintaining 
the necessary conditions for an early, effective and efficient implementation 
of the same. It is also aimed at providing and disseminating high-quality, 
understandable and reliable information and data on climate change and on 
efforts to address it. Further more, it promotes and enhances the active 
engagement of NGOs, business sectors and industry, the scientific 
community and other relevant stakeholders in their work and processes, 
including an effective communication.87 
 Another subsidiary organ under the COP is the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice established under article 9. It comprises 
government representatives who are competent in their relevant field of 
expertise. As its name denotes, the important responsibilities of this organ 
are to provide scientific assistance to the COP. Hence, the major task of 
the SBSTA is to provide the COP with advice on scientific, technological 
 
86   Handl, Gunther (1991): “Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to 
International Law”, Year Book of International Environmental Law 1: 3, at pp. 6-7. 
87   See, also the text of UNFCCC, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
convention/background/ items/ 1349.php.  
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and methodological matters. The two key areas of work in this regard are 
promoting the development and transfer of ESTs and conducting technical 
work to improve the guidelines for preparing the national communications 
and emission inventories.88  
 Through the creation of SBSTA, the GCCRR is able to establish a “a 
body of commonly agreed-upon technical knowledge that is widely accepted 
as a valid basis for the political negotiations.”89 The expectations of sharing 
the scientific knowledge by establishing SBSTA, infact sets the “base for the 
regime’s priorities, policies and strategies.”90 Peter Hass says that the SBSTA 
and also IPCC are institutional representatives of the community of climate 
change scientists who play a vital role “in articulating the cause-and-effect 
relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, 
framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and 
identifying salient points of negotiation.” 91 The involvement of scientific 
institutions such as SBSTA is expected to enhance the perception of fairness 
within the GCCRR by increasing the diversity of participants and assisting in 
consensus building, especially in relation to matters that are highly technical. 
However, there is also a risk that the developed countries might dominate the 
SBSTA and thereby reflecting their policy perspectives on climate change 
 
88   The SBSTA also carries out methodological work in specific areas, such as the LULUCF 
sector, HFCs and PFCs, and adaptation and vulnerability. In addition, the SBSTA plays 
an important role as the link between the scientific information provided by expert 
sources such as the IPCC on the one hand, and the policy-oriented needs of the COP on 
the other. It works closely with the IPCC, sometimes requesting specific information or 
reports from it, and also collaborates with other relevant international organizations that 
share the common objective of sustainable development. 
89   Gehring, Thomas (1990): “International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral 
Legal Systems” Year Book of International Environmental Law, 1:35 at p.41. 
90   Id. at 32-43. 
91   Hass, Peter M (1992): “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination”, International Organisation 46: 1, at p.3. 
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negotiations as well.92  
 The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (also known SBI) is another 
organ of the UNFCCC, established under article 10 to assist the COP in the 
assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention. 
The SBI gives advice to the COP on all matters concerning the 
implementation of the Convention. A particularly important task in this 
respect is to examine the information provided in the national communications 
and emission inventories submitted by the parties in order to assess the 
Convention’s overall effectiveness. The SBI reviews the financial assistance 
given to non-Annex I parties to help them implement their Convention 
commitments, and provides advice to the COP on guidance to the financial 
mechanism as operated by the GEF. The SBI also advises the COP on 
budgetary and administrative matters. 
 Further the UNFCCC has also created a Financial Mechanism. The 
contribution of countries to climate change, and their capacity to prevent and 
cope up with its consequences, varies enormously. The UNFCCC and the 
Protocol, therefore, foresee financial assistance from the Parties with more 
resources to those less endowed and more vulnerable. Developed country 
parties i.e. the Annex II parties shall provide the financial resources to assist 
developing country parties in implementing the Convention. To facilitate this, 
the Convention established a financial mechanism to provide funds to the 
developing country parties under article 11 of the UNFCCC. Thus it creates a 
mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional 
basis, including for the transfer of technology, which also will function under 
the guidance of and be accountable to the COP. Currently, the operation of the 
 
92   Supra n. 79 at p.41. 
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financial mechanism is partly entrusted to the GEF on an on-going basis, 
subject to review in every four years. The financial mechanism is accountable 
to the COP, which decides on its climate change policies, programme 
priorities and eligibility criteria for funding, based on advice from the SBI93. 
 The GEF to which the financial mechanism of the GCCRR is entrusted 
was established in the year 1991 by the World Bank. It has been described as 
the World Bank’s most significant effort to proactively protect the 
environment. 94  Since the very beginning, both the developing and the 
developed countries had been concerned about the lack of transparency and 
democracy within the GEF.95  As a result the GEF underwent a restructuring 
in the year 1994 and reduced the decision-making powers of the World Bank 
and created an independent governance mechanism.  
3.2 The Kyoto Protocol, 1997 
 The Kyoto Protocol96 is a protocol to the UNFCCC which sets out 
binding obligations on the industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of 
the GHGs. It was adopted in the year 1997 at Kyoto in Japan, and it was 
entered into force in the year 2005. As of today, 191 states have signed this 
Protocol. Barring the USA, Afghanistan, Andorra and South Sudan all other 
UN members have ratified this Protocol.97  Under this Protocol, Annex I 
countries, which include Thirty-Seven industrialized countries and the 
European Union, commit themselves to limiting or reducing their emissions of 
 
93   See, the text of UNFCCC, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background 
/convention/ background/items/1349.php (accessed 11/12/2009). 
94   Supra n. 92  at p. 42. 
95   Id. at p. 43. 
96   Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
December 11, 1997, 2303 UNTS 148, 37 ILM 22, text, available at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_ protocol/items/2830.php  (accessed on 11/12/2009). 
97   Canada and Australia withdrew from the Protocol in 2004. 
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GHGs at a stipulated percentage on the basis of the base year 1990. Whereas 
other members have only general commitments, the Annex I countries under 
this Protocol had agreed to reduce the GHGs at 5.2% of their 1990 emission 
rate (base year) during the period 2008-2012,98 which was not achieved and 
Kyoto entered into the second commitment period at Doha from 2013 to 2020. 
 When the first COP met at Berlin in the year 1995, it had reviewed the 
goal of ‘emission reduction to 1990 base year level by the year 2000’ as 
provided under article 4(2) of the UNFCCC.  In the said meeting, projections 
indicated that it was very unlikely that the Annex I parties were going to meet 
that goal.99 It was also evident that commitments with a horizon of the year 
2000 were not sufficient to combat climate change in a meaningful manner. 
Given the work of the IPCC, policy makers were also quite certain that for the 
realization of the targets, binding commitments would be required. But the 
introduction of such binding commitments was opposed by the clubs of oil 
producing and exporting countries as well as by the some powerful interest 
groups such as the US industrial lobby.100 However, rejecting such opposition, 
COP-I reached an agreement, which is called the Berlin Mandate. This 
Mandate set in motion a process to reinforce the UNFCCC’s commitments by 
means of additional protocols or other instruments. It was done with the 
objective of elaborating policies and measures and setting quantified 
limitation and reduction objectives within the specified time frames for 
different classes of States.101 It was also decided that the negotiations on the 
said Protocol were to be completed by 1997, so that it could be reported to the 
third session of the COP. However, the developing countries from the 
 
98   Supra n. 57. 
99   First Review of Information Communicated by Each Party Included in Annex I to the 
Convention, UN Doc. A/AC.237/81 (1994). 
100   Supra n. 79 at pp. 60-61. 
101   Id. at p 61. 
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beginning objected that in accordance with the principle of CBDR, the 
proposed protocol should not introduce any new commitments for them.102 
Thereafter, a negotiating body, known as the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin 
Mandate (also known as AGBM), was established to oversee the negotiation 
of the new instrument. The AGBM met eight times between 1995 and 1997 
and produced a timely drafting of the provisions for the COP-3 in Kyoto. The 
key issues before the AGBM may be grouped under three broad headings as 
follows:103  
(1) Specific policies and measures that might be included;  
(2) Targets for emission reduction commitments; and 
(3) Concerns of the developing country particularly relating to financial 
support and technology transfer. 
During this stage, the EU suggested elaborate policies and measures for 
mitigating climate change, ranging from the mandatory energy efficiency 
appliance labeling to carbon taxes. But this regulatory approach in the nature 
of ‘command and control’ was rejected by the USA, which preferred to retain 
flexibility with respect to choice of the mitigation mechanisms.104  The EU 
proposal did not find any support from the OPEC states also regarding the 
carbon tax. However, after much negotiation the USA also conceded to the 
binding targets at COP-2 that took place at Geneva.  
Article 2(1) sets out a menu of polices and measures to be adopted by 
the Annex I countries, which are phrased in non-binding terms and in 
accordance with its national circumstances. The policies covered include, the 
 
102   Ibid.  
103   Id. at p. 62. 
104   Id. at p. 62. 
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enhancement of energy efficiency, the protection and enhancement of sinks 
and reservoirs, the development of renewable forms of energy, and the reduction 
or phasing out of market imperfections and subsidies that run counter to the 
objectives of the UNFCCC.105  Article 2 (2) further, calls upon Annex I parties to 
pursue the reduction of GHG emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels, 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization (also known as 
ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (also known as IMO), which 
are the international organizations that deal with these sectors. International 
bunker fuel emissions were not included in Annex I parties’ Kyoto targets, 
because no agreement could be reached on how to ascribe the responsibility for 
such emissions.106 Accordingly, while Annex I parties must tally these emissions 
in their GHG inventories, they are excluded from the national totals and are 
reported separately.107 
The agreement on binding quantified emission targets and the creation 
of a timetable for their achievement represent the heart of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Under article 3, the Annex I parties, as a group, committed themselves to 
individual and differentiated emission targets, which they would have to meet 
with a view to reducing their overall emissions of the applicable GHGs by at 
least 5 percent below the 1990 levels. However, a resolution adopted at COP-3 
also provides that emissions trading schemes should only be implemented 
with mutual consent of the states concerned, which again gives flexibility 
despite using the obligatory language in the text of Kyoto Protocol. It may also 
 
105   The UNFCCC, Article 2(1)(a). 
106   Supra n. 100 at p. 64. 
107   Id. at p 65. 
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be noted that throughout the negotiations, the question of formulating the 
schemes on the basis of historical emissions never arose.108  
3.2.1 Flexibility Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
 The Kyoto Protocol introduces three flexible trading mechanisms viz., 
(i) the Joint Implementation; (ii) the Clean Development Mechanism, and (iii) 
the International Emissions Trading.  The following part of the thesis would 
be an attempt to examine these three mechanisms in detail to understand its 
merits and demerits. 
3.2.2  Joint Implementation 
 Joint Implementation (hereinafter referred to JI) is a project-based 
mechanism by which emission reductions are achieved in accordance with the 
projects implemented in an Annex I country by investors from another Annex 
I country. The investor country can then claim the resulting emission 
reduction to sell on the market or credit it against the investor country’s target. 
JI has its roots in articles 4(2)(a)109 and (d)110 of the UNFCCC.111 The basic 
 
108   Id. at p. 67. 
109   UNFCCC, Article 4 (2)(a) says that “Each of these Parties shall adopt national1 policies 
and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that 
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic 
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by 
the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would 
contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in these Parties' 
starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to 
maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other 
individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions 
by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may 
implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other 
Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in 
particular, that of this subparagraph” 
110   Id. at Article 4 (2)(d) thus says: “The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, 
review the adequacy of subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out 
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eligibility requirements for JI projects are set out in article 6 (1) of the 
Protocol.112 Those projects require the approval of both the countries involved 
i.e. the host and the investor, that any reduction in emissions by sources or 
removal by sinks must be additional to any that would otherwise occur, and 
that the countries maintain proper inventories and comply with the Protocol’s 
reporting obligations. Article 6(3)113 provides that the private sector entities 
may, subject to the authorization of the country concerned, participate in JI 
projects. During the negotiations, it was also envisaged that the private sector 
would have a key role to play as an investor in and the developer of JI projects. 
However, since JI projects result in a subtraction from a host country’s 
allocation of Assigned Amount Units (also known as AAUs) of carbon 
emission with potential consequences for compliance with its emission 
 
in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change 
and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on 
this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may 
include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
above. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions 
regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A 
second review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31 December 
1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Conference of the Parties, until 
the objective of the Convention is met.’ 
111   Supra n. 11 at p. 75. 
112   The Kyoto Protocol, 1997; Article 6 (1)reads thus: “ For the purpose of meeting its 
commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire 
from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at 
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that: (a) any such 
project has the approval of the Parties involved;(b) any such project provides a reduction 
in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any 
that would otherwise occur; (c) it does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not 
in compliance with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and (d) the acquisition of 
emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of 
meeting commitments under Article 3.” 
113   Id. at Article 6 (3): “A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to 
participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or 
acquisition under this Article of emission reduction units.” 
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reduction commitments, government supervision is important. 114  Hence 
private sector participation is subject to the authorization and the requirement 
that both the host and the purchasing country must approve the project. 
 As noted earlier, the developers of JI projects must demonstrate 
additionality; in other words, they must make the case that the project 
emissions will be lower than a credible baseline, which would have applied 
but for the project.115 The Protocol does not address the process for verifying 
additionality and other requirements for JI projects, but simply states that the 
parties “may . . . further elaborate guidelines for the implementation of this 
article, including for verification and reporting.”116  For Annex I countries that 
are not on track to meet their Kyoto commitments from action alone, the 
attraction of JI stems from the lower mitigation the costs in the countries of 
Eastern Europe, as compared with costs in the more advanced industrialized 
economies.117  
3.2.3  Clean Development Mechanism 
 The second flexibility mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is the 
‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (hereinafter referred to as CDM) that is 
established under Article 12. 118  It serves the twin goals of assisting the 
 
114   Supra n. 100 at p. 79. 
115   Ibid. 
116   Supra n. 113 at Article 6(2). 
117   See for example the Japanese economy is already very energy-efficient and has low carbon 
intensity. Therefore domestic abatement costs are high, and Japan is an active participant in 
the market to acquire JI and CDM credits. 
118   Supra n. 116 at Article 12 which says thus: “(1) A clean development mechanism is hereby 
defined. (2).  The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving 
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3. (3)   Under the clean development mechanism: (a) Parties not included in Annex I 
will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions; and  (b) Parties 
included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such project 
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developing countries in achieving sustainable development and also aiding 
Annex I states in meeting their emission limitation and reduction 
commitments.119  The CDM has been developed from a proposal by Brazil for 
creating a ‘Clean Development Fund’, which was to be financed from fines 
levied on Annex I parties for non-compliance with the binding targets under 
the Kyoto.120 This proposal now has been incorporated into the CDM.121 Like 
the JI, the CDM is also a project-based mechanism, but executed for credits 
 
activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. (4) The clean development mechanism 
shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be supervised by an executive board of the clean 
development mechanism. (5) Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall 
be certified by operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of: (a) Voluntary participation 
approved by each Party involved; (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the 
mitigation of climate change; and (c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that 
would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. (6) The clean development 
mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified project activities as necessary. (7)The 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first 
session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, 
efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of project 
activities. (8) The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to 
cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of 
adaptation. (9) Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities 
mentioned in paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, 
may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be 
provided by the executive board of the clean development mechanism. (10) Certified 
emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the beginning of the 
first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first 
commitment period.” 
119   Mark Kenber, (2005): “The Clean Development Mechanism: A Tool for Promoting 
Long-Term Climate Protection and Sustainable Development?,” in Farhana Yamin (ed.), 
Climate Change and Carbon Markes: A Hanbook of Emission Reduction Mechanisms, 
United Kingdom: Earthscan. 
120   Sebastian Oberthur and Hermann E. Ott, (1999): “The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate 
Policy for the 21st Century,” International and European Environmental Policy Studies, 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
121   Naoki Matsuo, (2003): “CDM in the Kyoto Negotiations: How CDM Has Worked as a 
Bridge between Developed and Developing Worlds?,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies 
for Global Change, 8: 191 at p. 197. 
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earned in developing countries. Unlike JI, for each Certified Emission 
Reduction (hereinafter referred to as CER) 122an Annex I party increases its 
cap. In this context the CDMs are integral to environmental protection.123 
However the only stipulation is that resulting GHG reductions must be real 
and measurable and additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project sanctioned under the CDM.124 This ensures that the “CDM 
projects must demonstrate that its reduction in GHG emissions goes beyond 
business as usual, which involves emission reductions generated by the 
project in addition to any that would have occurred in the project’s 
absence”.125 This is called the Additionality Criterion of the CDM.126 
For the proper and effective administration of CDM, the COP has 
developed detailed Rules. 127  The implementation of CDM projects are 
overseen by the CDM Executive Board (hereinafter referred to as CDM-EB), 
which is composed of 20 members who represent both Annex I and 
non–Annex I (the developing) countries.128 The CDM has created interest 
 
122   Every Certified Emission Reduction (CER) is equal to a ton of CO2. 
123   Ernestine Meijer and Jacob Werksman, (2005): “Keeping It Clean – Safeguarding the 
Environmental Integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism,” in David Freestone and 
Charlotte Streck (eds.) Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: Making Kyoto 
Work, USA: Oxford University Press. 
124   The Kyoto Protocol, Art. 12(5). 
125   Supra n. 11 at p. 80. 
126   Axel Michaelowa, (2005): “Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM: A 
Crucial Element of the Credibility of the Climate Regime,” in Farhana Yamin. (eds.) Climate 
Change and Carbon Markets: A Handbook of Emission Reduction Mechanisms,  United 
Kingdom: Earthscan. 
127   For a summary of the CDM project cycle; see,  Farhana Yamin, (2005): “The International 
Rules of the Kyoto Mechanisms,” in Farhana Yamin. (eds.) Climate Change and Carbon 
Markets: A Handbook of Emission Reduction Mechanisms,  United Kingdom: Earthscan; See 
also, Maria Netto and Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, CDM Project Cycle and the Role of the 
UNFCCC,” in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds.) Legal Aspects of Implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol: Making Kyoto Work, USA: Oxford University Press, at p.175. 
128   Report of the Conference of the Parties, (2002): Decision No. 17/CP.7, Conference of the 
Parties, Seventh Session, Addendum. Also see Part II: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
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among both the developed countries and among the developing countries. 
Developing countries see a potential influx of technology and resources. At 
the same time, the developed countries see the cheaper compliance and 
opportunities for their private sectors in banking, advising, and legal 
services.129 At the same time, the project developers and investors in the 
carbon market are critical of the CDM-EB for applying overly stringent 
project approval criteria for its lack of transparency, insufficient resources and 
incapacity with the negative consequences on the ability to cope up with its 
workload.130 Various studies have also pointed out problems with the CDM 
market, particularly with respect to the additionality of some CDM credits.131 
It is also stated that “…as it is not possible to ensure that every credit from 
…the CDM represents a real, measurable, and long-term reduction in 
emissions, the use of carbon offsets in a cap-and-trade system can potentially 
undermine the system’s integrity.”132 The CDM has also been criticized for its 
uneven regional distribution. The following table gives an idea about the 
regional distribution of CDMs as of 2012 (calculated in terms of CERs):133 
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Global CDMs 
Asia Pacific 79.7% 
Latin America and Caribbean 15% 
Africa 3% 
 
Parties, Vol. II, Annex, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002). 
129   Supra n. 125 at p. 82. 
130   For an expression of such views, see, International Emissions Trading Association, 
(2006): “State of The CDM,”  IETA Position on The CDM for CoP-12/MoP-2. 
131   Axel Michaelowa and Pallav Purohit, (2007): “Additionality Determination of Indian  
CDM Projects: Can Indian CDM Project Developers Outwit the CDM Executive Board,” 
Discussion Paper CDM-I, University of Zurich, Institute for Political Science, available 
at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/additionality-cdm-india-cs-ver 
sion9-07.pdf (accessed on 12/11/2012). 
132   Supra n. 129 at pp. 81-82. 
133   Id. at p. 82. 
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Europe and Central Asia 1% 
Middle East 1% 
This table shows that the geographic distributions of CDM projects are very 
uneven with Asia and Latin America which are accounting for a major share. 
In this context, many countries that have so far been less benefited from the 
CDM, such as sub-Saharan Africa, have called for measures to promote a 
more equitable distribution of projects.134 However, it is not surprising that 
India and China lead in the number of projects. Given the high transaction 
costs associated with the CDM, the project size (because the formula is, more 
tons abated equals more credits), and economies of scale in many similar 
projects, the investors are seemingly more interested in those countries. It is 
because the ability to attract CDM investment depends on the existing 
emission reduction potential, even among the developing countries. Project 
developers generally look out for host countries offering the lowest 
cost-mitigation opportunities because the underlying logic based on efficiency 
and not based on equity or fairness. It is said that efficiency and effectiveness 
of the CDM do not actually permit it to have an equitable distribution of 
projects.135 
Although there are many similarities, the CDM and JI are not the 
same. JI projects take place amongst the Annex I countries, and the 
mechanism is intended to assist the Annex I parties in complying with their 
emission reduction obligations under article 3 of the Protocol. The CDM has a 
dual purpose: (i) to assist the Annex I countries in meeting their emission 
limitation and reduction obligations, and (ii) to promote the sustainable 
development in the host countries for instance, by promoting the transfer of 
 
134   Ibid. 
135   Ibid. 
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clean technology. Since JI projects are implemented in Annex I countries, the 
credits earned from a given project are deducted from the host country’s 
Kyoto allowance, known as Assigned Amount Units (hereinafter referred to as 
AAUs). This means that as JI projects do not introduce additional allowances 
into the system, the overall amount of emissions under the cap does not 
increase. Environmental integrity is safeguarded by the requirement that a JI 
host country maintain an appropriate inventory of GHG sources and sinks as 
well as an accounting system for the additions and subtractions from its 
allocation of AAUs. This contrasts with the CDM, where there is no deduction 
from an allocation of allowances because projects are located in developing 
countries with no Kyoto target. To maintain the environmental integrity of the 
CDM i.e, to avoid the issuing of credits not based on real emission reductions, 
the verification, monitoring, and the certification requirements under the 
CDM are more onerous than the equivalent JI provisions.136 
3.2.4 International Emission Trading 
 The International Emission Trading is another flexible mechanism as 
recognized by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 137 . The concept of 
international emission trading was introduced in the negotiations by the USA 
supported by the members of the JUSSCANNZ club138. This movement was 
 
136   Charlotte Streck, (2005): “Joint Implementation: History, Requirements and 
Challenges,” in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds.) Legal Aspects of 
Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: Making Kyoto Work, USA: Oxford University Press. 
137   Kyoto Protocol, 1997, Article 17 says thus: “The Conference of the Parties shall define 
the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, 
reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may 
participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under 
Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to the domestic actions for the purpose 
of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that 
Article.” 
138   Members of this club are Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, 
Iceland, Mexico, and South Korea 
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in fact the result of the realization that at least for many countries, it would be 
politically difficult to obtain the significant domestic emission cut. So, 
instead, they regarded emission trading as critical in meeting the emission 
targets under the Protocol. An emission trading is a purely market-based 
approach for achieving the reductions in the anthropogenic emissions.  The 
limit or cap for each country prescribes the amount of pollutant that may be 
emitted by them. If that country does not reach this cap, or if there is surplus as 
a result of the JI or CDM, it is allocated or sold to the firms in the form of 
Emissions Permits that represent the right to emit or discharge a specific 
volume of the specified pollutant. Though a firm can hold a number of 
permits, the total number of permits however, cannot exceed the cap, limiting 
the total emissions within the permissible level.  
The most serious opposition came from the developing countries, 
which argued that trading would allow the United States, the largest emitter of 
the GHGs, to avoid meaningful domestic action.139 This also threatened the 
position of China and India, which, at time, advocated the position that over a 
period of time, the per capita emissions of the industrialized countries should 
decrease, eventually converging at equal per capita levels with those of the 
developing countries. They feared that under emission trading, the Russian 
Federation potentially stood to gain from trading with its large number of 
surplus AAUs, which would have flooded the market with AAUs. Flooding 
the market with AAUs would also have the effect of depressing the price of 
CERs generated by the CDM projects in developing countries. 
3.2.5 Compliance Mechanism 
 
139   Supra n. 132 at pp. 84-85. 
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 Article 18 of the Protocol requires the COP to “approve appropriate 
and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of 
non-compliance with the Provisions of the Protocol.” Regarding 
‘consequences’ for non-compliance, there were many objections from the 
developed countries. They did not want an inclusion of consequences in the 
Protocol. However, these objections to the proposal for binding penalties were 
avoided with the insertion of the final sentence of the article, providing that 
“any procedures or mechanisms…entailing binding consequences shall be 
adopted by means of an amendment.”140  Together with the market-based 
flexibility mechanisms, the compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol has 
been hailed as unique to the international environmental law.141  
The International law entitles the aggrieved party to reparation or 
compensation in the event of a wrong committed by the parties to the dispute 
while arguing their case before an independent third party. However, in truth, 
this third-party dispute resolution is not so common in international law, and 
even more so in international environmental law.142  States generally prefer 
negotiations as a mode of dispute resolution. Some scholars have also 
commented that the traditional dispute settlement, akin to domestic tort action, 
is simply not appropriate for harms involving a wide range of actors.143 Under 
such circumstances, a process resting on monitoring, supervision, and 
 
140   Jacob Werksman, (2005): “The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System,” in Olaf 
Schramm Stokke et al. (eds.) Implementing the Climate Regime: International 
Compliance, United Kingdom: Earthscan. 
141   Ibid. 
142   Supra n. 139 at p. 87. 
143   Birnie, Patricia and Boyle, Alan (2002): International Law and the Environment, 
London: Oxford University Press.  See also, Hari M. Osofsky, (2009):  “Is Climate 
Change International?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role,” Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 49(3): 587. These authors contend that climate change regulation 
necessitates multiscalar legal approaches i.e. is the approach which, simultaneously 
engage more than one level of governance. 
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management is a preferred means of achieving the objectives of the instrument 
concerned and more particularly in environmental protection.144   
However, another group of scholars consider the enforcement and the 
calculations underlying the compliance and participation as central to the 
design of effective international regimes.145  The advocates of this school of 
thought generally argue that the states choose to participate only in treaties in 
which, the compliance imposes little or no cost.  Some scholars argue that the 
perceived legitimacy146 and fairness147 of a particular rule will influence the 
parties’ compliance.  
In the Kyoto Protocol, the process of drawing up the rules for a 
compliance mechanism began at Fourth COP. The Buenos Aires Programme 
of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures, adopted at COP-4 in 1998, 
established the ‘Joint Working Group on Compliance’ that was mandated to 
articulate procedures by which “compliance with the obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol should be addressed.”148 Thereafter at 2001 COP-6 in Bonn, 
an agreement was reached, among other things, on the objectives of the 
mechanism, the consequences of enforcement, the scope of the enforcement, 
and the conditions for lodging appeals.149 At the 2001 COP-7 in Marrakech, 
 
144   Supra n. 142 at p.86. 
145   Scott Barrett, (2003): “Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate 
Change Agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 3: 349. 
146   Franck, Thomas (1990): The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
147   Franck, Thomas M. (1998): Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
148   Report of the Conference of Parties, (1999): Decision 8/CP.4, in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, Annex 2, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1. 
149   Report of the Conference of Parties (2006): Decision 27/CMP.1, in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties, Addendum, Part II: 
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the parties agreed that the compliance mechanism would consist of a 
Compliance Committee, with two functioning branches: a Facilitative Branch 
and an Enforcement Branch.150  
The Compliance Committee (hereinafter referred to as CC) consists of 
20 members, with 10 elected members to serve in each respective branch. It is 
stipulated that the members who serve in their individual capacities must have 
recognized “the competence relating to climate change in relevant fields such 
as the scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields”151 Membership in 
each branch is composed of as follows, one member from each of the five 
regional groups of the UN,152one member from the small island developing 
states, two members from the parties included in Annex I, and two members  
the from non–Annex I parties. Though prima facie it appears that the 
developing countries have a majority representation in the committee, it is also 
a fact that for all practical purposes, some of the members act as mere puppets 
in the hands of the developed countries. 
The CC is required to make “every effort to reach an agreement on any 
decision by consensus.”153 Where this fails, the decisions shall be adopted by a 
majority of three-fourths of the members present and voting. However, as 
Annex I parties were unwilling to permit the developing country members to 
have the final say in the Enforcement Branch, a double majority provision 
 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3. 
150  Report of the Conference of Parties, (2002): Decision 24/CP.7, in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties, Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties, vol. III, Annex, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3. 
151  Report of the Conference of Parties, (2002): Decision 24/CP.7, in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties, Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties, vol. III, Annex, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3. 
152   They are African Group, Latin American and Caribbean, Asian Group, Eastern 
European, and Western Europe and Others. 
153   Supra n. 144. 
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applies whereby decisions also require a three-fourths majority of the 
members of Annex I parties.  
3.3  The Conference of Parties (COP) and the Implementation of 
 Kyoto Protocol 
 The Kyoto Protocol, which is extended till 2020 after the recent 
COP-18 at Doha in 2012, was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 
2005 154 . This Protocol sets out the targets and timetables of emission 
reduction for the States. However, the technical details to bring the overall 
framework into operation did not find a place in the Protocol itself. This task 
remained with the Conference of Parties.155 In this regard it is said that like the 
UNFCCC, the Protocol is also, in many respects, a framework instrument with 
the drafters having left many details to the subsequent negotiation including 
the following; 
(a) The rules for the market-based flexibility mechanisms remained as a 
task of COP to be elaborated.156 
(b) Further the basic operational details relating to the reporting and the 
accounting for emissions; financial assistance and transfer of 
technology for developing countries; and the compliance mechanism 
were also under the purview of COP to be clarified. 
 The details of the COP held after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at the 
third COP in 1997 are as follows: 
 
154   Some critics had predicted its failure even when it was entered in to force in the year 
2005. See, David Victor, (2001): The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to 
Slow Global Warming, USA: Princeton University Press.  
155   Report of the Conference of Parties, 1998): Decision 1/CP.3, in Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its Third Session, Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the Conference of 
the Parties, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (1998).  
156   Such as JI, CDM and International Emission Trading. 
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 (i)  COP 4, Buenos Aires, Argentina (1998): The Fourth COP after the 
adoption of Kyoto Protocol was an opportunity to deal with the unfinished 
business of climate negotiations. 157  The parties adopted a number of 
decisions including the Buenos Aires Plan of Action that established a 
negotiating agenda for the coming into operation of the Protocol.158 The 
Plan covered a number of issues, including the financial mechanism, the 
development and transfer of technology, the implementation of the 
Convention and the Protocol, articles concerning adverse effects of 
climate change on the developing countries, and the Kyoto 
mechanisms.159 The conference highlighted once again the persistent fault 
line between the industrialized countries and the developing countries, 
which came to the front with a proposal to place the issue of voluntary 
commitments for developing countries on the agenda.160 The proposal 
faced immediate and fierce resistance from the G-77 countries and China, 
representing the developing countries. Amongst the developing countries 
Argentina pledged that his country would assume a voluntary target by 
1999. The same issue, i.e. voluntary commitments of the developing 
countries were taken up later also. For instance in COP-12 which held at 
Nairobi in the year 2006, the Russian Federation raised this issue again. In 
this regard Soltau says “In legal terms-and consistent with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities-the protocol does not provide 
for negotiation or assumption of voluntary commitments. Discussion of 
 
157   For a summary of the meeting, see also, Report of the Fourth Conference of the Parties to 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, (1998): Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/ (accessed on 23/01/2011).  
158   Report of the Conference of Parties, (1999): Decision 1/CP.4, in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (accessed on 23/01/2011). 
159   Supra n. 144 at 93. 
160   Ibid. 
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such commitments engenders enormous suspicion among developing 
countries, which regard them as a slippery slope to binding commitments, 
as well as undermining the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.”161   
 Another critical aspect that was deliberated at COP-4 was regarding 
the review of the adequacy of commitments under the UNFCCC.162 While 
there was an agreement on the inadequacy of commitments, the parties could 
not reach a consensus with the developing countries that were constantly 
criticizing the insufficient emission mitigation by the industrialized countries 
for various reasons.163  
(ii) COP-5, Bonn, Germany(1999): COP-5 adopted a number of important 
decisions on technical issues such as guidelines for the reporting of annual 
inventories by Annex I countries164 and guidelines for expert review of 
inventories submitted by the Annex I countries.165 It is said that these 
decisions contributed to the transparency, integrity, and comparability of 
emissions data, which are all critical qualities in the negotiations on 
climate change. 166  The modalities and procedures for the flexibility 
mechanisms, particularly the CDM, and the design of the compliance 
mechanism were also discussed in detail. With respect to the CDM, the 
nuclear powers wanted the nuclear energy as an option that can be traded. 
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However the, non-governmental organizations were critical of such a 
move.167  
 
(iii) COP-6 (Part-I), The Hague, Netherlands (2000): COP-6 was convened in 
the Hague, with the aim of completing the negotiations on the topics under 
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Despite vigorous attempts to rescue the 
meeting,168 the COP-6 ended as a failure, as parties were unable to reach 
an agreement on a number of issues.169 Among the issues that derailed the 
negotiations were, those disagreements on the extent to which CDM and JI 
should be supplemental to the domestic action by the Annex I countries;170 
how much credit each country should get for the carbon dioxide absorbed 
by the forests and grasslands, 171  and the compliance mechanism. 172 
 
167   Ibid. 
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(accessed on 12/03/2009); Christian Egenhofer and Jan Cornillie, (2001): “Reinventing 
the Climate Negotiations: An Analysis of COP 6,” CEPS Policy Brief 1, available at 
http://www.ceps.be  (accessed on 12/03/2009).  
170   Art. 6(1)(d) of the Protocol provides that the acquisition of ERUs from JI projects should 
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commitments. Similarly, Art. 12(3)(b) states that Annex I countries may use CERs from 
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reforestation since 1990.” This approach entails methodological and measurement 
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Because of many roadblocks, the COP suspended its sessions and 
requested that the president “seek advice on the desirability of resuming 
that session in May/June 2001 in order to complete the work.”173  The 
observers have identified that ‘the sheer scale of the agenda and the lack of 
trust and understanding among the parties as reasons for the failure.’ 174 
(iv) COP-6 (Part II), Bonn, Germany and America’s Rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2001): COP-6 was resumed after a year at Bonn, Germany, 
where negotiators managed to reach an agreement on most of the critical 
political issues relating to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This 
could happen even when the USA rejected the Kyoto Protocol.175  Despite 
the US position and the gap that it created in the relations between the US 
and the Europe, the Cop-6 (part II) made progress regarding the following 
four main areas viz., (i) the rules for emission trading and the flexibility 
mechanisms; (ii) the eligibility of forestry projects under the CDM and 
rules on the counting of forestry management; (iii) funding and capacity 
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building for developing countries to combat climate change; and (iv) 
formulating the compliance mechanism.  
 Another significant contribution of this Conference was a political 
statement titled as the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement settled 
certain issues that had arisen at COP-6 (Part I) held in the Hague. One of 
the key features of the Bonn Agreement was that the flexibility 
mechanisms “shall be supplemental to the domestic action, and that 
domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element” of the effort 
made by the Annex I parties to meet their emission reduction 
commitments.176 It also stated that the Annex I parties ‘are to refrain from’ 
using JI and CDM credits from nuclear facilities to meet their 
commitments, thus effectively ensuring that the nuclear energy projects 
would not be eligible under these mechanisms.177 The parties, in COP 6 
(Part II) also agreed that the forestry projects could be included in the 
CDM. Despite all these efforts, a consensus could not be achieved on 
whether the consequences of non-compliance should be binding or not.178  
(v)  COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco (2001): The main success of COP-7 was 
that it succeeded in translating a political agreement known as Bonn 
Agreement into a legal text.179 Many decisions were prepared with respect 
to the issues such as the rules and procedures applicable to the systems and 
inventories relating to GHG emissions and removals by sinks.180 Along 
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with this the compliance regime;181 guidelines and procedures for the 
implementation of the flexibility mechanisms;182 and the land-use and 
forestry as sinks for the removal of GHGs183 were the other important 
decisions that the parties took at this Conference. Altogether all these 
deliberations and decisions comprised more than two hundred pages, 
which is commonly known as the Kyoto Rule-book.184   However it was 
at COP –7, the parties with surplus allowances and credits in the first 
commitment period were allowed to bank them for the subsequent 
commitment period and thereby substantially watering down the 
environmental integrity of the protocol.   
(vi) COP-8, New Delhi, India (2002): The COP at New Delhi saw the concerns 
of developing countries taking the center stage.185 The main issues were 
the adaptation, which was an immediate concern for the developing 
countries, but an issue that has generally played the second fiddle to the 
mitigation in the climate negotiations.186 The documentary record that was 
produced is known as Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and 
Sustainable Development, which reaffirms that development and poverty 
eradication are the overwhelming priorities of the developing countries.187 
It emphasizes that the climate change should be addressed while meeting 
the requirements of the sustainable development and the need to integrate 
measures to combat climate change into the national development 
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programs. It stresses the importance of adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change for all countries, noting that developing countries are particularly 
vulnerable, and calls upon industrialized countries to further implement 
their commitments relating to the financing, capacity building, and the 
technology transfer.188  
(vii) COP-9, Milan, Italy (2003): The unfortunate fate of the Kyoto Protocol 
prevailed at Milan also. The Protocol that was still not entered into force 
was at the mercy of the Russian Federation, which sent mixed but largely 
negative signals on this point.189 This Conference also decided that the 
adaptation would enjoy the priority in the allocation of resources and that 
the technology transfer and the associated capacity building would also be 
covered. 190  The adaptation activities included water resources 
management, agriculture, integrated coastal zone management, coping 
with the disasters caused by the extreme weather events etc.191  
(viii) COP-10, Buenos Aires, Argentina (2004): The most important feature of 
COP 10 was the Russian Federation’s decision to ratify the Protocol, 
which in turn validated it as a legal instrument. A major outcome of this 
meeting was the adoption of the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on 
Adaptation and Response Measures, which covered the following areas 
viz., the adverse effects of climate change, impact of the implementation of 
response measures, to develop a structured program of work on the 
 
188   Supra n. 121. 
189   Steven Lee Myers and Andrew C. Revkin, (2003): “Russia to Reject Pact on Climate 
Putin Aide Says,” New York Times, December 3. 
190  Decision 5/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, (2004): 
Addendum, Part II: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. I, 11–12, 
FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1. 
191  Supra n. 188. 
155 
scientific, technical, and the socioeconomic aspects of impacts, 
vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change.192 
(viii) COP-11/MOP-I, Montreal, Canada (2005): This was the first COP after 
the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2006. In that sense, it 
was also the first Meeting of the Parties (hereinafter referred to as MOP-1) 
of the Protocol.  It was therefore, considered as one of the largest 
intergovernmental conferences on climate change ever held, hosting over 
10,000 delegates. The Montreal meeting was historic on several counts. 
Firstly, it was the first meeting of the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the MOP; secondly, it formally adopted the draft decisions that constituted 
the Kyoto Rulebook agreed at the Marrakech Accords and the subsequent 
COPs.193 
 The parties also initiated the mandate of reviewing the Protocol 
Commitments of the Annex I parties by establishing the Ad Hoc Working 
Group (AWG). The review of Annex I commitments was also triggered by 
article 3.9 of the Protocol, which requires that the COP/MOP shall initiate 
the consideration of Annex I commitments at least seven years before the 
end of the first commitment period, in other words, by 2005. The 
developing countries proposed that the negotiations on the second 
commitment period should conclude in 2008 and argued that it was 
incumbent on the industrialized countries to demonstrate the leadership on 
mitigation. For their part,  the Annex I parties, excluding the USA which is 
not a party to the Protocol, resisted the establishment of a timeline. 
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Eventually, the parties settled on the less-specific language stating that the 
negotiations on the Annex I commitments should be completed in time to 
ensure that there was no gap between the first and second commitment 
periods.194 
(ix) COP-12/MOP 2, Nairobi, Kenya (2006): As COP 12 is the first COP to be 
held in Africa, the Nairobi conference was naturally expected to advance 
the adaptation agenda. At Nairobi, the progress was made on the 
establishment of the Adaptation Fund and the work program of the 
‘Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise (SBTA)’ on 
impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation. The ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Annex I commitments’ also held its second session at Nairobi agreeing that 
the future work would proceed under various headings viz., the analysis of 
mitigation potential and the ranges of emission reduction objectives.195 
 The mandatory review of the Protocol commitments under article 9(2) kept 
the negotiators busy throughout the conference. The developing countries, 
particularly the African group and China, advocated the conclusion of the 
review at the meeting without any further commitments from them, while 
the EU wanted to launch a continuing review process. In the end, the 
developing countries obtained the assurance that the review would not lead 
to new commitments. At the same time, the Russian proposal to amend the 
Protocol to allow for voluntary commitments by the non–Annex I parties 
again kept negotiators busy until the final hours of the conference.196  
 (x) COP-13/MOP 3, Bali, Indonesia (2007): At Bali, an agreement on a 
timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework i.e., at the 
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end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, was achieved 
with the adoption of the Bali Action Plan.197 An Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (also known as 
AWG-LCA) was also established as a subsidiary body to conduct the 
negotiations aimed at urgently enhancing the implementation of the 
Convention up to and beyond the year 2012.  Developments also happened 
outside the COP. In April 2007, the UN Security Council for the first time 
convened for a debate over climate change.198 Similarly, the UNGA also 
convened a thematic debate on climate change, which saw an almost 
exhaustive list of countries addressing the topic.199 At this meeting, as 
before, the EU reiterated its position of a 20 percentage cut by 2020, to be 
deepened to 30 percentage, if the other major actors were committed to 
serious mitigation action. Later, the UN Secretary-General convened a 
one-day, high-level event on climate change, which was organized around 
the four themes of adaptation, mitigation, technology, and finance and 
which drew the participation of almost 80 heads of States or 
Governments.200 The key outcome of this Conference was the Bali Action 
Plan, launching a negotiating process for beyond 2012.   
(xi) COP-14/MOP 4, Poznan, Poland (2008): This Conference took place in the 
context of an ever-deepening global financial crisis. Since it was already 
clear that the technology transfer and finance would be two serious issues, 
developing countries tabled a proposal that included a Multilateral Climate 
Technology Fund, by which the Annex I governments would use the 
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finances from environmental and energy taxes and the auctioning of 
pollution rights to fund the technology transfer. They would also use the 
public financing to promote public-private partnerships, including 
enterprises as well as the research and the development institutions. The aim 
of this mechanism is to address the cooperation on the technology research 
as well as development, diffusion, and transfer.  
(xii)  COP 15/MOP 5, Copenhagen, Denmark (2009): One of the main 
challenges at the Copenhagen was to establish an ambitious binding climate 
agreement for the period from 2012, once the first commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol expires. However, there were parallel movements 
from the developed countries to bring a less specific, non-binding 
international agreement. It was evident that the many Annex 1 
industrialized countries are now reluctant to fulfill the commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, the Copenhagen did not achieve any 
agreement for any long-term action.  
(xiii)  COP 16/MOP 6, Cancun, Mexico (2010): The result of this Conference was 
the creation of a ‘Green Climate Fund’ and a ‘Climate Technology Center.’ 
But at the same time, the funding of the ‘Green Climate Fund’ was not 
agreed upon. The commitment to the second period of the Kyoto 
Protocol also could not be agreed upon, though there was a little consensus 
that the base year shall be 1990 and IPCC shall continue to provide the 
global warming information.  
(xiv) COP 17/MOP 7, Durban, South Africa (2011): The Durban Conference 
agreed to have a legally binding agreement for the post 2012 period that 
would be prepared by the year 2015, and to take effect in 2020. The 
Conference also saw the development regarding the creation of a Green 
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Climate Fund, which will distribute more than US$100 billion per year as 
an aid for the poor countries in their efforts to adapt to climate impacts. 
(xv) COP 18/MOP 8, Doha, Qatar (December 2012): The main agenda for the 
Doha Conference that took place at Doha, Qatar were as follows:201 
(i) To seek the extension of the Kyoto Protocol that would expire at the end 
of the year 2012 after its first commitment period (2008-2012). The 
developed countries also sought negotiation of a new Protocol instead 
of the Kyoto protocol. 
(ii) To address the further development of the 2011 Durban Platform for a 
post Kyoto Protocol to be developed by the year 2015 and be in force by 
the year 2020. 
(iii) To analyse the progress in the development and funding of the Green 
Climate Fund that was created at COP 17. 
After the conclusion of COP-18 some remarked that it was successful but only 
incrementally. 202 At Doha, the developed countries had argued for a new legal 
instrument with the expectation that Kyoto Protocol will not be extended for a 
second commitment period with the three core components: (i) legally binding; 
(ii) widest possible participation by all the Parties; and (iii) mandates the 
increase in global temperature below 2 degree Celsius.. The Second 
Commitment Period for the Kyoto Protocol (hereinafter referred to as KP2) was 
finally agreed upon, allowing it to move forward for another eight-year period 
i.e. from 2013 to 2020. Among the developed countries,  only the EU, Australia, 
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Switzerland, and Norway agreed for the KP2 thus making it only  participation 
a meagre 15 percent of the developed country emissions.203 The Doha was also 
successful in the non-KP2 developed countries such as Canada, Japan, Russia, 
New Zealand etc. to restrict their eligibility to the flexible market mechanisms. 
In other words, although they can ‘participate’ in the CDM projects, they cannot 
transfer the resulting Emission Reduction Units against their emission 
targets.204   
In cases where mitigation and adaptation fail, people affected by the 
impact of climate change may be subject to untold suffering. In this regard, 
Parties at Doha began addressing a new issue known as the ‘loss and damage.’ 
Until this year, the developed country Parties had resisted any concrete decision 
on this issue on account of challenges associated with attributing specific losses 
and damages directly to the climate change. But under persistent pressure from 
the Least Developed Countries (also known as LDCs) and the island states, the 
Parties agreed to establish by COP-19, the Institutional Arrangements that 
would help the developing countries deal with the irrecoverable losses and 
damage from the climate change.205 With regard to the adaptation, the COP at 
Doha also launched a new set of adaptation planning by approving a set of 
technical guidelines to help the Parties to develop the National Adaptation Plans 
(also known as NAPs)206. This is a departure from the adaptation planning 
approach taken in the past. As expected, the principle of CBDR was at the heart 
of the discussions at Doha also. Though the negotiations at the Doha also failed 
in resolving this issue, there was an agreement that the governments and the 
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observer organizations shall submit proposals to the UNFCCC by the year 
2013.  
3.4 North-South Divide and Fairness in Climate Change Negotiations 
 An in-depth analysis of the developments in the area of climate change 
raises the most fundamental question i.e. who gained from these negotiations; 
the South or the North? According to Gunther Handl, “any gain by either side, 
but at the cost of the other is selfishness.207 But if the gainer is the environment, 
the planet earth, the solar system, then it is fairness. But such selfless 
motivations stem from the desire to see the international law regulate and 
implement what is right and just, for the sake of the global community, 
irrespective of the particular outcome for the state/individual in question.”208 
Unlike Handl, majority of the scholars follow one-sided arguments s in 
analyzing fairness in climate change negotiations from a North-South 
perspective. 
 Kirsten Bishop also contends, “Given the substantive outcome of 
climate change negotiations…it would seem that the developing countries were 
quite successful in having their fairness claims addressed at the procedural stage 
of the regimes development.”209However, some others have an altogether 
different approach to this question. For example, Ntambireweki says, “the lack 
of environmental activism in developing country governments…speaks 
volumes about the missed opportunities” and “as long as the South fails to 
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articulate its problems, however, it is a duty, born out of a common humanity, 
for the North to champion the cause of a better world in a holistic sense.”210  
On the other hand, RKL Panjabi claims that the attention given to the 
concerns of the developing countries might be excessive. It is argued that, 
“…with some justifiable cynicism that the South’s Agenda in the Pre-UNCED 
process boiled down to acquiring as much money as possible from the North for 
environmental projects. It could also be argued that the UNFCCC reflected and 
catered to the South’s needs more than to the over-all cause of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions globally.”211  
Whatever may be the contentions, the truth is that the content and 
implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have been, and will 
continue to be, heavily influenced by the political will and the determination of 
the major powers, particularly the USA, which also happens to be the largest 
contributor of greenhouse gas emissions.212   Considering the fact that the 
bargaining power within multilateral negotiations is far from the balanced, the 
conflicting trade policies of certain individual countries like the USA will 
continue to have the potential to completely frustrate the negotiations and the 
subsequent enforcement of the resulting agreements. To consider an example, 
the USA and its desire to ensure the existence of an emission trading scheme to 
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make implementation of the Kyoto Protocol more economically palatable, it has 
been noted that “…if viable rules for trading of emission reductions are not 
adopted by the international agreement, the US electricity sector will not be able 
to afford the Kyoto Protocol, and the prospects for its ratification by the Senate 
will dwindle.”213  
3.5 Conclusion 
 Drawing together the analysis made in this chapter, this section attempts 
to briefly assess the aspect of fairness in the climate change regime and the way 
forward. As already discussed in the earlier part, states have steadily though 
slowly built the GCCRR through the successive Conference of Parties. 
Beginning with the historic UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol and other 
documents, states have already established an impressive and intricate 
multilateral regime. However, the multifaceted nature of the political issues and 
the technical complexity of many of the issues dealt with are quite staggering. 
These complexities stem from various factors, some of which are examined 
below. 
 Though the UNFCCC and the Protocol are environmental treaties in 
reality, they have profound social and economic implications. The future 
division of the mitigation burden between the industrialized and the developing 
countries cuts to the core of disagreements on global development and fairness 
in the relations between the States. The industrialized countries have attempted 
to extend the binding commitments to the developing countries, which, in turn, 
have invoked the principle of CBDR, underlining the historical responsibility of 
the developed countries.  
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 Another significant issue is the absence of mutual trust and commitment 
to the issue. An example is the binding nature of the Annex I parties’ targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Even considering the fact that the period was of 
considerably short duration i.e. from 2008 to 2012, the failure to comply with 
this requirement cannot be justified. The procedural lapse to maintain adequate 
accounting standards for the GHG emissions and removals is also becoming an 
issue of fairness and equity. The combination of the very modest environmental 
impact and the fact that some Annex I parties are not on track to meet their 
targets may appear to give credence to the critics’ arguments.  Though the 
GCCRR has universal participation, in reality a small group of some 15 large 
emitters are responsible for more than seventy five percent of the global 
emissions. Unless and until there is willingness among these emitters, nothing 
could succeed.  
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Chapter IV 
India’s Climate Change Policies and Negotiation                    
Strategies: A Critical Analysis 
 
The Idea that developing countries like India and China must 
share the blame for heating up the earth and destabilising its 
climate…is an excellent example of environmental colonialism1 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, climate change concerns have been 
increasing in leaps and bounds across the globe. Its reflections are loudly 
echoed in India too. The legitimate need to take part in the cross-border 
negotiation and the discourse as to how to control and cope up with the 
dynamics of climate change have been brought to the forefront in India as 
early as the late 1980’s. During all these years, India has been finding it 
difficult to effectively tackle the complexities of the so-called North-South 
divide as it has to take a Policy, both externally in its relations with other 
states and internally at the national level. Adoption of any such policy 
statement is not a simple task as the processes of deliberation and 
negotiations, which are considered to be the primary principles of 
democracy, has to be in consonance with the requirements of fairness and 
justice. While keeping in tune with the requirements of economic 
development and poverty eradication on one hand, these policy statements 
also should be capable of protecting the environment and its resources for the 
use of future generations. It also has to social engineer2 the interests of all 
 
1 Agarwal, Anil and Narain, Sunita (2003): Global warming in an Unequal World: A Case 
of Environmental Colonialism, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, at p. 1. 
2  ‘Social Engineering’ is a concept that is used in social sciences including the political 
science and the law. In political science it is referred as political engineering and refers 
to the efforts to influence the attitudes and social behaviors of masses.  For further 
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stakeholders including those of various sub-national groups. One cannot 
expect these policies to be substantively fair unless the requirements of 
procedural fairness are complied with.  
The fundamental assumption of fairness in relation to public policy is 
the view “that a political community should seek to ensure that its members 
are all able to enjoy at least a social minimum.”3 The concept of social 
minimum invariably is based on the idea of ‘distributive justice’ and refers to 
the “bundle of resources [and opportunities] that a person needs in order to 
lead a minimally decent life in their society.”4 Any given society or regime, 
to be called fair, should assure the same through transparent and democratic 
institutions, policies and laws. It means that in the community of states, each 
and every state has the right to social minimum, which is again the right of 
every single individual when it comes to governance of a state.  
However, in view of the abstractness of this concept, the greatest 
challenge for policy-makers is in determining as to what is the level in which 
these resources and opportunities should reach the needy. Different scholars 
have attempted to answer this question in different ways.  One approach is 
welfarism. For Utilitarianism, welfare is “happiness which is the net balance 
of pleasure over pain that the individual experiences”.5 In this regard, 
 
reading on the subject see, Noam Chomsky, (1998): Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books. In law, according to 
Roscoe Pound social engineering means the use of law for resolving the conflicts in the 
society. Law is used as a tool to shape and regulate people’s behavior in a society. It is 
all about finding a balance between the competing interests in society. See also, Roscoe 
Pound (1921): The Spirit of Common Law, New Hampshire: Marshall Jones Company. 
3  White, Stuart (2008): “Social Minimum”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/ 
entries/social-minimum . 
4  Ibid. 
5   Bentham, Jeremy (1789); “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, in 
Mary Warnock, (ed.,) John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, Glasgow: William Collins.  
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considering the existing divide in accessing resources, utilitarianism has to 
be understood in the light of ‘adaptive preferences’6 which is the tendency of 
human beings (and states when it comes to global governance) that, if they 
“are born into deprived circumstances, then they might adjust their 
expectations so that they are satisfied with their lot. Even though they are 
poor, they are happy, or don’t suffer from much frustration of desire, because 
they have adapted to life in which they have a few resources at their 
command.”7 At the same time, Amartya Sen argues that simply because a 
person is happy and satisfied it cannot be presumed that the system is fair.8  
He argues that a person’s well-being is more than mere adaptive happiness 
and it is the actual condition in which his requirements are fulfilled.9 Further, 
the next question that arises in this regard is pertaining to gauges of 
measuring equality. The branch of political philosophy known as 
recourcism, attempts to assess the respective advantage enjoyed by the 
different states/people in a neutral way.10 According to recoursists even if 
the two states/people have equal access to resources or opportunities, a 
disability that one of them suffers shall make them vulnerable in achieving 
the desired objectives. In this regard, the resourcist Ronald Dworkin argues 
that a disabled state/person has practically less access to resources or 
opportunities than the other.11 Any policy to be called as fair should consider 
these factors. 
 
6   Supra n.3. 
7   Ibid. 
8   Sen, Amartya (1987): The Standard of Living, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
at p. 8. 
9   Sen, Amartya (1992):  Inequality Reexamined ,Oxford: Clarendon Press, at p. 39. See 
also Sen, Amartya (2009): The Idea of Justice, New Delhi: Penguin. 
10   Supra n. 6. 
11 Dworkin, Ronald (2000): Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, See, chapters 3 and 4. 
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The evolution and the growth of the law and policy relating to 
Climate Change have already been analysed in Chapter 3. In continuity, this 
Chapter analyses, India’s Climate Change Policy, its evolution, changes and 
reasons for such changes from a critical perspective. The chapter is divided 
into two parts. The first part critically analyses India’s Domestic Policy 
Statements on environmental protection and the second part makes an 
attempt to critically examine India’s Foreign Policy regarding environmental 
protection generally, and Climate Change Policies particularly.  
4.1  India’s Internal Policy on Environment and Climate Change 
 The questions of fairness in managing natural resources were 
prominent even during the colonial days.  When India was under the British 
rule, Britain had emerged as the world leader in deforestation, devastating 
forests for shipbuilding, iron smelting and farming.12 On certain occasions 
the destruction of forests was used by the British to symbolize the political 
victory.13 This as some authors opine indicate ‘the destructive energy of the 
British race all over the world’ by converting forests into deserts.14 It is also 
stated that during those days search parties were sent by the British to teak 
plantations for locating the most durable timber that could be used for 
building warships. All through this time, a great chunks of forest resources 
were destroyed and no supervision was exercised for this illegitimate cutting 
of trees.15  
 
12 Gadgil, Madhav and Ramachandra, Guha, (1993): This Fissured Land: An Ecological 
History of India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 118. 
13  Ibid. For example, in the early 19th century and following its defeat of Marathas, the 
East India Company razed to the ground teak plantations in Ratnagiri that were nurtured 
and grown by the legendary Maratha Admiral Kanhoji Angre. 
14  Supra n. 12. 
15  Ibid. 
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 The British administration also felt the need for introducing 
appropriate laws to prevent the deforestation, but again for asserting its 
unfair monopoly in forests against the legitimate rights of the local 
community. In furtherance, the first Forest Department was formed in India 
in the year 186416 and the Indian Forest Act17 was enacted in 1865, which 
sought to assert the absolute claims of the State over forests. The key 
foundation of the environmental policy of the British was its claim that “the 
right of the state to dispose of or retain for public use the waste and forest 
area, is among the most ancient and undisputed features in oriental 
sovereignty.” 18 On the basis of this claim, the State was supposed to be the 
owner of all natural resources.  The Forest Act of 1878, which substituted the 
Forest Act of 1865, also continued this policy and obliterated the customary 
use of the forests by rural population.19 It provided for three classes of 
forests. The reserve forest consisted of compact and valuable areas, well 
connected to towns upon which, the total state control was safeguarded by 
extinguishing all private rights.20 In the second category included protected 
forests through which state control was again firmly maintained by outlining 
the detailed provisions for the reservation of particular tree species as and 
when they became commercially valuable. The third category was the village 
forests, where again the same policy was continued.  Further the National 
Forest Policy of 1894, again asserted that ‘state is the owner for all the 
 
16  Divan, Shyam and Rosencranz, Armin (2008): Environmental Law and Policy in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 28. 
17  Which was later substituted with Indian Forest Act, 1927. 
18  Supra n. 15. 
19  Supra n. 16. 
20  Ibid. 
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forests’ who may at their liberty exploit these resources for any purposes 
including commercial.21  
Thereafter when India became independent, the National Forest 
Policy, 1952 was formulated. Unfortunately, it also upheld the unfair policies 
of its predecessor, the Forest Policy, 1894, viz., the exclusive power and 
control of the states over the forest, its produces and the management.22 A 
change was seen in the year 1988 when India announced its National Forest 
Policy, which endeavours to strike a balance between conservation and 
commercial exploitation of forest resources and the rights of local 
communities.  However the fundamental problem was that there were no 
corresponding changes made in the statutory law. Even today, the Forest Act, 
1927 is the statute through which the National Forest Policy is implemented 
in India. It may be noted that there is a striking contradiction between the 
foundations of the Act of 1927 and the Policy of 1988. As long the state 
considers natural resources to be under its absolute monopoly, at the cost of 
legitimate use of these resources by the community, it fails in rendering the 
social minimum and hence becomes unfair.23  
4.1.1  The Stockholm Conference and its Impact on the Environment 
Policy in India 
 The year 1972 marked a watershed in the history of environmental 
policy in India. Prior to 1972, environmental concerns such as sewage 
disposal, sanitation and public health were under the control of various 
Ministries of the Government and each pursued functions related to these 
 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  The Indian Supreme Court through judicial activism replaced the ‘state monopoly’ over 
forest and natural resources by the public trust doctrine to some extent in M. C. Mehta v. 
Kamal Nath [ (1997) 1 SCC 388. It is passed on the idea that the state is holding the 
forest and other natural resources in trust for the public. 
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subjects according to their own discretion in the absence of a proper 
coordination system at Union or State level.24 Very often, in India, this lack 
of coordination and bureaucratic red tapism caused hurdles in achieving the 
desired objectives and the resultant fairness.  During the preparatory stages 
of Stockholm Conference, 1972, the UN General Assembly had requested a 
report from each of its members on the state of environment in their country. 
Responding to this call, a Committee on Human Environment25 was set up to 
prepare the report. Accordingly the Committee prepared three Reports viz. (i) 
Report on Some Aspects of Environmental Degradation and its Control in 
India; (ii) Report on Some Aspects of Problems of Human Settlement in 
India; and (iii) Report on Some Aspects of Rational Management of Natural 
Resources. The impact of population explosion on the natural environment 
were also analysed with the help of these reports26 and the National 
Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination (NCEPC) was 
established in the year 1972.27  However it also appeared to be another 
bureaucratic set up without much activities and support from the other 
Ministries. Later on it was replaced by the National Committee on 
Environmental Planning (NCEP) in the year 1981 with almost similar 
functions. 
 
24  Dwivedi, O.P (1997): India’s Environmental Policies, Programmes and Stewardship, 
New York: St. Martins Press, at p. 54. 
25  Under the Chairmanship of Mr. Pitamber Pant, the then Member of the Planning 
Commission of India. 
26  Supra n. 24. 
27  The NCEPC was an apex advisory body in matters relating to environmental protection 
and improvement. The Committee was to plan and coordinate, but the responsibility of 
execution was with various ministries and other government agencies. 
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The continuing decline of the quality of the environment, together 
with the tragedy at Bhopal28 has spurred the Indian policy makers to change 
the policies. The requirement of strong environmental protection laws was 
strongly felt which, resulted in the enactment of the Environmental 
Protection Act, 1986. Thereafter many statutes were enacted in India with 
the aim of ratifying the various international environmental conventions. The 
following table indicates the statutes enacted in India in furtherance to its 
obligation under the international environmental law.  
Table 4: International Environmental Laws and corresponding Indian Statutes 
 International Environmental Laws Corresponding Indian Environmental 
Statutes 
1 The Stockholm Conference, 1972 and the 
Stockholm Declaration. 
The Air Act, 1981 and the Environmental 
Protection Act, 1986 
2 The Rio Conference, 1992 and the Rio 
Declaration 
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and 
the National Environmental Tribunal Act, 1995 
3 Convention of Biological Diversity, 
1992. 
The Biological Diversity Act, 2002   
4 Convention of International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, 1973.   
The Wild Life Protection (Amendment) Act, 
2002  
 
 The following are certain policy documents pertaining to 
environmental protection generally and climate change particularly in India. 
4.1.2   The Constitution of India  
 Indian Constitution is one of the first Constitutions in the world 
having a specific provision on environmental protection. The Constitutional 
 
28  See for example Baxi, Upendra and Paul, Thomas (1986): Inconvenient Forum and 
Convenient Catastrophe: The Bhopal Case New Delhi: Indian Law Institute. 
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amendment was brought in the year 1976, inserting 48A and 51A (g). Article 
48A, a Directive Principle of State Policy, states: “States shall endeavor to 
protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and 
wildlife of the country.”  Similarly article 51A (g) which is a fundamental 
duty reads: “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and 
improve the natural environment including the forests, lakes, rivers and wild 
life, and to have compassion for the living creatures.” So protection of the 
environment and safeguarding of forests is a goal under the constitution and 
also a fundamental duty of the citizens.  The duty has cast on the citizens to 
follow sustainable conduct oriented towards the protection and improvement 
of environment and the forests and have a compassion for the living 
creatures. These constitutional provisions do reflect the State’s concern and 
the citizen’s desire towards the protection of environment and curb the 
activities and interventions causing adverse impacts on climate and the biotic 
diversities.  
Though these provisions of the Constitution of India cannot be 
enforced in a court of law, the Indian judiciary, through a creative 
interpretation of article 2129 of the constitution expanded the scope of  the 
‘right to life’ to include environmental protection. The Indian Judiciary have 
strengthened article 21 in two ways. First, procedurally, by requiring the 
laws affecting personal liberty to pass the tests of articles 14 and 1930, it 
attempted that the procedure depriving a person of his right to life or liberty 
should be fair and just.31 Similarly the judiciary also recognized several 
 
29  Article 21 reads thus: “No Person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to the procedure established by law.” 
30  Article 14 enshrines the right to equality before law and protects a person against 
arbitrary or unreasonable state action. Article 19 enumerates certain fundamental rights 
such as the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
31  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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unarticulated substantive liberties to be implied by article 21 including the 
right to a wholesome environment. For example in Rural Litigation and 
Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh32, the court 
recognized the right to environment as an integral part of the right to life 
under article 21. Further in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar33 the court held 
that right to life includes the right to enjoy unpolluted air and water. The 
court said that if anything endangers the right to life through environmental 
degradation, a citizen has a right to move the Supreme Court under article 32 
of the constitution. Further in Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana34 the court 
observed:  
Article 21 protects the right to life as a fundamental right. 
Enjoyment of life …includes the right to live with human 
dignity which encompasses within its ambit the protection and 
preservation of environment, ecological balance free from 
pollution of air and water, sanitation etc, without which life 
cannot be enjoyed…There is a constitutional imperative on the 
state government and the municipalities not only to ensure and 
safeguard the environment but also to take adequate measures 
 
32  AIR 1988 SC 2187. 
33  AIR 1991 SC 420. See also, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Delhi Stone Crushing Case) 
1992 (3) SCC 256; Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1051; 
Shantistar Bulders v. Narayan K. Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630. 
34  1995(2) SCC 577. See also, several other decisions in this regard. For example, 
T.Damodar Rao v. The Special Officer, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, AIR 
1987 AP 171; L.K Koolwal v. State of Rajathan, AIR 1988 Raj 2; Arvind Textiles v. 
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 Raj 195; Madhavi v. Tikan, 1988 (2) KLT 730; Attakoya 
Thangal v. Union of India, 1990 (1) KLT 580; Law Society of India v. Fertilisers and 
Chemicals Travancore Ltd, AIR 1994 Ker 308; Kinkri Devi v. State of Karnataka, AIR 
1994 Kar 57; V. Lakshmipathy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1994 Kar 57; K.C. Malhotra 
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1994 MP 48, Hamid Khan v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh, AIR 1997 MP 191. 
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to promote, protect and improve both man made and natural 
environment.35 
Similarly in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation36 the Supreme 
Court reiterated the stand that a person’s ‘right to life’ cannot be taken away 
except according to a just and fair procedure. The same position was 
reiterated in Banawasi Seva Ashram v. Union of Uttar Pradesh37 where the 
Supreme Court of India drafted detailed safeguards to protect the forest 
dwellers including the tribal people from being ousted from the forestland 
for developmental activities. Though in this case, the court kept the 
objectives of development ahead of protecting the environment, it was 
directed that it could be done only after satisfactorily relocating the forest 
dwellers. Such an interpretation at least theoretically helped to check the 
government actions that threaten poor people from displacement hazards and 
also have an environmental impact. However, according to the estimates, out 
of India’s more than 16 million people displaced for developmental activities 
not more than a 4 million are satisfactorily rehabilitated.38 In Sardar Sarovar 
Project, it has been commented that the ‘record of resettlement and 
rehabilitation in India…has been unsatisfactory in virtually every project 
with a large resettlement component’.39 This again indicates that there exists 
a fairness divide in the policies regarding developmental activities in India. 
 
35  Id.  at 580. 
36  AIR 1986 SC 180. 
37  AIR 1987 SC 374.  See also Karanjan Jalasay Yasas Samiti v. State of Gujarat, AIR 
1987 SC 532; Gramin Sewa Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1986 (Supp) SCC 578. 
38  Divan, Shyam and Rosencranz, Armin (2008): Environmental Law and Policy in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 32. 
39  Bradford Morse, (1992): Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review, (The 
World Bank). 
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The recent incidents in Nandigram40 and Yamuna Expressway41 reaffirms 
the fact that despite these rules made by the Indian judiciary, practically 
there exists a substantial fairness divide. It may be noted that in cases, where 
the government permits a particular developmental activity without 
undergoing adequate Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) and public 
scrutiny, such an action of the state can never be fair. 
 The aspect of fairness is also at stake when these judicial decisions 
are to be implemented. Apart from the theoretical criticisms such as, charges 
of judicial legislation, violation of separation of powers, encroachment on 
administration, and judicial despotism42 etc. are the practical constraints that 
make these decisions less effective. The issues such as long pendency of the 
cases, and the lack of implementing mechanism with the judiciary are some 
of the other constraints. If pollution of river Yamuna is taken as an example, 
despite judicial supervision, the city of Delhi alone dumps millions of litre of 
sewage into the river on every day. The Yamuna Action Plan (YAP), which 
has been implemented since 1993 by the government of India, has become a 
futile exercise. In the year 2009, Jairam Ramesh, the then Minister of 
Environment and Forests, admitted in the Lok Sabha about the failure of 
YAP saying that “river is no cleaner now than two decades ago” despite 
spending millions of rupees to control pollution. He again said: “The 
 
40  Nandigram is a village in the State of West Bengal where a large area of land was 
acquired by the State for ‘public purposes’ as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 
without giving the land owners an ‘opportunity to be heard’ and adequately 
compensating them. In fact the land was meant for allotting to the  private companies to 
start their industries.  This has led to a large-scale revolt and violence in the area. 
41  Similarly during the construction of Yamuna Express Way, a high-speed road 
connecting New Delhi to Agra by a private company, land was acquired by the State for 
‘public purposes.’ Since no adequate compensation was given to the landowners they 
revolted and the consequential violence still continues. 
42  Jamie Cassels, (1989): “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting 
the Impossible?” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 37: 495, at p. 507. 
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honourable Member has raised questions on whether…the Yamuna quality 
has improved.  I would like to say that I can always give you figures to show 
that it has improved.  But the true test is, does the Yamuna look cleaner 
today than 20 years ago.  The answer is, ‘No’.”43 
Another issue of fairness in relation to the implementation of these 
constitutionally recognised rights arises specifically in the area of climate 
change. As discussed in Chapter 1, the aggregate environmental pollution in 
other parts of the world, also causes environmental degradation in India. 
This, which is called as the ecological shadow, challenges the enforcement 
of the constitutionally protected rights in India since these rights bind only 
the Republic of India and not foreign states that are responsible for the 
dangerous levels of GHG accumulations. Though theoretically, the liability 
for ‘trans-national environmental harm’ had been recognised as early as 
193844 practically it has been a continuing problem ever since. 
4.1.3   Other Policy Documents Pertaining to Environmental Protection 
and Climate Change 
 In the year 1992, the Government of India adopted the National 
Conservation Strategy and the Policy Statement on Environment and 
Development (hereinafter referred to as the NCS)45 and the Policy for the 
Abatement of Pollution.46The NCS adopts the policy of sustainable 
development and declares India’s commitment to re-orient policies and 
 
43  Jairam Ramesh, “Debate on Pollution of Rivers and Lakes in the Country”, Lok Sabha 
Debates (17 July 2009), available at : http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/ 
Result15.aspx?dbsl=478  (accessed on 23/12/2012). 
44  Trail Smelter Arbitration For details see Trail smelter case (United States v. Canada), 
16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941 VOLUME III pp. 1905-1982, available at 
http://untreaty. un.org/cod/ riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf (accessed on 12/05/2010). 
45  Ministry of Environment and Forests (1992): National Conservation Strategy and 
Policy Statement on Environment and Development, New Delhi: Government of India. 
46   Ministry of Environment and Forests (1992): Policy Statement for Abatement of 
pollution, New Delhi: Government of India.. 
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action in unison with the environmental perspective.47 The NCS proceeds to 
recognise the enormous dimensions of the environmental problems that are 
being faced by India and declares strategies for action in various spheres 
such as agriculture, forestry, industrial development, mining and tourism. 
The NCS also deals with the rehabilitation of persons ousted by the 
developmental projects, the role of non-governmental organisations and also 
about the special relationship between woman and the environment. The 
policy for the abatement of pollution declares India’s objective to integrate 
environmental considerations into decision making at all levels. To achieve 
this goal, it adopts certain fundamental guiding principles48 such as (i) the 
prevention of pollution at source; (ii) the adoption of the best available 
technology; (iii) the polluter pays principle; and (iv) the public participation 
in decision-making49. However, these policy instruments remained powerful 
only in books. Even after the promulgation of these principles, no polluter is 
made to pay for the pollution caused by him. Public participation in decision-
making processes in these areas has also more or less remained as a myth.  
 
47   See the Preamble, Paragraph 1.1 and paragraph 1.4 of the NCS.  
48   Ibid. Paragraph 10.1 says thus: “The objective is to integrate environmental 
considerations into decision making at all levels. To achieve this, steps have to be taken 
to: (i) prevent pollution at source; (ii) encourage, develop and apply the best available 
practicable technical solutions; (iii) ensure that the polluter pays for the pollution and 
control arrangements; (iv) focus protection on heavily polluted areas and river stretches; 
and (v) involve the public in decision making. 
49   Ibid. Paragraph 11.1 says: “The public must be made aware in order to be able to make 
informed choices. A high governmental priority will be to educate citizens about 
environmental risks, the economic and health dangers of resource degradation and the 
real cost of natural resources. Information about the environment will be published 
periodically. Affected citizens and the non-governmental organisations play a role in 
environmental monitoring and therefore allowing them to supplement the regulatory 
system and recognising their expertise where such exists and their commitments and 
vigilance will also be cost effective. Access to information to enable public monitoring 
of environmental concerns, will be provided for” And paragraph 11.2 says thus: “Public 
interest litigation has successfully demonstrated that responsible non-governmental 
organisations and public spirited individuals can bring about significant pressure on 
polluting units for adopting abatement measures. This commitment and expertise will 
be encouraged and their practical work supported.” 
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The National Environment Policy, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 
NEP)50 is another important policy drafted in India.  It aims at reviewing of 
the existing legislation and also the enactment of new legislation if required. 
NEP also seeks to encourage partnership of various stakeholders, viz. the 
public agencies, the local communities, the academia and the scientific and 
research institutions, the investment community, and the international 
development partners in harnessing their respective resources and strengths 
for the conservation of the environment. The NEP also seeks to achieve a 
balance and harmony between the conservation and the development.51 The 
NEP prescribes that human beings are at the centre of concern for sustainable 
development and entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.52 It also says that while conservation of the environmental resources 
is necessary to secure the livelihood and well being of all, the most secure 
basis for conservation is to ensure that the people dependent on particular 
resources obtain better livelihood from the fact of conservation, than from 
the degradation of the resource. The NEP aims at mainstreaming 
environmental concerns in all developmental activities.  
Similarly the National Forest Policy, 1988, proposes to ensure 
environmental stability and maintenance of ecological balance including the 
atmospheric equilibrium, which is vital for sustenance of all life forms, 
human, animal and plant. The derivation of the direct economic benefit must 
be subordinated to this principal aim.53 The national goal was, therefore, to 
have 33 per cent of the total land area of the country under the forest or tree 
cover by 2012 to ensure stability of the fragile ecosystem. Forest land and 
 
50  Ministry of Environment and Forests (2006): The National Environment Policy, New 
Delhi: Government of India. 
51  Id. at p.3. 
52  Id. at  preamble. 
53  Supra n. 46. 
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the land with tree cover should not be treated merely as a resource readily 
available to be utilized for various projects and programmes, but as a 
national asset which requires to be properly safeguarded for providing the 
sustained benefits to the entire community. Diversion of forestland for any 
non-forest purpose should be subject to the most careful examinations. 
Construction of dams and reservoirs, mining, industrial development and 
expansion of agriculture should be consistent with the needs for conservation 
of trees and forests. Projects which involve such diversion should at least 
provide in their investment budget, funds for afforestation.54  
Apart from the ineffectiveness of implementation of these policy 
statements, the goals of fairness are also challenged when they are analysed 
in the light of the new economic policies adopted in India since 1991 to spur 
economic development by integrating the Indian economy with the global 
trade. The government has reduced the industrial regulation, lowered 
international trade and investment barriers and encouraged the export-
oriented enterprises. The entire environmental framework including these 
environmental policies and the various other legislations has in effect 
become less useful in such cases. 
The Government of India has promulgated policy statements that are 
specific to Climate Change. The National Action Plan on Climate Change 
(hereinafter referred to as NAPCC) was adopted in the year 2008. It aims at 
protecting the poor through an inclusive and sustainable development strategy, 
sensitive to climate change and achieving the national growth and poverty 
alleviation objectives while ensuring ecological sustainability. It speaks about 
efficient and cost-effective strategies for end-use as well as extensive and 
 
54  Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change (2008): National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, New Delhi: Government of India. 
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accelerated deployment of appropriate technologies for the adaptation and the 
mitigation of climate change. It identifies measures that promote India’s 
developmental objectives while yielding co-benefits for addressing the issues 
of climate change effectively. It outlines a number of steps to be taken 
simultaneously to advance India’s development and balance it with the climate 
change-related objectives of adaptation and mitigation.55 Its main focus is 
based eight missions viz. (i) The National Solar Mission;  (ii) the National 
Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency; (iii) the National Mission on 
Sustainable Habitat; (iv) the National Water Mission;  (v) the National Mission 
for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem; (vi) the National Mission for 
Sustainable Agriculture; and (vii) the National Mission on Strategic 
Knowledge for Climate Change. 
(i) National Solar Mission: The NAPCC aims to promote the development 
and use of solar energy for power generation and other uses, with the 
ultimate objective of making solar energy competitive with fossil-based 
energy options. It also includes the establishment of a solar research 
centre, increased international collaboration on technology development, 
strengthening of domestic manufacturing capacity, and increased 
government funding and international support.56  
(ii) National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency: This national mission 
brings within its fold, the Energy Conservation Act, 2001 which provides a 
 
55  Prodipto Ghosh, (2009): National Action Plan on Climate Change, available at 
http://moef.nic.in/downloads/others/CC_ghosh.pdf (accessed on 25/05/2012). 
56  The Mission portrays the following: (a) Solar energy permits decentralization of the 
distribution of energy and thereby empowers people at the grassroots level; (b) 
Photovoltaic cells are becoming cheaper with new technology and these newer, 
reflector-based technologies could be used for setting up megawatt scale solar power 
plants across the country; (c)Launch of major R&D programme in relation to solar 
energy is also proposed, which could draw upon international cooperation as well, to 
enable the creation of more affordable, more convenient solar power systems, and to 
promote innovations that enable the storage of solar power for sustained, long-term use. 
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legal mandate for the implementation of the energy efficiency measures 
through the institutional mechanism of the Bureau of Energy Efficiency 
(also known as BEE) in the Central Government and the designated 
agencies in each State. A number of schemes and programmes were 
initiated and it was anticipated that these would have resulted in a saving 
of 10,000 MW by the end of 11th Five Year Plan in 2012. To enhance the 
energy efficiency, four new initiatives are said to be put in place. These 
are:57 
a. A market based mechanism to enhance the cost effectiveness of 
improvements in energy efficiency in energy-intensive large 
industries and facilities, through certification of energy savings that 
could be traded; 
b. Accelerating the shift to energy efficient appliances in designated 
sectors through innovative measures to make the products more 
affordable; 
c. Creation of mechanisms that would help financing programmes in all 
sectors by capturing the future energy savings; 
d. Developing fiscal instruments to promote energy efficiency. 
(iii) National Mission on Sustainable Habitat: Through this National 
Mission, the NAPCC aims at promoting energy efficiency as a core 
component of urban planning by extending the existing Energy 
Conservation Building Code, strengthening the enforcement of 
automotive fuel economy standards, and using the pricing measures to 
encourage the purchase of efficient vehicles and incentives for the use of 
 
57  Bureau of Energy Efficiency (2012): Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT), New Delhi: 
Ministry of Power, Government of India.  
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public transportation.58 The NAPCC also emphasizes on the waste 
management and recycling. To promote the energy efficiency as a core 
component of urban planning, the Mission calls for:59 
a. Extending the existing Energy Conservation Building Code; 
b. A greater emphasis on urban waste management and recycling, 
including the power production from waste; 
c. Strengthening the enforcement of automotive fuel economy standards 
and using the pricing measures to encourage the purchase of efficient 
vehicles; and 
d. Incentives for the use of public transportation.60 
(iv) National Water Mission: The National Water Mission sets a goal of  
20% improvement in water use efficiency through pricing and other 
measures to deal with issue of water scarcity as a consequence of climate 
change.  The mission plan states that a National Water Mission will be 
mounted to ensure integrated water resource management that helps to 
conserve water, minimize wastage and ensure more equitable distribution 
both across and within the states.61 Further, the Mission will take into 
account the provisions of the National Water Policy and develop a 
framework to optimize water use by increasing the water use efficiency 
by 20% through regulatory mechanisms with differential entitlements and 
pricing.62 It seeks to ensure that a considerable share of the water needs 
 
58  Ministry of Urban Development (2011):  National Mission on Sustainable Habitat, New 
Delhi: Government of India, at p. 35. 
59  Id. at p.15. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ministry of Water Resources (2011): National Water Mission, New Delhi: Government 
of India, at p.3. 
62  Ibid.  
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of urban areas are met through recycling of waste water and the water 
requirements of coastal cities with inadequate alternative sources of water 
are met through the adoption of new and appropriate technologies such as 
low temperature desalination technologies that allow for the use of ocean 
water.63 
The National Water Policy would also include the enhanced storage 
both above and below the ground, rainwater harvesting, coupled with the 
equitable and efficient management structures. The Mission also aims at 
developing new regulatory structures, combined with the appropriate entitle-
ments and pricing. This would also help to optimise the efficiency of the 
existing irrigation systems including the rehabilitation of systems that have 
been run down and also to expand irrigation, where feasible, with a special 
effort to increase storage capacity. Incentive structures would also be 
designed to promote water-neutral or water-positive technologies, recharging 
of underground water sources and adoption of large-scale irrigation 
programmes, which rely on sprinklers, drip irrigation and ridge and furrow 
irrigation.64 
(v) National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem: This unique 
mission sets the goal to prevent the melting of the Himalayan glaciers 
and to protect the biodiversity in the Himalayan region. The plan aims to 
conserve the biodiversity, the forest cover, and other ecological values in 
the Himalayan region, where glaciers that are a major source of India’s 
water supply are projected to recede as a result of global warming. This 
mission is to evolve the management measures for sustaining and 
safeguarding the Himalayan glacier and mountain eco-system. Himalayas, 
 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
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being the source of the key perennial rivers, importance should be given 
to the fact of recession in these glaciers which will in turn require the joint 
effort of the climatologists, glaciologists and other experts coupled with 
exchange of information with the South Asian countries and the countries 
sharing the Himalayan ecology65. In mountainous regions, this mission 
aims to maintain two-thirds of the area under forest cover in order to 
prevent erosion and land degradation and ensure the stability of the fragile 
eco-system.66 
(vi) Green India Mission: The NAPCC in this mission aims at afforestation 
of 6 million hectares of degraded forestlands and expanding forest cover 
from 23 to 33% of India’s territory. This national mission seeks to enhance 
the ecosystem services including the carbon sinks. Forests play an 
indispensable role in the preservation of ecological balance and 
maintenance of bio-diversity. Forests also constitute one of the most 
effective carbon-sinks. It also aims at rejuvenating degraded forestland 
through direct action by the communities organized through the Joint 
Forest Management Committees and guided by the Department of Forest 
in state governments.67  
(vii) National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture: The NAPCC aims to 
support climate adaptation in agriculture through the development of 
climate-resilient crops, expansion of weather insurance mechanisms, and 
agricultural practices. This mission would devise strategies to make the 
Indian agriculture more resilient to climate change and to identify and 
 
65  Department of Science and Technology, (2010): National Mission for Sustaining the 
Himalayan Ecosystem, New Delhi: Government of India. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ministry of Environment and Forests, (2011): Green India Mission, New Delhi: 
Government of India. 
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develop new varieties of crops and especially thermal resistant crops and 
alternative cropping patterns, capable of withstanding extremes of 
weather, long dry spells, flooding, and variable moisture availability.68 
This is to be supported by the convergence and integration of the 
traditional knowledge and practice systems, information technology, 
geospatial technologies and biotechnology. Under this mission, a new 
credit and insurance mechanism would be devised to facilitate the 
adoption of desired practices. Focus would be on improving the 
productivity of rainfed agriculture. India would certainly spearhead the 
efforts at the international level to work towards an ecologically 
sustainable green revolution.69 
(viii) National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change: To gain 
a better understanding of the climate science, impacts, and challenges, 
the plan envisions a new Climate Science Research Fund, improved 
climate modelling, and increased international collaboration.70 It also 
encourages the private sector initiatives to develop adaptation and 
mitigation technologies through venture capital funds.71 To enlist the 
global community in research and technology development and ensure 
collaboration through mechanisms including open source platforms, a 
Strategic Knowledge Mission is proposed in this National Mission. This 
is expected to identify the challenges of and the responses to climate 
 
68  Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, (2010): National Mission for Sustainable 
Agriculture: Strategies for Meeting the Challenges of Climate Change, New Delhi: 
Government of India. 
69  Id. at p. 34. 
70  Department of Science and Technology, (2010): National Mission on Strategic 
Knowledge for Climate Change, New Delhi: Government of India. 
71  Ibid. 
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change. It would ensure the issue of funding of high quality and focused 
research into various aspects of climate change. 
The Mission, on its research agenda would look into the socio-economic 
impacts of the climate change including impact on health, demography, 
migration patterns and livelihoods of coastal communities. It also supports 
the establishment of dedicated climate change related academic units in 
Universities and other academic and scientific research institutions in the 
country that would be further networked. There has also been a proposal to 
generate a Climate Science Research Fund under the Mission to support 
research. Private sector initiatives for the development of innovative technolo-
gies for adaptation and mitigation would be encouraged through venture 
capital funds. Research to support policy and implementation would be under-
taken through identified centres. The Mission also focuses on dissemination 
of new knowledge based on research findings. 
The NAPCC also describes other ongoing initiatives that are as follows72: 
a. Power Generation: The government is mandating the retirement of 
inefficient coal-fired power plants and supporting the research and 
development of Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) and 
ultra modern technologies.   
b. Renewable Energy Under the Electricity Act 2003 and the National 
Tariff Policy 2006, the central and the state electricity regulatory 
commissions must purchase a certain percentage of grid-based power 
from renewable sources. 
 
72 Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change (2008): National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, New Delhi: Government of India. 
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c. Energy Efficiency: Under the Energy Conservation Act 2001, large 
energy-consuming industries are required to undertake energy audits 
and an energy-labelling program for appliances that have been 
introduced.  
d. Proposals for Health Sector: The proposed program comprises two 
main components, namely, provision of enhanced public health care 
services and assessment of increased burden of diseases due to 
climate change. 
Ministries with lead responsibility for each of the mission are directed to 
develop the objectives, implementation strategies, timelines, and monitoring 
and evaluation criteria to be submitted to the Prime Minister's Council on 
Climate Change. The Council would also be responsible for periodically 
reviewing and reporting on each mission's progress. To be able to quantify 
the progress, appropriate indicators and methodologies would be developed 
to assess both avoided emissions and adaptation benefits.73 
However, these Policy Statements are themselves not enforceable in a 
court of law though they can be effective tools of interpretation.74 These 
statements represent a broad political consensus and amplify the duties of the 
Government under Part IV of the Indian Constitution stating the Directive 
Principles of State Policy.  These policy instruments will help the legislature in 
 
73 Ibid. See also Summary of India’s Climate Change Plan, available at 
http://www.c2es.org/ international/key-country-policies/india/climate-plan-summary 
(accessed on 06/12/2012)  
74  See for example, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Product, 1995 SCC (6) 
363. In this case the Supreme Court of India relied upon the National Forest Policy and 
the State Forest Policy of Himachal Pradesh to invalidate a decision taken by the State 
Industrial Project Authority. The Authority approved the establishment of units which 
manufactured ‘katha’ from the scarce khair tree without considering factors such as the 
availability of khair trees and the adverse impacts on forests. The court held that the 
policy of economic liberalisation has to be understood in the light of National Forest 
Policy and forest laws enacted by the State. 
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enacting better laws and also the judiciary as a tool of interpretation to prefer 
an environment friendly interpretation to a more conservative approach.75 
These Policies are implemented through the following methods in India: 
(i)  Implementation through Statutes and Authorities: Detailed legislation 
and Rules have been enacted by the legislatures in India for 
implementing these Policy Statements such as the Air Act76, the Bio-
Diversity Act77, the Environment Protection Act78, the Forest 
Conservation Act79 etc. with many other legislations and corresponding 
Rules. Various Authorities have also been setup under these Statutes and 
Rules for the effective implementation of the policies.  This shall be 
discussed in detail under Chapter V. 
(ii) Implementation through the Courts: In the recent past the judicial forums 
in India have become extremely vigilant in protecting the environment. 
This is reflected in the number and range of decisions from the various 
Indian Courts. The detailed analysis shall be done in Chapter 5.  
4.1.4   Fairness and Environmental Policy in India 
 The greatest advantage for India is that, the country is in its early 
stages of economic development and it can grow differently. In other words, 
it can create a low carbon economy using the high-end and emerging 
 
75  Along with these general policies pertaining to environmental conservation there are 
few sector specific policies as well such as the National Agriculture Policy, 2000; the 
National Population Policy, 2000; the National Water Policy, 2002; the National Zoo 
Policy, 1998; the Wild Life Conservation Strategy, 2002 etc.  
76  The Air (Prevention And Control) Act, 1981. 
77  The Biodiversity Act, 2002. 
78  The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. 
79  The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 
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technologies.80 By putting economic development ahead of the emission 
reduction targets, the environment and climate policies in India make a case 
for the right of emerging economies to pursue development and growth to 
alleviate poverty without being worried about the volume of atmospheric 
emissions they generate in the process.81 However, few others say that these 
policies have no durable plan of action. For example the NAPCC has a 
basket of eight Missions and but no plan that will fetch the social minimum 
to the poorest and most vulnerable. A policy that deals with a new set of 
circumstances and factors has necessarily to take into its consideration the 
interest of the poor as well.82  
Greenpeace considers the focus on solar energy as the highlight of 
India’s policies. According to this organisation, the emphasis on solar energy 
shows India’s foresight in energy planning and its intention to capitalize on 
the country’s potential for solar energy. At the same time Greenpeace, states 
that on the energy-efficiency front, the plan is both unambitious and vague 
about what the country is setting out to achieve. Though the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have supported the 
Policy, saying that eight missions will be important to leverage for energy 
 
80  Narain, Sunita (2008): “The Mean World of Climate Change”, Down To Earth (2008), 
available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/mean-world-climate-change  (accessed 
on 16/02/2011). 
81  Sudhirendar Sharma, (2008): “Missing the Mountain for the Snow”, India Together, 
available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2008/jul/env-napcc.htm (accessed on 26/02/ 
2011). 
82  Rahul Goswami, (2008): “Blind spots in India? New National Action Plan on Climate 
Change”, InfoChangeIndia, available at http://www.infochangeindia.org/ environment/ 
analysis/blind-spots-in-indias-new-national-action-plan-on-climate-change.html  
(accessed on 13/12/2010). 
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efficiency across the industry sectors,83 a few others have stated that 
adeqauate awareness must also be created among the general population.84  
Further, the scope of implementation of the NAPCC remains limited, 
as government ministries have been unable to get clearance from the political 
and developmental barriers. Part of the problem lies in the fact that a number 
of key ministries including the Water Ministry come under the purview of 
the states, (in List II of Schedule 7 of the Constitution), and not under the 
central government. The disparity in development and economic growth 
among the various states in India also results in differing standards of 
environmental commitment. While some states have enforced renewable 
energy targets and are attempting to exploit their renewable resources, other 
states lag behind. 85  
India has consistently emphasized on the importance of integrating 
climate change policy with the country’s need for rapid economic growth 
and development, arguing that as a developing country, sustained 
development is vital for India to build up capacities to counter the effects of 
climate change and reduce its overall vulnerability.86 In this light, the 
NAPCC seeks to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions not through setting 
targets but by prioritizing renewable energy and reducing India’s 
 
83   Sonu Jain, (2008): “India’s Climate Change Action-Plan Takes the Safe Way: No to 
Caps, Yes to Efficiency”, The Indian Express online, available at http://www. 
indianexpress.com/news/indias-climate-change-actionplan-takes-the-safe-way-no-to-
caps-yes-to-efficiency/318373/2  (accessed on 13/12/2010). 
84   Pandve, Harshal (2008): “Global initiatives to Prevent Climate Change”, Indian Journal 
of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 12, 96-7. 
85   Times News Network, (2008): “5% Energy to Come From Renewable Sources From 
2009-2010”, Times of India, (31 December 2008), available at http://articles 
.timesofindia. indiatimes.com/2008-12-31/pune/27893549_1_renewable-energy-energy-
efficiency-solar-energy (accessed 13/12/2010). 
86   Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change (2008): National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, New Delhi: Government of India. 
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dependency on fossil fuels. As stated earlier the enthusiasm and aspiration 
for achieving sustainable economic growth also varies from state to state. For 
example, the state of Gujarat has established a number of renewable energy 
plants while most other states are far behind in this aim.87 Even in the case of 
Gujarat, establishment of such renewable energy plants would undoubtedly 
reduce the potential GHG
 
emissions, but it remains unclear as to the exact 
level of GHG reductions that these projects are achieving.88 
The NAPCC has also been criticized for not establishing hard targets, 
particularly in the crucial area of water management.89 Until now, India has 
addressing climate change predominantly in the energy sector and the water 
resource sector has not received the priority attention that it deserves. There 
is a growing shortfall of water in the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the World 
Bank also has warned that India is on the brink of severe water crises with 
most of its states living under the stress of water scarcity.90 The National 
Water Mission component of the NAPCC proposes enacting a new national 
water policy to combat, mitigate, and adapt to water scarcity scenarios that 
may arise out of the climate change. It says that if climate change 
uncertainties are to be integrated into water management planning, there is 
an urgent need to augment the water storage capacity, consider reducing the 
 
87    Business Standard, (2009): “Astonfield to Pump in RS 3600 Crore for Solar Project in 
Gujarat”, Business Standard, (5 February 2009), available at:  http://www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/astonfield-to-pump-in-rs-3600-crore-for-solar-project-
in-gujarat-109020500067_1.html (accessed 13/12/2010). 
88   Krittivas Mukherjee, (2008): “Indian Politics said to Make Climate a Tough Sell”, 
REUTERS, (October 8, 2008), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2008/10/08/ 
us-summit-india-climate-idUSTRE4971320081008 (accessed 13/12/2010). 
89   Viswanathan, Radhika and Sridhar, Aparna (2009): “Assessing National Climate Policy 
November 2008-February 2009”, Climate Analysis, 50-54, available at www. 
climaticoanalysis.org (accessed on 14/12/2010). 
90   Chandan Mahanta (2009): “Cliamte Change Threats to India’s Water Resources and 
Emerging Policy Responses” The Henry L. Stimson Center, available at: http://www. 
isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=110861 (accessed 14/12/2010). 
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subsidies that encourage over consumption, and practice more judicious use 
of the ground and surface water. For India to sustain its growth rate an 
efficient water management is mandatory.91 But at the same time 
privatisation of water management and increasing the cost of drinking water 
is grossly unfair and against the fundamental right to life.92 Further it is also 
said that the focus of the policy is unduly prescriptive in using the command 
and control approach and less of participatory approaches, which is totally 
unfair in a democracy. It focuses less on community participation, which 
would bring the masses to have enough bargaining capacity and force the 
regulatory bodies to respond to the problem effectively.93 
4.2   India’s Foreign Policy on Environmental Protection and Climate 
Change 
 In the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, 1972, the then 
Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi had also participated along with 
official from 113 countries (she was the only head of the State who had 
participated in the Conference which itself was appreciated and interpreted 
as India’s concern for the environment). Her speech at the Conference is 
considered to be the best source for identifying India’s Foreign Policy on 
Environmental Protection. She said thus:94 
 
 
91  David Michel and Amit Pandya (2009): Indian Climate Policy: Choices and Challenges,  
Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, p. 5. 
92  Id. at p. 25. 
93  Gupta, Vijay (2011): “A Critical Assessment of Climate Impacts, Vulnerability and 
Policy in India”, Present Environment and Sustainable Development, 5(1), 11 at p. 19. 
94  Address of Prime Minister of India Smt. Indira Gandhi, at the United Nations 
Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 14 June 1972. available at http:// 
lasulawsenvironmental.blogspot.in/2012/07/indira-gandhis-speech-at-stockholm.html 
(accessed on 15/12/2010). 
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On the one hand the rich look askance at our continuing 
poverty-on other, they warn us against their own methods. 
We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further 
and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of 
large number of people. Are poverty and need the greatest 
polluters? For instance, unless we are in a position to provide 
employment and purchasing power for the daily necessities 
of the tribal people and those who live in or around our 
jungles, we cannot prevent them from combing the forest for 
food and livelihood; from poaching and from despoiling the 
vegetation. When they themselves feel deprived, how can we 
urge the preservation of animals? How can we speak to those 
who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, 
the rivers and the air clean when their own lives are 
contaminated at the source? The Environment cannot be 
improved in conditions of poverty. Nor can poverty be 
eradicated without the use of science and technology. 
There are grave misgivings that the discussion on 
ecology may be designed to distract attention from the 
problems of war and poverty. We have to prove to the 
disinherited majority of the world that ecology and 
conservation will not work against their interest but will 
bring an improvement in their lives. To withhold technology 
from them would deprive them of vast resources of energy 
and knowledge. This is no longer feasible nor will be 
acceptable. 
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The environmental problems of developing countries 
are not the side effects of excessive industrialisation but 
reflect the inadequacy of development. The rich countries 
may look upon development as the cause of environmental 
destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of 
improving the environment for living, of providing food, 
water, sanitation and shelter, of making the desert green and 
the mountains habitable. 
The ecological crises should not add to the burden of 
the weaker nations by introducing new considerations in the 
political and trade policies of rich nations. It would be ironic 
if the fight against pollution were to be converted into 
another business, out of which a few companies, 
corporations, or nations would make profit at the cost of the 
many. 
It has been my experience that people who are at 
cross purposes with nature are cynical about mankind and ill-
at-ease with themselves. Modern man must re-establish an 
unbroken link with nature and with life. He must again learn 
to invoke the energy of growing things and to recognise as 
did the ancients in India centuries ago, that one can take from 
the Earth and the atmosphere only so much as one puts back 
to them. In their hymn to Earth, the sages of Atharva Veda 
chanted: I quote, ‘What of thee I dig out, let that quickly 
grow over, Let me not hit thy vitals, or thy heart. 
196 
 Through this speech Mrs. Gandhi made India’s Foreign Policy on 
environmental protection very clear. Its basic presumption was that the 
environmental problems in India are not caused by industrialisation and other 
economic activities but by the lack of it. People are tempted to over exploit 
and pollute the environment when there are absolutely no means for them to 
earn for subsistence. Hence there cannot be any fruitful efforts of 
environmental protection without eradicating poverty and ensuring the people 
of their livelihood or in other words rendering them the social minimum. 
Thus, it can easily be said that India’s foreign policy on environmental 
protection was on the basis of a balance between sustainable development 
and equity on one hand and poverty and underdevelopment on the other 
hand.95 
4.2.1   India’s Foreign Policy on Climate Change: An Analysis 
 There are very few international instruments that are negotiated as 
expeditiously as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.96  
During the drafting stages of the UNFCCC as well as later on at the 
negotiation table, the fundamental approach of the developing countries was 
clear. It was based on equity, a policy that reflects the fact that anthropogenic 
climate change was the result of cumulative emissions of GHGs that 
originated/originating in developed countries in the past as well in the 
present. On the other hand, the developed countries had a different approach. 
They contended that since climate change is a global problem, there has to be 
a ‘Common Responsibility’ in mitigating the harmful effects of climate 
change. In other words, they sought to minimize the link between the 
commitments under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and the responsibility 
 
95  This continues to be India’s foreign policy on environment even today. 
96  The Negotiations commenced in February 1991 were completed by May 1992. 
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for causing climate change.97 For example, the USA refused to recognise the 
link altogether, maintaining that countries should contribute to an 
international effort in accordance with the means at their disposal and their 
respective capabilities.98  
 Where as the argument of India and other developing countries were 
different. Their stand was based on the Principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR).99  To explain further, India at Rio 
stated thus:100 
The problem of global warming is caused not just by 
emissions of greenhouse gases but by excessive levels of per 
capita emissions of these gases. If per capita emissions of all 
countries had been on the same level as those of the 
developing countries, the world would not…have faced the 
threat of global warming. It follows, therefore, that developed 
countries with high per capita emission levels of greenhouse 
gases are responsible for incremental global warming. 
In these negotiations, the principle of equity should be 
the touchstone for judging any proposal. Those responsible 
for environmental degradation should also be responsible for 
taking corrective measures. Since developed countries with 
high per capita emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible 
 
97  Dasgupta, Chandrasekhar (2012): “Present at the Creation: The Making of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change” in Navroz K. Dubash, Handbook of 
Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, at page 89. 
98  United States of America (1991): Submission of the United States to the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change, UN Doc. A/AC.237? 
Misc.1/Add.1.pp.89-95. 
99  For a detailed discussion on CBDR see ;Chapter 2.  
100  Supra n. 97. 
198 
for the incremental global warming, it follows that they have 
a corresponding obligation to take corrective action. 
Moreover, these are also countries, which have the greatest 
capacity to bear the burden. It is they who possess financial 
resources and the technology needed for corrective action. 
This further reinforces their obligations regarding corrective 
action. 
In the backdrop of this objective, India proposed that:101  
Developed country parties shall, as immediate measures: (a) 
declare, adopt and implement national strategies to stabilize 
and reduce their per capita emissions of greenhouse gases, 
particularly carbon dioxide; stabilisation …should be 
achieved by developed country parties at the latest by the 
year 2000 and should be set out at 1990 emission levels, with 
the goal of achieving at least a 20% to 50% reduction on 
these stabilised levels by the year 2005; (b) provide new and 
additional financial resources for developing country  parties 
for the said objective…(c) provide assured access to 
appropriate environmentally sound technology on 
preferential and non-commercial terms to developing 
countries; and (d) to support developing countries in their 
efforts to create and develop their endogenous capacities in 
scientific and technological research and development 
directed at combating climate change. 
 
101  Ibid. 
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 Developing countries may, in accordance with their 
national development plans, priorities and objectives, 
consider feasible measures with regard to climate change 
provided that the full incremental costs are met by provision 
of new and additional financial resources from the developed 
countries. 
These positions of India at the negotiating tables of UNFCCC owed much to 
its geo-political assessment of the stance taken by the developed countries in 
many different arena of multilateral engagement.102 There was strong 
evidence that the developed countries were approaching the climate change 
issue through a prism of global domination and advancement of self-
interests.   
These proposals were generally welcomed by all developing 
countries at Geneva. At the same time generally most103 of the developed 
countries were against such a proposal. The United States simply refused to 
recognise the question of historical responsibility.104 However, the 
developing countries formed a single coalition under the leadership of India 
and China on these specific fundamental issues and lobbied. India along with 
53 other developing countries submitted a common text on ‘commitments’, 
which, called on the developed countries on the basis of assessed 
 
102  See for example, the UN Conference on Human Environment, 1972, the UN 
Convention on Environment and Development, 1992. 
103  In this regard, Germany recognised that developed countries have a ‘special 
reasonability since these countries have been the main sources of the increase in 
atmospheric concentrations of climate-relevant gases. See, Germany (1991): Non-
Paper:l Important Elements for an International Climate Convention in INCFCCC 
Preparation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change. A/AC.237/Misc.1?Add.1. 
pp.15-23.  
104  Supra n. 81.  See also Rajan, M.G. (1997): Global Environment Politics: India and the 
North –South Politics of Global Environmental Issues, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press. 
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contributions to GHG emission, to provide on grant basis new, adequate and 
additional financial resources to meet the full incremental costs of the 
developing country parties’ in connection with the mitigation and adaptation 
measures. 105  
In the beginning, it was proposed that the task of drafting the 
convention on climate change would be done at the Intergovernmental Panels 
on Climate Change (IPCC). But the IPCC then were represented by experts 
from the developed countries and its First Assessment Report had said that 
both the North and the South have ‘common responsibilities’ on the fight 
against climate change. In this context, India also worked closely with other 
countries from the South to ensure that this was amended to ‘Common but 
Differentiated responsibility’ of industrialised and developed countries.106 
Further, worried about the presence of representatives from the developed 
countries in the IPCC it had worked along with Brazil for shifting of climate 
negotiations to be held outside the IPCC.  Thereafter, it was shifted to the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to ensure ‘openness, transparency, 
universality and legitimacy’ and full cooperation of all states107and thereby 
helping to create a level playing field.  
4.2.2   India’s Key Strategies in International Climate Law Making 
 During the making of the international law on climate change as 
discussed in the earlier part this thesis, India took a very proactive step from 
the very beginning. Another most important point that may be noted here is 
 
105 General Assembly, (1991): Draft Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations, 
A/AC.237/Misc. 1/Add.1.pp.10-14. 
106  Rajan, M.G. (1997): Global Environment Politics: India and the North–South Politics 
of Global Environmental Issues, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p.108. 
107  Ibid. 
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that its policies on climate change were consistent on international 
negotiation tables’ from the submission of the First Assessment Report by 
IPCC in the year 1990, to, the Rio De Janeiro in the year 1992, to, Kyoto 
Protocol in the year 1997 and up to 2007. At the 2007, G8+5 Summit at 
Germany, India’s Climate Policy indicated a change. The Prime Minister of 
India, Mr. Manmohan Singh made a unilateral and voluntary announcement 
that India’s per capita GHG emissions would never exceed that of the 
developed world108. Thereafter at the 2009, G-8 Summit held in Italy, India 
recognised for the first time that the rise in global temperature ‘ought not to 
exceed 2 degree Celsius’ and that India would work together to identify a 
global goal to reduce ‘global emissions by 2050’. Though it was only a 
political declaration without any legal binding in India, it is signalled as 
India’s willingness to concede, in theory at least, an implicit cap on future 
emissions.109 The same trend was more audible at the Copenhagen also 
during the 15th Conference of Parties. India stated that since she is highly 
vulnerable to the issue of climate change, she is required to be a ‘leader, as a 
proactive player as somebody who is shaping the solution’, It changed its 
position from earlier ‘Per Capita Convergence’ to ‘Per Capita Plus’ 
approach. India also said that it can through a domestic legislation or 
executive action put a maximum ceiling to the key sectors in the country 
such as energy, industry, transportation etc. It also said that it could even 
allow external reviews of India’s domestic mitigation actions through a more 
detailed national communication to the UNFCCC. At Copenhagen, India 
also made it clear that, flexibility is its policy except in the case of three 
 
108   Sengupta.Sandeep (2012): “International Climate Negotiations and India’s Role” in 
Navroz K. Dubash, Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and 
Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p.104. 
109   Id. at pp. 104-110. 
202 
‘Non-Negotiables’ that it would not compromise. The three ‘Non-
Negotiables’ are:110 
(a) It shall not accept any legally binding emission reduction cut;  
(b) It shall not accept any ‘peaking year’; and  
(c) It shall permit scrutiny in unsupported mitigation processes at par 
with externally supported mitigation processes. 
Thereafter in the year 2009, the Government of India declared in the Lok 
Sabha that India would voluntarily reduce the ‘emissions intensity’ by 20-25 
per cent by 2020 compared to its 2005 level through domestic mitigation 
actions.111  In this regard the following table gives an analysis of India’s 
policies pertaining to climate change during the period from 1988 to 2012. 
 
Table 5:  India’s key contribution at important events of International Climate 
Change Negotiations112 




IPCC was established and 
UNGA Res. 43/53 recognised 
climate change as ‘concern of 
mankind.’ Thereafter the 
UNGA Resolution 44/207 
Called for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
Ministry of Environment and Forests constituted 
an ‘Expert Advisory Committee’ on Global 
Environmental Issues. 
 
110  Ramesh, Jairam (2009): “Parliamentary Debates on Climate Change Pre-Copenhagen”, 
Lok Sabha, Session XV-III (On Thursday, 3 December 2009). 
111  Supra n. 108. 
112   This table has been derived from data taken from Agarwal., Narain, S, and Sharma, A. 
(eds.) (1999): Green Politics: Global Environmental Negotiations, New Delhi: Centre 
for Science and Environment, p.44; Paterson, M (1996): Global Warming and Global 
Politics, London: Routledge; ; Sengupta.Sandeep (2012): “International Climate 
Negotiations and India’s Role” in Navroz K. Dubash, Handbook of Climate Change and 
India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
203 
1990 IPCC First Assessment 
Report calling for ‘Common 
Responsibility’ among all 
nations since Climate Change 
is a ‘Global Concern’ 
India successfully built a coalition of developing 
countries and successfully substituted ‘Common 
Responsibility’ with ‘Common But Differentiated 
Responsibility (CBDR)’. India also successfully 
lobbied for shifting climate negotiations from 
IPCC dominated by ‘developed countries’ to 
UNGA where there is a level paying field. 
1991-
92 
UNFCCC Negotiations India successfully campaigned in making equity 
and CBDR as fundamental principles of GCCRR. 
But at the same time India and other developing 
countries could not get any concrete emission 
reduction commitments from the North 
1995 COP-I, Berlin India successfully defended the demand for 
mandatory commitments from the  advanced 
developing countries with emission reduction 
commitments (Thereafter in every COP this 
conflict arose between North and South and the 
South successfully defended it.) 
1995-
1997 
Kyoto Protocol Negotiation The North generally wanted the Protocol be 
without any binding commitments with ‘targets 
and time tables’ on them. But India successfully 
lobbied for the inclusion of binding commitments 
in the Protocol but without any additional 
commitments from the South. 
1995-
2001 
Negotiations at Berlin to 
Marrakech regarding Kyoto 
Flexibility Mechanisms 
India initially was a strong opponent of all the 
three flexibility mechanisms saying it is another 
attempt by North to avoid taking any serious 
domestic emission reductions of their own. Later 
on by COP at Marrakech (2001) India understood 
the potential of flexibility mechanisms. Now all 
most 20% of the global CDMs are implemented 
in India. 
2007 G8+5 Summit, Germany India made a unilateral and voluntary 
announcement that India’s per capita GHG 
emissions would never exceed that of the 
developed world. 
2007 COP at Bali and Bali Action 
Plan 
India successfully made attempts to make the 
conditions under which any international 
measurement, reporting and verification of 
developing country mitigation actions would be 
permitted.   
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2009 G-8 Summit, Italy India specifically recognised for the first time 
that the rise in global temperature ‘ought not to 
exceed 2 degree Celsius’ and that India would 
work together to identify a global goal to reduce 
‘global emissions by 2050’. Though it was only a 
political declaration without any legal binding in 
India, it is signalled as India’s willingness to 
concede, in theory at least, an implicit cap on 
future emissions.     
2009 COP 15; Copenhagen  India stated that since it is highly vulnerable to 
climate change and hence it is required to be a 
‘leader, as a proactive player as somebody who is 
shaping the solution’, It changed its position from 
earlier ‘Per Capita Convergence’ to ‘Per Capita 
Plus’ approach. India also said that it can through 
a domestic legislation or executive action put a 
maximum ceiling to the key sectors in the 
country such as energy, industry, transportation 
etc. It also said that it could even allow external 
reviews of India’s domestic mitigation actions 
through a more detailed national communication 
to the UNFCCC. 
According to India, flexibility is its policy, 
though there are three ‘Non-Negotiables’ that it 
would not compromise on (a) It shall not accept 
any legally binding emission reduction cut; (b) It 
shall not accept any ‘peaking year’; and (c) It 
shall permit scrutiny in unsupported mitigation 
processes at par with externally supported 
mitigation processes. In the year 2009 the 
Government of India declared in the Lok Sabha 
that India would voluntarily reduce the 
‘emissions intensity’ by 20-25 per cent by 2020 




Post-Kyoto Negotiations and 
COP 18; Doha  
After 2012, the expiry of Kyoto Protocol, the 
North demanded for an ‘undifferentiated 
international agreement on climate change, where 
all major GHG emitters, the developed and 
developing alike, would have similar mitigation 
obligations subject to similar levels of scrutiny.’ 
India and its alliance, the BASIC Club (Brazil, 
Argentina, South Africa, India, China) 
successfully opposed these attempts of the North 
to bypass Kyoto.  
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4.2.3   Reasons for Shift in Indian Climate Policy 
 India’s international behavior on climate change has deep historical 
roots and has been intimately shaped by how it has conceptualized its overall 
national interest’s overtime. Its primary concern was to eradicate poverty and 
achieve modernization and development through the well-trodden western 
model of modernization and development. It was during this time that 
environmental issues grabbed global concern and the North demanded a need 
for ‘limits to growth’. India and generally all developing countries took this 
‘limits to growth’ approach as unfair and neo-colonial.  Similar to other 
developing countries, the argument was based on the principle of 
‘Sovereignty’.  So there was a consensus that any international agreement to 
curb GHG emissions, which were intrinsically connected to the national 
energy use, economic growth and development, would not just be an 
environmental treaty but rather a ‘major multilateral economic agreement’ 
where, ‘the sharing of costs and benefits implied …could significantly alter 
the economic destinies of individual countries.’113Another important reason 
in determining India’s position at the climate change negotiations was the 
extremely weak and vulnerable position that it found itself in following its 
economic crisis of 1991. Another reason is that it was the time in which, the 
cold war ended, and the USA was at the peak of its ‘unipolar’ moment. At 
this moment it was entirely rational for India’s negations to use principled 
arguments based on equity and justice.114  
 
113  Dasgupta, C. (1994) “The Climate Change Negotiations”, in I.M. Mintzer and J.A. 
Leonard (eds) Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p. 131. 
114  Ibid. 
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 Thereafter, until 2008-09 India had also continued the same foreign 
policy on climate change. The main reasons for such a continuity are as 
foolows:115 
(i) There were little efforts from the North to actually deliver what had 
been actually promised at Rio. The international law being on their 
side, there was little reason for the developing countries including 
India to unilaterally become proactive. 
(ii) During this period there was a consensus among the general public, 
among government negotiators; political parties; environmental 
NGOs; business groups; scientists; and the media that India’s 
external policy on climate change is legitimate and valid.   
(iii) Finally, an important structural reason for the continuity seen in 
India’s foreign policy on climate change is the inherent nature of 
international system itself, where the primary motivation of all states 
has been to safeguard their own economic competitiveness and their 
relative positions in the hierarchy of nations, rather than to 
collectively and meaningfully address the problem of climate change. 
 As noted earlier in this chapter, India’s foreign policy on climate 
change has now been transitioned into very significant changes. These 
changes may be divided into three eras as given in the below table. 
 
115  Id. at p.113. 
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Table 6: Changes in India’s Climate Change Policy 
Stages India’s Strategic Perspective 
First Stage 
 
Growth-First Perspective: During the period 1988 to 2006-07, India’s 
main contention was that poverty is main hindrance for economic 
development.  India strongly opposed the ‘Common Responsibility’ 
argument of the North and instead advocated CBDR. India further 
demanded concrete emission commitments from the North. 
Second Stage Sustainable Development Perspective: During 2007 to 2009, India 
gradually started changing its domestic policy for reducing the emission. 
But at the same time she was not ready to make any changes in her foreign 
policy. 
Third Stage Sustainable Development Internationalist Perspective: After 2009, India 
along with her readiness to make changes in the domestic policies 
regarding climate change, communicated to the world that India was ready 
to make changes in its foreign policy also. 
The various reasons for change of India’s Policy on Climate Change may be 
identified as follows: 
(i) The consensus on the climate policy is not very solid as it used to be. 
There are dissenting opinions emerging from the academia, the civil 
society and from many other sectors.116 
(ii) India has changed significantly over the last two decades. From being 
in a position of severe economic vulnerability at the end of cold war in 
1991, it has now emerged as a powerful economic and political actor 
on the global stage. This has led to increased calls from its counterparts 
for India to do more on climate change, which also eventually reflected 
in the thinking of Indian political leadership and policymakers. 
(iii) The fact that its fellow emerging powers in the international system 
like China, Brazil and South Africa have all announced voluntary 
mitigation targets of their own, generated a considerable peer pressure 
 
116  Rajamani, Lavanya (2007): “India’s Negotiating Position on Climate Change: 
Legitimate but Not Sagacious”, CPR Issue Brief, No. 2, Centre for Policy Research, 
New Delhi. 
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on India also to do so. This was further driven by a fear that unless 
India was seen to be acting progressively on the issue, it could be 
isolated and blamed internationally in the event of any failure, which 
would risk its reputation and desire to be seen as a globally responsible 
state. 
(iv) The changing configuration of global geopolitical alliances has also 
had its impact on India’s thinking and policies on this issue. Some 
groups have criticized and attributed the recent shifts in India’s climate 
change policies to the growing bilateral ties between India and the 
USA. 117 
(v) India has sufficiently reaped the benefit from the past external affairs 
policy on climate change in terms of, among other things, the 
economic development. India now cannot afford to ignore the 
emergence of new scientific evidence on climate change and the 
pressing question of its own vulnerability. Equally, it cannot also 
afford to ignore the domestic voices that may be at variance with its 
traditional stance on this issue.   
4.3   Conclusion 
 Contrary to the common perception that developing countries are mere 
rule takers rather than rule makers in the international system vis-a-vis the 
developed world,118India has been a major international force since the earliest 
days of the negotiations. It has played the constructive role in building the 
 
117  Raghunandan, D (2010): “Kyoto is Dead, Long Live Durban?”, Economic and political 
Weekly. XlV (52). 
118  Hurrel, A and Woods, N. (eds) (1999): Inequality, Globalization and World Politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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international climate change regime, its norms and rules and institutions.119 It 
also played a key role in international climate negotiations over the last two 
decades by having an influential voice as a defender of the global south, as a 
coalition builder and an aggressive protector of its own interests. India is also 
considered to be an important producer of ideas in setting international law on 
climate change. 120  India has become successful in defending the unfair 
strategies of the developed countries in making the developing countries 
responsible for the environmental degradation caused by them.   
Being the world’s second most populous nation, an emerging 
economic power and a significant future emitter of GHGs, India will 
doubtlessly continue to remain a major force in the international climate 
negotiations. Like in the past, where India has played a major role in 
developing the architecture, norms and rules of the climate regime, to suit its 
own interests and that of its coalition partners, India will continue its efforts 
at the global level.It has been rightly noted that, “if India’s national 
legislation on climate change is to be best served, then it must combine 
aggressive domestic action to combat climate change with tough and clear 
eyed bargaining in its international negotiations. Equally, as its attempts to 
play a new bridging role between the North and the South, India needs to 
manage its various alliances, old and new in a sensible manner, based on its 
 
119  Sengupta.Sandeep (2012): “International Climate Negotiations and India’s Role” in 
Navroz K. Dubash, Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and 
Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 101. 
120  Id. at p. 104. For example, India was the first developing country that practically built a 
‘southern coalition’. India has been always emphasising that the primary responsibility 
for reducing GHGs emissions belonged to the North and that no emission reduction 
obligation could be accepted by the South; and that the developed world would have to 
provide developing countries with both clean technology and finance to help them 
address this challenge. 
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own interests, but also keeping in mind its professed values of securing a 
fairer GCCRR that will protect the weaker nations against the strong.”121 
At the same time, the domestic policy regime in India pertaining to 
climate change is not free from issues. Though the constitution of India 
recognizes the state’s responsibility to protect environment, it is placed under 
the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are non-justiciable. Despite 
the fact that the Indian judiciary, through the technique of creative 
interpretation in cases known as public interest litigation, declaring it to be 
enforceable, practically this again failed in taking the ‘social minimum’ to 
the masses.  Further the various policies promulgated by the state with regard 
to environment and climate change are also heavily criticized for failing to 
be fair.  
 
121  Id. at p. 116. 
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Chapter V 
India, Global Climate Change Regime and                         
Fairness Divide 
 
Persuading polluters to pay for the damage they cause…will be a 
major challenge in coming decades. Burden sharing is a very 
complex issue, and frankly I don't see much sign of it happening yet.1 
 
The debate on multilateral action on climate change has been a polarised one 
since the beginning.  It consistently brought the ‘development’ and the 
‘poverty eradication’ argument on one side of the debate and ‘aggressive 
action for emission reduction’ on the other side. Naturally, India along with 
other developing countries was on the former side of the debate and 
developed countries on the latter side.  The developed countries argued that 
the energy consumption in  ‘key developing countries’2 in recent times 
would lead to such massive quantities of GHG emissions, that no matter how 
stringent the emission curbs in the developed countries, the planet’s climate 
would be at severe risk.3 They also criticised the present method of 
calculating emissions on per capita basis and instead argued for measuring it 
on absolute terms. Responding to these, the developing countries pointed out 
 
1 Pachauri, Rajendra as quoted in Laurie, Goering (2007): “Warming to the Challenge of 
Climate Change”, Chicago Tribune, (April.29, 2007), available at: http://inel. 
wordpress.com/2007/04/29/rajendra-pachauris-3-points-on-climate-change/. (accessed 
on 12/09/2012) 
2  Key developing countries on the basis of their GDP growth rates in recent times 
includes; India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico.  
3  Ghosh, Prodipto (2012): “Climate Change Debate: The Rationale of India’s Position”, 
in Navroz K. Dubash (ed.) Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and 
Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p.157. 
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that that they are still very poor4 and though some of them experienced 
impressive GDP growth rates in the recent past, their per capita GHG 
emission is just a fraction of those of the developed countries.5 Thus, they 
argue “in terms of the accumulations of GHGs in the atmosphere, which, is 
what actually leads to climate change, their responsibility is miniscule or 
negative.”6 With this background, this chapter analyses India’s current 
domestic policy in comparison with the actual practices of environmental 
protection and emission reduction.   
India’s contemporary domestic and foreign policy on climate change 
could be understood from the statement made by the Minister for 
Environment and Forests in the Lok Sabha during the Pre-Copenhagen 
Debates in 2009. He said: 7 
When I took over as Minister of Environment and 
Forests…the Prime Minister’s instructions to me were, ‘India 
has not caused the problem of global warming. But try and 
make sure that India is part of the solution. Be Constructive; 
 
4  According to the Human Development Index 2011, the following are the positions of 
these key developing countries: Brazil-85; India-134; China-101 and South Africa-123. 
For details see, the Human Development Index, (2011): United Nations Development 
Programme, pp 127-130. 
5  The developing countries argue that, “the history of world’s economic development 
indicates that economic growth and GHG emissions follow a certain rule. Emissions of 
CO2 and other GHGs increase as the economy develops. When the development 
reaches a certain level, CO2 emissions will level off and the turning point will appear. 
After a period of stationary phase, the emissions start to fall.” They feel that it is unfair 
and unreasonable to ask them to start absolute emission reduction before achieving such 
a stationary phase. See, Xie Zhenhua (2012): “Absolute Emission Cuts is Unfair to 
China at Present”, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and 
Development, available at: http://www.cciced.net/encciced/newscenter/latestnews/ 
201211/t20121123_242582.html (accessed on 11/12/2012). 
6  Supra n. 3 at p. 158. 
7  Ramesh, Jairam (2009): Parliamentary Debates on Climate Change Pre-Copenhagen, 
Lok Sabha, (Session XV-III, 19th November-18th December, 2009).  
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be Pro-active’. Then I asked myself, what is India’s position 
when it comes to international negotiations? The only 
position India had: ‘Our per capita is very low; your per 
capita is very high; therefore we would not do anything.’ Sir, 
per capita is an accident of history. It so happened that we 
could not control our population. That is why, we get the 
benefit of per capita…It is an important point because per 
capita is the only instrument of ensuring equitable 
distribution. But it cannot be the only point. …So, when I 
first started looking at the international canvas, I was struck 
by the fact that India’s position was: ‘Our per capita is low 
and, therefore, we are entitled to pollute more till we reach 
your per capita levels. Since you have caused the problem, 
you must fix the problem. 
Continuing further he said: 8 
  So, I ask my self this question: can we go beyond the per 
capita? Per capita is the basic position. Our per capita is 
low. Our Prime Minister has said that our per capita 
emissions will never exceed the per capita emissions of the 
developed world. My friends from the Left Parties accused 
me of compromising the Prime Minister’s statement. Sir, this 
is English language. This is semantics…To my simple mind, 
I do not see any difference between ‘will not exceed’ and 
‘will remain below’. It is the same thing. Sir, there are some 
non-negotiables for us at Copenhagen. Let me categorically 
 
8  Ibid.   
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state what these non-negotiables are…The first non-
negotiable is that India will not accept a legally binding 
emission reduction cut…I want to say this absolutely, clearly 
and categorically. There is no question of India accepting a 
legally binding emission reduction target… Second, there are 
some attempts by some countries to say that developing 
countries should announce when their emissions will peak.  
Let me say that this is the second non-negotiable for us. We 
will not accept under any circumstances an agreement, which 
stipulates a peaking year for India… There is a third non-
negotiable. Today, it is non-negotiable, but depends on the 
concessions that we can get from the western countries. 
Perhaps, we could modulate our position in consultation with 
China, Brazil and South Africa.9 We are prepared to subject 
all our mitigation actions, whatever we do, which is 
supported by international finance and technology to 
international review. There is nothing wrong with it, as we 
are getting money from outside and we are getting 
technology from outside…The problem arises on the 
mitigation actions, which are unsupported, that is, that which 
we are doing on our own. We certainly would not like the 
unsupported actions to be subject to the same type of scrutiny 
that the supported actions are subject to…  
and therefore: 10  
 
9  Members of the BRICS club.  
10  Supra n. 7.  
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 I separate the domestic responsibility from international 
obligations. I want to be aggressive on domestic obligation 
and I want to be pro-active on international obligation 
because in International obligation there is only one thing 
that counts. Ultimately, when I go to Copenhagen, it is not G-
77 or China or America or Brazil or South Africa, it is India’s 
interest that counts. 
 
 In continuation with these statements, India at the 2009 Copenhagen 
Summit, announced that it would voluntarily reduce its emissions intensity 
between 20 and 25% below the 2005 levels by the year 2020.11 The 
statement made by the Minister in the Parliament and the subsequent change 
in the policy indicates a shift in India’s foreign policy in relation to the 
climate change.  Earlier the consensus amongst the Indian policy makers was 
that ‘India does not have the responsibility because we did not pollute in the 
past’. Traditionally, such a stand was considered to be in tune with India’s 
national interest. After more than two decades of economic liberalisation, the 
same policy makers have started thinking that India’s national interest 
demands more commitment. A commitment that is more constructive and 
proactive. A commitment that is per capita plus. In this context, the 
important question is as to what extend the commitment to be ‘aggressive on 
domestic obligation’ made to the lower house of the Parliament is reflected 
in India’s various policies regarding the protection of the environment. 
 
11  UNFCCC (2010): “Letter including India's Domestic Mitigation Actions”, available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/indiacphacc
ord_app2.pdf  (accessed on 12/11/2011). 
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During the past more than two decades, India has made impressive 
drive towards constructing and adopting various Policy Statements, both 
foreign and domestic, pertaining to the various aspects of environmental 
protection including climate change.12 Efforts were also made for changing 
and modifying these Policies according to the circumstances.  Attempts were 
also made to carry forward these policies, externally in its relations with 
other states through various diplomatic efforts13 and internally through the 
enactment of various statutes,14 framing various rules and regulations and 
 
12  See, Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of these Policy Statements. 
13  See, Chapter 2 and 3 for a detailed analysis on this point. 
14  In India, Article 53 of the Constitution of India vests the executive power in the 
President of India, though article 74(1) requires the President to act in accordance with 
the advice of Council of Ministers. Further the legislative power is contained in the 
Schedule 7, which includes three lists (List I-Union List; List II-State List and List III-
Concurrent List), each of which set out the matters in respect of which relevant federal 
and state legislatures can make laws. Article 73 and 246(1) read in conjunction with the 
relevant items on the Union List, give the executive all the powers to negotiate, enter 
into and ratify treaties. Article 53 requires that the entry into and implementation of 
treaties and other international obligations with other countries be carried out in the 
name of the President. It is important that in India, states do not enjoy the power to enter 
into treaties in India. It is the exclusive power of the federal government. It is also 
important to note that the Parliament has, by virtue of articles 245 and 246 read in 
conjunction with Entry 97 of List-I, residual power to make laws with respect to any 
matter not mentioned in List-II and List-III. Further, article 253 of the Constitution 
provides that the Parliament has the power, “to make any law for the whole or any part 
of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any 
other country or countries or any decision made by any international conference, 
association or other body.” It is also important to note that the negotiation and entering 
into treaties and other international agreements are not listed in either the state or 
concurrent lists.  In most cases, ratification is sufficient to make the terms of the treaty a 
part of India’s domestic law. However, legislative implementation of these treaties is 
required where the terms would affect the rights of individuals, result in public 
expenditure or result in changes to existing domestic law. [See Seervai, H.M. (1983): 
Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary, Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Private 
Ltd.]. However, the fundamental question was relating to importance of domestic law in 
relation with international law. The Indian Judiciary in this regard, in Birma v. State, 
AIR 1951 Raj. 127, held that international law do not form part of the law of the land 
unless expressely made so by the legislature. [See also, Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, 
(1957): Constitutional Developments in India, London: Oxford University Press, at p. 
217.]. Further in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783,  
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also through judicial decisions. In this context, there are a few questions that 
are required to be answered. They include the following; 
(a) Are these policies and the outcome of the efforts of their 
implementation fair? How do they attempt to social engineer the 
conflicting interests of various sub-national groups and take the 
social minimum to the needy? 
(b) Are these policies and the implementation schemes have achieved its 
desired objectives? If no, what were the reasons for such a failure?  
This Chapter is an effort to answer these questions. While doing the analysis, 
the emphasis will be on the Indian forest laws and pollution laws.  
 
 
Justice Hidayatullah held that “…the position maybe summed up thus: there is a 
distinction between (1) the formation, and (2) the performance of the obligation. The 
first is an executive act, the second a legal act if a law is required. The performance then 
has no force apart from a law that is to say unless the Parliament assents to it and the 
Parliament then accords its approval to the first executive act. The treaties created by 
executive action bind the contracting parties, and therefore, means must be found for 
their implementation within the law.”  In P.B. Sawant v. Union of India, AIR 1994 
Bom. 323, the court again addressed the nuances regarding treaty-making power in 
India while it held that entering into treaties was a policy decision which the courts 
should not interfere under article 226. Birendra Bahadur Pandey v. Gramophone Co. Of 
India Ltd, AIR 1984 Cal 69, the court held that in India “…the treaty or International 
Protocol or convention does not become effective or operative of its own force as in 
some of the continental countries unless domestic legislation has been introduced to 
attain a specified result. Once, the Parliament has legislated, the Court must first look at 
the legislation and construe the language employed in it. If the terms of the legislative 
enactment do not suffer from any ambiguity or lack of clarity they must be given effect 
to even if they do not carry out the treaty obligations. But the treaty or Protocol or the 
convention becomes important if the meaning of the expressions used by the Parliament 
is not clear and can be construed in more than one way. The reason is that if one of the 
meanings, which can be properly ascribed, is in consonance with the treaty obligations 
and the other meaning is not so consonant, the meaning, which is consonant, is to be 
preferred. Even where an Act had been passed to give effect to the convention which 
was scheduled to it, the words employed in the Act had to be interpreted in the well 
established sense which they had in municipal law.” 
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5.1 Why Environmental Protection and Climate Change Mitigation 
is Important for India? 
 
 As has already been discussed in the previous chapters, the term 
climate change refers to the long-term changes in the temperature, humidity, 
clouds and rainfall and not the day-to-day variations. 15 Regional climate 
change is caused by both local and global factors.16 Such a difference is 
extremely important because if a regional climate change occurs on account 
of local factors, then these changes can be mitigated by the local action. For 
example, if Kerala is getting warmer because of the failure of the proper 
implementation of the local emission laws, then mitigation efforts cannot do 
without successfully implementing the laws with or without changes. At the 
same time, if the entire country is getting warmer because of the increased 
pollution in India, then the corresponding changes have to be made in the 
environmental laws of the entire country. At the same time, if the reasons for 
climate change were global i.e. the aggregate emission from the other 
countries (known as ecological shadow17), then the idea of bringing emission 
 
15  IPCC (2007): Climate Change: Scientific Basis, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
16  Srinivasan, J (2012): “Impacts of Climate Change in India”, in Navroz K. Dubash (ed.) 
Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, at p. 29. 
17  The term ecological shadow came into prominent usage when it was for the first time 
used in Jim Macneil, Peter Winsemius, and Taizo Yadushiji, (1991): Beyond 
Interdependence; The Meshing of the World's Economy and the Earth's Ecology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. The book was concerned with the interconnections 
across boundaries and suggested that industrialised countries “draw upon the ecological 
capital of all other nations to provide food for their populations, energy and materials 
for their economies and even land, air and water to assimilate their waste by-products. 
This ecological capital, which may be found thousands of miles from their regions in 
which it is used, forms the shadow ecology of an economy…In essence, the ecological 
shadow of a country is the environmental resources it draws from other countries and 
the global commons.” If the state that draws resources from elsewhere does not in some 
way ensure the sustainability of the resource base that it draws upon, then extraction of 
resources causes a shadow to fall over the ecology of another state. In Jennifer Clapp 
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reduction through a global consensus would gain importance. It has already 
been stated that India is the leader and voice of developing countries, when it 
comes multilateral action in climate change. The Country has been 
successful, through such proactive steps in preventing the extremely unfair 
standards from finding a place in the rulebooks. However, India has not 
shown the same level of caution in laying down the rules internally and 
implementing them effectively.  
 The important question is as to why India should be more concerned 
about the issue of climate change in comparison to other Countries?  The 
answer lies in the fact that India is the second most populous country in the 
world and majority of its population lives far below or somewhere near the 
poverty line. This population is also unique in the world due to its extreme 
variations in accessibility to the resources. As has already stated, regional 
climate is influenced not only by the global increase in emission, but also by 
the regional change in the use of land and other natural resources.18 Such 
changes increase the all India mean surface temperature which was the 
highest in 201019 and it has increased by 0.51°C in the past 106 years.20 It is 
also projected that the maximum temperature might increase by 2 - 4°C by 
 
and Peter Dauvergne (2005): Paths to Green World: The Political Economy of the 
Global Environment, Cambridge: MIT Press, it is elaborated by saying that the 
ecological shadow is more than merely the aggregate of trees, soil, minerals and air or 
an area that is destroyed; it should also include the price paid for this destruction and the 
related impacts on resources management. See, Simon Dalby, (2002): Environmental 
Security, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
18  Marshal, C.H. and Pielke R.A. et al (2004): “The Impact of Anthropogenic Land-Cover 
Change on Warm Season Sensible Weather and Sea-Breeze Convection Over the 
Florida Peninsula”, Monthly Weather Review, 132:28, at p. 32. 
19  Indian Meteorological Department (2010): Annual Climate Summary, Pune: National 
Climate Centre.  
20  Rupa Kumar, Krishna Kumar et al. (2002): “Climate Change in India: Observations and 
Model Projections”, in Climate Change in India: Issues, Concerns and Opportunities, 
P.R. Shukla et. al New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.Ltd.  
220 
2050s.21 This is of particular importance considering the fact that, even 
relatively small climatic changes can have a huge impact on the water 
resources, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions such as the northwest 
India.22 There were also fluctuations in the increase in the annual mean 
temperature in various states and regions.  
The increase in emission has reflected in the fluctuation of rainfall 
also. An increase in the rainfall has been observed along the west coast, 
northern Andhra Pradesh and northwest India at 10 to 12 percent over the 
last 100 years. At the same time a decrease has been observed over the east 
Madhya Pradesh, northeast India and some parts of Gujarat and Kerala at 6 
to 8 percent.23  Such fluctuations in the temperature or rainfall will seriously 
affect in a harmful manner certain classes of people like the Indian farmers 
who are highly dependent on agriculture and Indian women, particularly 
rural women, who are living below or near the poverty line.   
 There is a lot of concern about the impact of global warming on 
glaciers. In most parts of the world, glaciers are retreating. During the past 
50 years, many glaciers have retreated at an average of 10 metres per year24 
due to the anthropogenic reasons.25This is much faster than the gradual 
retreat of glaciers due to natural causes. This also will have an impact on the 
availability of fresh water since glaciers form the main source of water for 
 
21  Government of India (2004): “Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC”, 
available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indnc1.pdf (accessed on 03/02/2010). 
22 Government of India (2009):”‘State of Environment Report”, available at 
http://moef.gov.in/soer/2009/SoE%20Report_2009.pdf (accessed on 03/02/2010). 
23  Government of India (2008): “National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)”, 
available at http://pmindia.nic.in/Pg01-52.pdf (accessed on 03/02/2010). 
24  Kulkarni, A.V. and  Bahuguna, I.M., et al (2007): “Glacial Retreat in Himalaya using 
Indian Remote Sensing Satellite Data”, Current Science, 92: 69. 
25  Supra 15 at p. 33. 
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the key perennial rivers such as the Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra. Almost 
67 percent of the glaciers in the Himalayan mountain ranges have retreated 
in the past decade and will continue to retreat, diminishing the flow of the 
aforementioned rivers and leading to severe water shortage as well as 
potential food insecurity and diminished energy security including the 
hydropower generation.26 
Similarly the rise in the sea level is another serious concern 
pertaining to the global warming. An increase in sea surface temperature will 
lead to an expansion of seawater and hence an increase in the sea level. In 
addition, ice melting from glaciers also has led to further increase in the sea 
level. During the past 100 years, the global sea level has increased by around 
170 millimetres.27  Such an increase in the sea level is a major concern 
because a large fraction of India’s population resides within 50 kilometres of 
the seacoast.28 It is also predicted that an increase in the global mean 
temperature by 1 degree celsius will raise the sea level by 25 metres.  In 
India, West Bengal and Gujarat are the most vulnerable states to sea level 
rise. An increase of one metre sea level will submerge, almost 6000 square 
kilometres of land in India.29 The observed rate of sea level rise along the 
Indian coast has been estimated between 1.06 and 1.75 millimetres per year. 
The highest recorded rise has been along the coast of West Bengal. A sea 
level rise of 0.4 to 2.0 millimetres has been recorded along the Gulf of 
Kutch. Along the Karnataka coast there has been a relative decrease in sea 
 
26  Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (2009): Security Implications of Climate 
Change for India, New Delhi: IDSA.  
27  Supra 21. 
28  McGranahan, Balk and Anderosn (2007): “The Rising Tide: Assessing The Risk of 
Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones”, 
Environment and Urbanization, 19:17. 
29  Supra 23 at p. 34. 
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level.30 Rising sea levels will lead to salt intrusion into the coastal fresh 
water sources and thus, threaten water availability.31  
These facts and figures have created lots of fear in the minds of 
people in India. An examination of these concerns are important in the light 
of the research and study revealing that more than 80 percent of Indians 
regard climate change as posing a serious threat to themselves and their 
families and that more than 40 percent, infact wish to see their government 
consider climate change at an even higher priority than it does.32 However, 
when one speaks about the background of climate change policy and 
strategies of India, it is imperative to know as to what is the per capita GHG 
emission of India in comparison with the other major countries. The 
following table compares India’s per capita GHG Emissions with a few 
major industrialized countries.33 
Table 7: India’s per capita GHG emissions in comparison with other countries  







World Average 4.25 
 
 
30  Supra 23. 
31  Supra 19. 
32  David Michel and Amit Pandya (eds), (2009): Indian Climate Policy, Washington DC: 
The Henry L. Stimson Center. 
33  Government of India (2008): “National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)”, 
available at http://pmindia.nic.in/Pg01-52.pdf  (accessed on 12/03/2010). 
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The above table reveals that despite the fact that India is a fast growing 
economy in the world, it is still causing less than a fourth of the world 
average of GHG emission, when quantified on per capita basis, which is 
much below the per capita level of emission in the developed nations.34 
Despite these figures, ‘there is no country more vulnerable to climate change 
than India, on so many fonts’. There are mainly four points of vulnerability 
that are particularly worth mentioning here. 35 They are the following. 
(a) The first major point of vulnerability arises from India’s heavy 
dependence on the monsoons. India’s economic and agricultural 
systems are closely tied to it. Two out of three people in India are 
either directly or indirectly depend on agriculture for employment. 
An indifferent monsoon brings down India’s economic performance, 
but more importantly affects the low-income groups the most. An 
analysis of data over the last 50 years shows that nearly half of our 
fluctuations in GDP are related to the variations in the monsoon.  It 
may be said that, what happens to the monsoon is the single largest 
determinant of prosperity in India.36 
 
34  Therefore, it is argued that “India’s position, …stands vindicated as it is not committed 
to any legal obligation but, volunteers to reciprocate as a responsible nation and 
member of all international conventions adopted to cop up with the situations.”; See, Ali 
Mehdi, (2010): “Climate Change and Biodiversity: India’s Perspective and Legal 
Framework’ Journal of the Indian Law Institute (Special Issue on Climate Change and 
Environmental Law) 52:343 at p. 356. The per capita emission for India would still be 
2.56 tons-CO2 equivalent in 2030, which would be significantly below the global 
average. See also, Vijay Gupta (2011): “A Critical Assessment of Climate Change 
Impacts, Vulnerability and Policy in India”, Present Environment and sustainable 
Development, 5:15. 
35  Ramesh, Jairam (2012): “Forword”, in Navroz K. Dubash (ed.) Climate Change and 
India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at 
p.xx. 
36  Ibid. 
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(b) The second point of vulnerability is India’s coastline. It is one of the 
longest in the world and more than 250 million people live there. A 
large proportion of them are dependent on climate sensitive 
livelihoods such as agriculture or fishing. Hence a sea level rise of 
even one meter would have serious implications on people living in 
the cost.  
(c) The third vulnerability comes from the threat of Himalayan Glaciers. 
While glacial movement is a highly complex phenomenon, it is 
unequivocal that in general, the health of our glacier is threatened. 
Melting glaciers will have a direct impact on water availability to 
hundreds of millions people across the gangetic belt, disrupting crop 
production and affecting rainfall patterns. 
(d) The fourth major point of India’s vulnerability is India’s dependence 
on extraction of the natural resources. Most of India’s core mining 
areas are in the heart of densest forests. This simply means that the 
more mining, the more forests are destroyed and more additions are 
made to GHG emissions. 
As noted above, the majority of the Indian population lives below the 
poverty line37 and they are the most vulnerable to issues of climate change. 
They will be severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate change such 
as droughts, floods, and risks to human health, food security, lives or 
livelihood in the economy. Another sub-national group that will suffer due to 
the climate change is the farming community. It is predicted that, the climate 
change can cause a loss of 10% to 40% crop production by 2100 and reduce 
farm income between 4% and 26% in India with a decline in forest 
 
37  Supra n. 33. 
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productivity.38 It also will have serious impact on the cost of energy, which 
will in turn affect the agriculture and industrial sector. It may also be noted 
that in recent years, India’s primary energy consumption has been increasing 
due to population growth.39 Extreme weather events would also create health 
problems. Serious contamination of freshwater supplies with human waste 
and bacteria would be one of such reasons.40 Glacial retreat, decreased 
rainfall and increased flooding in certain areas will threaten the water 
availability, access and quality. The per capita availability of freshwater in 
India is expected to drop from around 1,820 cubic metres currently to below 
1,000 cubic metres by 2025 as a result of the combined effects of population 
growth and climate change.41  
5.2 Environmental Protection and GHG Emission Reduction: 
Effectiveness of the Legal Mechanisms in India 
 India’s environmental statutes mainly employ the system of licensing 
and criminal sanctions to preserve the natural resources and regulate their 
use.42  Civil compensation is only recovered in suits filed by private 
 
38  Ibid. 
39  The Energy-GDP elasticity during 1953–2001 has been above unity. The total installed 
power capacity in the country as on March, 2008 is 1,43,061 MW, 64.2% of which is 
thermal, 25.1% hydro, 7.8% renewable, and around 4% nuclear energy. India plans to 
enhance energy capacity by 78,520 MW by 2012-13, to electrify the rest of 20% of 
villages, to meet the additional demand. See, Vijay Gupta (2011): “A Critical 
Assessment of Climate Change Impacts, Vulnerability and Policy in India”, Present 
Environment and sustainable Development, 5:15. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2008): “Climate Change and Water”, 
IPCC Technical Paper VI, Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-
papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf (accessed 08/07/2012). See also, Dennis Taenzler, 
Lukas Ruettinger,et al (2011): “Water, Crisis and Climate Change in India: A Policy 
Brief”, Adelphi, available at: http://www.adelphi.de/files/uploads/andere/pdf/ 
application/pdf/2011_water_crisis_and_climate_change_in_ india_a_policy_brief.pdf 
(accessed on 08/07/2012). 
42  Shyam Divan and Armin Roasencranz (2008): Environmental Law and Policy in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 40. 
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individuals and this remedy is negligible when compared to the other 
remedies.43 Under the various statutes enacted for the protection of 
environment, the authorities are empowered to even shut down polluting 
industries and stop the supply of water and power.44 At least in theory, this 
enforcement method assures quick results because it combines the judicial 
and administrative powers in a single authority that can take quick decisions. 
However in practice the case is different. As opined by Shyam Divan, the 
performance of most of these authorities, such as pollution control boards, 
forest authorities or town planning authorities has been disappointing 
because they are not very proactive in most cases unless there is a judicial 
supervision.   
The legislatures and executive measures in India are adopted in 
accordance with the constitutional policy and also in pursuance of various 
declarations, conventions, and instruments adopted by India. India has been 
proactive in the formulation of policy into binding rules45 of conduct as well 
the constitution of various authorities to execute and achieve the goal of 
reduction of GHG emission. A survey of environmental legislation in India 
reflects our concerns to the environment. The following section outlines the 
various legislations, which are presently relevant in this regard.  
5.2.1 Legislative Powers under the Indian Constitution and 
Environmental Protection 
 The Constituent Assembly that drafted the Constitution of India did 
not discuss specifically about environmental matters and its inclusion in the 
 
43  Ibid. 
44  See, the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Chapter III.  
45  See, Bimal N. Patel, (2008): India and International Law (Vol: 2), Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p. 21. 
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Constitution.46  It was the Government of India Act, 1935 that had infact 
discussed about the environmental matters, particularly with reference to the 
distribution of environmental subjects into three lists.47 However, the Forty 
Second Amendment to the Constitution of the year 1976, which was in fact 
incorporated as a result of the Stockholm Declaration, introduced certain 
provisions with the aim of protecting the environment. Nevertheless, such 
provisions are unique features of Indian Constitution, when compared to 
other world constitutions. The Directive Principles of State Policy in Article 
48A48 and the Fundamental Duties under Chapter in Article 51-A (g)49 
expressly require the state and its citizens to act for the protection of 
environment.50 However, the fact that the Directive Principle State Policy 
(DPSP)51 and Fundamental Duties Chapter are non enforceable in a court of 
 
46  Supra n. 40 at p. 43. 
47  H. M Seervai, (1991): Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (Vol.1), 
New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Company, at pp. 164-71. See also, B. Shiva Rao 
(1968): The Framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents, New Delhi: Indian 
Institute of Public Administration at p.315. 
48  Article 48 A says thus: “Protection and Improvement of environment and safeguarding 
of forests and wild life: The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the 
environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.” 
49  Article 51 A (g) says thus: “It shall be the duty of every Citizen in India, to protect and 
improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers, and wild life, and to 
have compassion for living creatures.” 
50  The wordings of Article 48-A were subject to much debate in the Indian Parliament. 
One Amendment that was proposed, required the state to ‘conserve and develop water, 
soil and other natural resources’ to be included in Article 48-A. Another demand was 
that this Article should also ensure that any effort by the State to protect and improve 
the environment would not harm the tribal forest dwellers. (See, the Lok Sabha Debates, 
Eighteenth Session, Fifth Series, Vol.LXV,No.5, October 29,1976, Columns 94-116.). 
In the Rajya Sabha also there were similar demands. Some of members of the Rajya 
Sabha wanted Article 48-A to specifically include ‘Mineral wealth’ and a specific 
requirement on the Government to ‘undertake adequate and effective measures to check 
environmental pollution’ (See, Parliamentary Debate: Rajya Sabha: Official Report, 
Vol.XCVIII, No.5, November 9, 1976, Columns 158-171). 
51  The Directive Principles of State Policy (also known as DPSP) are given in Part IV of 
the Indian Constitution. The DPSP are those principles that could not be guaranteed by 
the State because of many reasons including economical reasons. However, they are 
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law under Article 32 or 226, remains as an obstacle for the effective 
enforcement of these provisions.  But, at the same time the Indian judiciary 
has increasingly interpreted the Article 2152 of the Constitution to mean that 
‘Right to Life’ includes various aspects of the concept of clean environment. 
Regarding the importance of the DPSP the Supreme Court of India in 
Sachidananda Pandey’s case53 held thus:54 
Whenever a problem of ecology is brought before the 
Court, the Court is to bear in mind, Article 48-A of the 
Constitution of India….and Article 51 A(g) …When the 
Court is called upon to give effect to the Directive 
Principle and the Fundamental Duty, the Court is not to 
shrug its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of 
policy and so it is a matter for the Policy-Making 
authority. The least that the court may do is to examine 
whether appropriate considerations are borne in mind and 
irrelevances excluded.  In appropriate cases the court may 
go further, but how much further will depend on the 
circumstances of the case.  
 
intended to be achieved by the State in the later years when the States economic power 
improves. Though the DPSP are not directly enforceable in the Court of law, the 
judiciary enforces them indirectly, by using them as tools of interpretation for the 
Fundamental Rights under part III of the Indian Constitution.  For example, see, 
Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana, 1995 (2) SCC 571; Indian Council for Environ 
Legal Action v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1446; M.C. Mehta v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2187; Kinkeri Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 HP 
4 etc. 
52  Article 21 says; “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to the procedure established by Law.” 
53  Sachidanda Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109. On this point see also, 
T. Damodar Rao v. The Special Officer, Municipal Council of Hyderabad, AIR 1987 
AP 171 at 181. 
54  Id. at p1114-15. 
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Under India’s unique federal form of the government, the legislative power 
is shared between the Central Government (the Parliament) and the State 
Governments (State Legislatures) according to Part XI of the Indian 
Constitution.  While the Parliament makes law for the entire country, the 
state makes laws for that particular state. Article 246 of the Indian 
Constitution bifurcate the subject areas of legislation between the Parliament 
and the state legislatures.  Similarly the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution 
provides for three lists. The List I (also known as Union list) identifies areas, 
where the Parliament only can make laws, where as List II (also known as 
State List) contains areas, where the states can make laws. While List I 
includes areas such as foreign affairs, atomic Energy, interstate 
transportation, shipping, major ports, regulation of air-traffic, regulation and 
development of oilfields, mines and mineral development and interstate 
rivers; the List II includes subject areas such as public health and sanitation, 
agriculture, water supplies, irrigation and drainage and fisheries. List III also 
known as Concurrent List contains 52 areas where both Parliament and State 
Legislatures can enact laws. This includes forests, the protection of wildlife, 
mines and mineral development not covered in the Union list, Population 
Control and Family Planning, Minor Ports and Factories. The parliament 
may, in addition to those subject areas detailed in List I may also legislate in 
the following circumstances; 
(a) The Parliament has the residual power under the Indian Constitution, 
to legislate on subjects not covered by any of these three lists.55  
 
55  Constitution of India, Article 248. 
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(b) The Parliament may also legislate on any matters that are important 
from the perspective of ‘national interest’ on any matters that are 
enumerated in the state list.56  
(c) It may also enact laws on the state subjects, for states whose 
legislatures have consented to central legislations. One example for 
such a central legislation is the Water (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act, 1974, when twelve states gave their consent for such 
legislation. 
 The Forty Second Amendment to the Indian Constitution in the year 
1976, also made new entries like ‘Population Control and family Planning’ 
in the Concurrent List, while ‘Forests’ and ‘Protection of Wild Animals and 
Birds’ were moved from the State List to the Concurrent List. Looking from 
the environmental perspective, this division of legislative power is important. 
It is because some environmental problems such as sanitation and waste 
disposal can be effectively tackled at the local level rather than at the central 
level, whereas few other issues, such as the water pollution and the wildlife 
protection can be better managed by statutes enacted at the central level.57   
 Many changes followed the ‘Stockholm Spirit of Compromise’58 
across the globe. Many environmental statutes were enacted in various 
countries. It is observed that during 1971-75, thirty-one major national 
environmental laws were enacted in countries that are members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (also known as 
OECD) alone, when compared to just four during the period 1956-60, ten during 
 
56  Id. at Article 249. 
57  Supra n. 40 at p.43.  
58 UNEP, (2003): “Integrating Environment and Development: 1972-2002”, available at 
http://www.unep.org/geo/geo3/pdfs/Chapter1.pdf (accessed on 25/06/2011). 
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the years 1960-65 and eighteen from the year 1966 to the year 1970.59 This 
trend was followed in India also. The Government with the help of Article 25360 
of the Indian Constitution read with Entry 1361 of the Union List /List I have 
legislated many statutes for the protection of environment. Article 253 
empowers the Central Government to enact laws on virtually anything, 
including areas that are listed in the State List, if it is for implementing an 
international obligation. Using these powers the Parliament enacted the Air 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986. The Preamble to both these Statutes says that they were 
enacted to implement the decisions reached at the United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment, 1972, the Stockholm Conference.  
5.2.2 India’s Federalism and Environmental Protection 
 The above-analysed federalist structure of law making in India also 
has created many tensions, particularly the ones related to the regional 
development and the preservation of natural resources.62 For example the 
tensions were evident in regulating the coastal development and the 
commercial exploitation of mineral resources. Another example for such a 
tension is in the case of town planning, building regulations and local 
 
59  Long, B.L. (2000): International Environmental Issues and the OECD 1950-2000: A 
Historical Perspective, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
60  The Constitution of India, Article 253 reads thus: “Notwithstanding anything in the 
foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has Power to make any law for the 
whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or 
Convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at the 
International Conference.” 
61  Ibid. Entry 13 of the List I includes to the prerogative of the Union Government to 
“participation in International Conferences, Associations and Other Bodies and 
implementing of Decisions made thereat.” 
62  Supra n. 40 at p. 47. 
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zoning.63 As a result, the laws pertaining to these subjects are found in the 
law books of various states. But there were many problems with these State 
Laws. Some of them were extremely ambiguous while others were rarely 
enforced. To cure such defects with regard to regulating the construction in 
coastal zones, the Central Government imposed the Coastal Zone 
Regulations in 1991which was amended in 2000.64 This was subsequently 
replaced by the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 2011. The CRZ 
regulation restricts construction in a 500 metre wide strip along the Indian 
coast, which provoked many coastal states. These states were disturbed by 
the sweeping nature of power as assumed by the Central Government with 
the help of Article 253 read with Item 13 in List 1, particularly on a subject 
in which they are entitled to make laws according to the constitutional 
scheme. However in S. Jagannath v. Union of India65, the Supreme Court of 
India ratified the power of the Central Government to make such laws since 
it was construed as another international obligation on India as a result of the 
Stockholm Declaration. It may also be noted that the Court went to extent of 
saying that CRZ Regulations ‘shall have an overriding effect and shall 
prevail over the law made by legislatures of the States.’66  Despite such 
efforts, the fact that there is no single entry in List I of Schedule XII 
pertaining to environment makes the task of law making difficult. Currently, 
most of the subjects are included in the state list, which is one of the 
fundamental reasons for disparity in the effectiveness of laws made in India.  
 
63  The Constitution of India. Item 5 and 18 of List II. 
64  Ministry of Environment and Forests, (2011): “Coastal Regulation Zone Notification-
2011”, available at http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/CRZ-Notification-
2011.pdf (accessed on 04/02/2012). 
65  AIR 1997 SC 811.It is commonly referred to as the Shrimp Culture case. 
66  Id. at 846. 
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 The following section enumerates certain legislations made by the 
Parliament with the aim of protecting the environment. 
5.2.3 Public Nuisance and Civil Remedies and Social Minimum 
 The common law concept of nuisance is one of the most traditional 
remedies available against the environmental protection. This also has been 
recognized by some of the environmental statutes in India, which gives it the 
colour of a statutory remedy as well. For example, the definition of pollution 
under the water (Prevention and Control) Act, 1974 says that contamination 
of water can be said to be pollution, when it may or is likely to create a 
nuisance.67 In India, the law of easements ensures the owner of a land, 
beneficial enjoyment thereof free from air, water or noise pollution.68 This 
enables an aggrieved person to challenge any act of pollution69 and to move 
to the Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 
(CPC)70 and also under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.   
 Under section 9 of CPC, whenever there is a nuisance created 
through pollution, the court can order relief in the form of damages, 
injunction, interim orders, declaration and decree. When the harm affects 
many people, this attains the character of a public nuisance. In such cases, 
 
67  Nuisance may be divided into two types viz., Public Nuisance and Private Nuisance. 
While private nuisance is interference with use of land; public nuisance means an 
interference with a right common to the general public. Though both these types are 
important for environmental management, the law of public nuisance has a predominant 
connection with the environmental law.  
68  The Indian Easement Act, 1882. Section 7, Illustrations (b)to (f) and (h).   
69  See, cases like Guhiram v. Uday Chandra, AIR 1963 Pat 455; Kailash Chand v. Gudi, 
1990 HP 17 etc. 
70  Code of Civil Procedure, Section 9. This section empowers the court to try all suits of a 
civil nature and reads thus: “The Court shall…have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil 
nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred.”  
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the Advocate General or any one with the leave of the court71 or two or more 
persons can institute a suit irrespective of whether the special damage is 
caused to such people. In such cases, the remedy may be either a declaration 
or injunction or any other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances 
of the case.72 In Perumal Naicker v. Rathina Naicker,73 the Court held that 
the provision deals with public nuisance is a combination of both civil and 
criminal remedy, which makes both the civil action and the criminal action 
possible in such cases.  Though the law of nuisance is a ‘reservoir for class 
action’ it is not widely used in India. It is necessary to develop this remedy 
as a potent weapon against ecological maladies that may spring up in the 
form of public nuisance.74 The lack of awareness and the lack of 
environmental consciences make these provisions a failure, which shows that 
there are no proactive steps from the government of India in ensuring the 
protection of environment in this regard.  
 In the series of Bhopal Gas Tragedy cases,75 another strategy was 
used to overcome the problems in the Class Actions. The Bhopal Gas Leak 
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, was adopted by the Parliament 
conferring on the Central Government, the exclusive right to represent the 
claims of the victims in cases involving issues of parens patriae. The main 
purpose was to secure the claims of the victims that are dealt ‘speedily, 
effectively, equitably’ and not to the best advantage of the claimants. 
 
71  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 91. 
72  P. Leelakrishan (2010): Environmental Law in India, New Delhi: LexisNexis 
Butterworths Wadhwa, at p. 16. 
73  AIR 2004 Mad 492. 
74  Supra n. 70. 
75  Union of India v. Union Carbide Corporation (1986) 2 Com LJ 169; Union Carbide 
Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 271; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, 
AIR 1990 SC 1480. 
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However, in this case, which was the worst industrial disaster of its kind in 
the human history, the Government of India, severely failed in not only 
preventing the accident but also in doing justice to the victims. It is a clear 
case of the failure of the working of the Environment Impact Assessment in 
India. The facts show that when a license was applied for the starting the 
operations of the carbide plants, many factors were overlooked or ignored. 
There were many houses in the locality, the Bhopal railway station and a 
busy market situated a couple of kilometers from the proposed site. None of 
these factors were taken into consideration when the license was issued.76 
The licensing authorities were not interested in the future effects and the 
availability of safety mechanisms in the site. It was also alleged that the 
approval was given to a plant, whose design was defective from the 
standpoint of safety and that a project of identical design had reportedly been 
rejected by Canada.77 Moreover, many accidents were frequently reported, 
but no action was taken. There was no transparency in the operation of the 
plant and everything was masked in secrecy.78 It is reported that even the 
doctors in the carbide factory hospital did know the antidote to the Methyl 
Isocynate that caused the accident.79  
 The Bhopal disaster discloses the malady of a legal system that failed 
to stress on the mandatory need for an open, fair and effective Environment 
Impact Assessment (EIA). This incident is an indication of the failures of our 
legal and governance system. A system that is corrupt, unscientific and 
ineffective. The lesson unlearned from the Bhopal disaster is particularly 
 
76  Vijay Shankar Varma, (1986): “Bhopal: The Unfolding of a Tragedy”, Alternatives 
XI:133 at p. 140. 
77  Supra n. 70 at p. 321. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
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alarming, considering the fact that India is planning and opening up nuclear 
power plants in various parts of the country.80 
 The Indian Penal Code, 1860 also makes the public nuisance an 
offence. Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states that “a person is 
guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal 
omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the 
public or to the people in general, who dwell or occupy property in the 
vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or 
annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. A 
common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some 
convenience or advantage.” Similarly, any negligent act resulting in an 
infection that is dangerous to life81 and the acts of food adulteration82 are 
also offences coming under the purview of IPC. Also, contaminating the 
water of a public spring or reservoir to make it unfit for ordinary use83 or 
poisoning the atmosphere to the detriment of persons living in the 
neighbourhood84 are also punishable offences under the Indian Penal Code. 
Negligence in the use of poisonous substance, fire and combustible matter, 
 
80  Greepeace, (2012): “Next Bhopal will be Atomic Energy Dept’s Fault”, The Indian 
Express, (December 03 2012), available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/next-
bhopal-will-be-atomic-energy-depts-fault-greenpeace/1039764 (accessed on 
03/10/2012). 
81  The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 269 IPC says that “whoever unlawfully or 
negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, 
likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six month, or with 
fine, or with both.” 
82  Id. at Sections 272 to 276. 
83  Id. at section 277. 
84  Id. at Section 278. 
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explosive substances and machinery are also punishable offences, if it results 
in danger to the human life.85 
 Similarly the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, also contains 
provisions that can be used for environment protection. Under section 133 of 
the Cr.PC86 an executive magistrate can interfere and remove a public 
 
85  Id. at Sections 184-287. 
86  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 133 says that “(1) whenever a District 
Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially 
empowered in this behalf by the State Government on receiving the report of a police 
officer or other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit, 
considers -- (a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any 
public place or from any way, river or channel, which is or may be lawfully used by the 
public; or (b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation or the keeping of any goods or 
merchandise; is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in 
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such, goods 
or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or (c) that the 
construction of any building, or the disposal of any substance, as is likely to occasion 
conflagration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or (d) that any building, tent 
or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause 
injury to persons living or carrying on business in the neighborhood or passing by, and 
that in consequence the removal, repair or support of such building, tent or structure, or 
the removal or support of such tree, is necessary; or (e) that any tank, well or excavation 
adjacent to any such way or public place should be fenced in such manner as to prevent 
danger arising to the public; or (f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, 
confined or otherwise disposed of,  
 Such magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such 
obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such 
goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, 
structure, substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or 
tree, within time to be fixed in the order-(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or 
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be 
directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to 
regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or (iii) to prevent or 
stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of such substance; or (iv) 
to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or support 
such trees; or (v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or (vi) to destroy, confine or 
dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner provided in the said order; or, if he 
objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Executive Magistrate 
Subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the order, and show cause, in the 
manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be made absolute.  
(2)  No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be called in question in any 
civil court.  
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nuisance in the first instance with a conditional order and then with a 
permanent one. He can adopt immediate measures to prevent the danger or 
injury of a serious kind to the public. In Deshi Sugar Mill v. Tupsi Kahar87, 
the Patna High Court categorically stated that under this provision the 
District Magistrate is empowered to take action.  However, this right has 
been used by only in a few cases. In some of them, the respondents instead 
of removing the public nuisance went up to the Supreme Court of India 
spending many thousand of rupees. Thereafter in Municipal Council, Ratlam 
v. Vardhichand88 the residents of Ratlam Municipality was suffering for a 
long time from pungent smell emanating from open drains. The odour caused 
by human excretion in slums and the liquids flowing on to the street from 
distilleries forced the people to approach the magistrate for a remedy. 
Following a direction from the magistrate to remove the drain, the Municipal 
Council, instead of complying with the order challenged it right up to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court emphasised the responsibilities of local 
bodies towards the protection of environment and developed the law of 
public nuisance in the Cr.PC as a potent instrument for enforcement of their 
duties.  According to the Court, the imperative tone of these provisions 
demands a mandatory duty also. The court held that when an executive 
magistrate passes an order under section 133 of the code of criminal 
procedure, the local administration cannot take the plea of financial inability 
in implementing such order. Justice Krishna Iyer held that the section 133 
operates against the local administration regardless of cash in their funds, 
 
 An Explanation to the section reads thus: “public place” includes also property 
belonging to the state, camping grounds and grounds left unoccupied for sanitary or 
recreative purposes.” 
87  AIR 1926 Pat. 506. 
88  AIR 1980 SC 1622. 
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because human rights have to be respected by the state irrespective of 
budgetary provisions. He observed:89 
Decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human 
rights and are first charge on the local self-governing 
bodies. Similarly, providing drainage not pompous and 
attractive, but in working condition and sufficient to meet 
the needs of the people-cannot be evaded if the 
municipality is to justify its existence. 
 The verdict in Ratlam is a significant milestone in the path of 
environmental protection.  However, the doubt remains is that how many 
local bodies will actually have the financial ability to go for such an 
infrastructure project. This might make similar orders from the court 
unenforceable. Another issue is pertaining to the interest or awareness of 
executive magistrates in effectively using this provision. 90  
5.2.4 Protection of Forests and its Habitat in India: A Critical Analysis 
from a Fairness Perspective 
 Forests help in maintaining the ecological balance. They render the 
climate equitable, add to the fertility of the soil, prevent soil erosion and 
promote the perennial stream flow in the rain fed rivers. 91 They also shelter 
wild animals, preserve the gene pool and also protect the tribal population. 
Forests also bring revenue to the state, supply raw material to the industries, 
 
89  Id. at. 1629. 
90  See also, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedia Leather and Liqour Ltd, (2003) 7 SCC 389; 
Krishna Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1986) Cr LJ 396; Himmath Singh v. 
Bhagwana, (1988) Cr LJ 614;  Jayakrishna Panigarhi v. Hrishikesh Panda, (1992) 
Cr.LJ 1054 etc. 
91  VP Agarwala,(1985): Forests in India: Environmental and Production Frontiers, New 
Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing, at p 3; AK Singh, (1987): Forest Resources. Economy 
and Environment, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, at p.15. 
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and act as a source of fuel and fodder.92 It is the same reason due to which 
forest management always gives rise to conflicts. An example of such a 
conflict is the developmental activities like the construction of dam in a 
forest area that raises questions as to the violation of forest laws.  The 
following is an enumeration of various laws pertaining to forest in India. 
 The Forest Act, 192793 is a comprehensive legislation relating to the 
forest management that consolidated all the pre-existing laws.  This Act, a 
product of British colonial days reflects the exploitative intentions of the 
colonial and the feudal society of the time, rather than the environmental and 
ecological interests. Based on a revenue-oriented policy, its main object is to 
regulate the dealings in forest produce and augment the public exchequer by 
levy of duties on timber.94 This Act contains provisions pertaining to the 
reserve forests, whereby the state government could constitute any forestland 
or wasteland as a reserve forest by notification. Thereafter, the government 
would be entitled to any product of such forests. Activities in the reserve 
forest are regulated. Rights over land and rights to forest produce and 
watercourse can be exercised only subject to regulation. Any clearing or 
felling of trees, trespass etc are strictly prohibited. The second kind of forest 
described under the Act is the protected forest. It is observed that, through 
the division of forests into reserve forest and protected forest and the 
processes of governmental control over the natural resources give an 
impression that the Act is environment oriented. However the impact of the 
 
92  Supra n. 70 at p. 39. 
93  The first Indian Forest Act was enacted in the year 1865 through which the state 
declared that the forests belong to the state and state can commercially exploit it to any 
extent. Later on the Forest Act, 1878 was enacted. The Forest Act, 1927 repealed both 
these laws. 
94  Supra n. 89 at p. 40. 
241 
Forest Act was so devastating that it shook the foundation of the ecological 
system.95 Such a process of reservation also deprived the tribal population of 
their traditional rights and privileges. As some authors said the “tribal looked 
upon forest, the nature’s gift, as their own property and they had unfettered 
freedom to do so as they pleased. But the situation continued to change after 
the enactment of Indian Forest Act. The tribal who is supposed to be the 
master of forest is now no more than a wage earner.”96 Reservation of forests 
also led to their commercialisation with the intention to supply raw materials 
for industries.97 By an inequitable privatisation of forest resources in favour 
of a small section of the society, the law infact, worked against the interests 
of the rural and tribal population whose very existence was, to a substantial 
extent, dependent upon those resources.98 The Forest Act does not look at the 
forests from the ecological perspective.  In this context it is commented that 
“the revenue oriented approach, not conducive to the efficient eco-
management continued for a long time…the repercussions were rampant, 
illegal felling and encroachment.”99 However the Indian Judiciary is 
attempting to give a new phase to the Forest Act, 1927.  In State of Tripura 
v. Sudhir Kumar Ranjan Nath,100the Supreme Court said that the Indian 
Forest Act is one that intends to preserve, protect and promote the forest 
wealth in the interest of the nation. This is entirely a new eco-friendly 
 
95  Id. at p. 42. 
96  VS Saxena, (1986): “Social Forestry in Tribal Development” in Deshbandhu and RK 
Garg, Social Forestry and Tribal Development, New Delhi: Indian Environment 
Society, at pp 38-9. 
97  P.Leelakrishnan (1992): “Forest Conservation: Dawn of Awareness”, in P 
Leelakrishnan, Law of Environment, New Delhi: Eastern Book Company, at pp 51-52. 
98  Chhattrapathi Singh, (1986): Common Property and Common Poverty: Indian Forest 
Dwellers and the Law, New Delhi: Clarendon Press, at pp. 6-21. 
99  Supra n. 92. 
100 AIR 1997 SC 1168. 
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approach, which of course, is different from the purpose that it had when it 
was enacted.  
 The wide spread concern for large-scale deforestation resulting in the 
ecological imbalance and the environmental degradation made the policy 
makers to think over a new law.  Forests have been identified as the richest 
source, amongst the natural resources, to be exploited for commercial gain as 
well as for the infrastructure development by the colonial rulers. Hence, the 
British, in order to monopolize the control over forest, introduced the first 
Forest Act, 1865, having the right of ownership on themselves. Such 
protectionist approach failed because the local people lost interest in taking 
care of the forests, as they were not the direct beneficiaries. Post–Colonial 
governments also continued this practice101 until it was realized to have a law 
in the form of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 providing for the 
conservation of forests. The underlining object of the law was to impose 
restrictions on use of forestland for non-forest purpose and also to protect 
and conserve the green cover essential for the trapping of carbon-dioxide.  
 The Forest Conservation Act restricts the de-reservation of forest or 
use of forest or forestlands for non-forest purpose.  It says that no state 
government can without the prior approval of the central government, make 
any order to (i) de-reserve forest; (ii) use any forest land for non-forest 
purpose; (iii) lease out forest land to a private agency (iv) cut naturally 
grown trees in forest land for the purpose of using it for reforestation.102 The 
 
101  National Forest Policy, 1952, which is the first Forest Policy of independent India. 
102  The Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Sections 2 and 69.  
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phrase ‘non-forest purpose’ may also include clearing of forest for the 
cultivation of tea, coffee, spices rubber, palms etc.103  
Similar to this another important milestone in the law regarding forest 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in TN Godavarman Tirumilpad v. Union of 
India104. The concept of sustainable development as defined by the 
international law was illustrated specifically with regard to the forests. The 
decision of the court may be summarised as follows; 
(i) Forest includes the area noted in the government records as forest 
irrespective of ownership 
(ii) Mining licence in such an area without the prior approval is the 
violation of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. All ongoing activities 
under such invalid licence must cease. The State governments will 
have to take the necessary remedial measures. 
(iii) Running sawmills of any kind is a non-forest activity. All timber 
mills within a distance of 100 kms from the border of the state of 
Arunachal Pradesh are to be wound up. 
(iv) Responsibility is imposed on each state government to prepare a 
report on the number of sawmills; actual capacity of timber mills, 
proximity to the nearest forest and their sources of timber. 
(v) Complete ban on felling of trees in the tropical wet evergreen forest 
in Arunachal Pradesh is essential due to their significance to maintain 
ecological balance and preservation of biodiversity.’ Felling of trees 
 
103  Id. at section 2, Explanation. 
104  AIR 1997 SC 1228. 
244 
in the forests in other states, except in accordance with permission is 
suspended. 
(vi) Movement of cut trees and timber is banned with the exception of 
certified timber required for defence purposes.  
(vii) Each State Government should constitute an expert committee to 
identify the forest areas and to assess the sustainable capacity of the 
forest qua sawmills. 
(viii) In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, no private agencies should deal 
in felled trees or in timber. No permission should be given for 
sawmills within a distance of eight kilometres from the boundary of 
demarcated forest area. 
(ix) In Tamil Nadu, the tribals who are a part of the social forestry 
programme in respect of patta lands other than the forests may 
continue to grow and cut trees according to the government scheme 
and in accordance with the law applicable. 
(x) Plantations are not allowed to expand further and encroach upon 
forests by way of clearing or otherwise. 
When the case came up before the court, a high power committee was 
constituted to oversee the strict and faithful implementation of its orders. The 
Godavarman’s case is important in many respects. Similar to section 49-B 
(3) of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, which restricts trade and 
commerce in wild animals, animal articles etc. only through a state 
corporation, Godavarmans case stipulates that sale of timber and felled trees 
shall also take place through state corporations, and not through private 
channels. In furtherance the court also appointed a Central Empowered 
Committee (CEC), which would function for five years, studying all the 
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problems relating to conversion of forest for non-forest purposes and report 
the same to the Court.105  
 Another major development is the enactment of the Biological 
Diversity Act, 2002. India is one of the few countries to have enacted such a 
legislation. The Union Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), the 
nodal agency for implementing provisions of CBD, has developed a strategy 
for biodiversity conservation at macro-level in 1999 and has enacted the 
Biological Diversity Act in the year 2002. The Act provides for the 
conservation of biodiversity within species, between species, ecosystem and 
the traditional knowledge connected therewith. This Act primarily aims at 
giving effect to the provisions of Convention on Biodiversity, 1992, i.e. 
conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components, fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of utilization of genetic 
resources, and also regulates the access to biological resources and 
associated traditional knowledge. Under this law, three tier bodies are 
constituted for the effective enforcement of its provisions. Another very 
significant feature of the Act is that it lays down the duty 106of the Central 
Government to develop the national strategies, plans, and programmes for 
the conservation, promotion and sustainable use of the biological diversity 
including the measures for identification and monitoring of areas rich in 
biological resources. It speaks of promotion of in situ and ex situ 
conservation of biological resources, incentive for research, training and 
 
105  TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1636. For the influence 
of Godavarman on the various High Courts in India, see also; Niyamavedi v. State of 
Kerala, AIR 1993 Ker. 262; Goa Foundation v. Conservator of Forests, Panaji, AIR 
1999 Bom 177; Banswara Marble Mines v. Union of India, AIR 1999  Raj 154; Kamal 
Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2006 MP 167.  
106  The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, Section 36. 
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public education to increase awareness with respect to the biodiversity. 
Under section 37 of the Act, the state government may, in consultation with 
the local bodies, notify areas of biodiversity importance as biodiversity 
heritage sites. The Act also empowers the Central Government, in 
consultation with the concerned State Government to notify any species 
which is on the verge of extinction or is likely to become extinct in their near 
future, as a threatened species and prohibit or regulate the collection thereof, 
for any purpose and take appropriate steps to rehabilitate and preserve those 
species.107 The Biodiversity Act has multifaceted scope and utility ranging 
from regulating the activities in biodiversity rich area to casting duties on the 
government to adopt measures to conserve the diversity in the living 
organisms.  
 Another important issue that is crucial from the fairness perspective 
is the rights of forest dwellers. According to the policy of the British, they 
had no right to access the resources of forests. When a developmental 
activity takes place, the location of development projects on or near forest 
area raises complex questions such as conflict between the short-term 
benefits and the long term tangible and intangible losses, the social impact, 
rehabilitation of the local population and re-forestation. In Banwasi Seva 
Ashram v. State of Uttar Pradesh108 the court held that “indisputably, forests 
are a much wanted national assets. On account of the depletion thereof the 
ecology has been disturbed; climate has undergone major changes and rains 
have become scanty. These have long-term adverse effects on national 
economy as also on the living process. At the same time, we cannot lose 
sight of the fact that for industrial growth and also for the provision of 
 
107  Id. at section 38. 
108  AIR 1987 SC 374. 
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improved living facilities, there is a great demand in this country for energy 
such as electricity.” The court further said that, the oustees of such 
developmental activities should be rehabilitated after examining their rights. 
When the matter came up again before the Court,109 it was held that the state 
has the responsibility to find out alternative plots, render resettlement and 
subsistence allowance, give free transportation, reserve jobs and provide 
facilities of roads, water supply, health care and electricity.  
 However, in Pradeep Krishen v. Union of India,110 the Supreme 
Court held that “if one of the reasons for the shrinkage is the entry of 
villagers and tribes living in and around the sanctuaries and the national 
parks, there can be no doubt that urgent steps must be taken to prevent any 
destruction or damage to the environment, the flora and fauna and wildlife in 
these areas.”111The Court also ruled that “…while every attempt must be 
made to preserve the fragile ecology of the forest area and protect the Tiger 
Reserve, the right of the tribals formally living in the area to keep body and 
soul together must be given proper consideration. Undoubtedly, every effort 
should be made to ensure that the tribals, when resettled, are in a position to 
earn their livelihood.” The same issue again came up before the Supreme 
Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India.112 It was alleged that 
several villagers and few towns in Gujarat and Rajasthan might be benefited 
by the augmentation of water supply, when the height of Reservoir was 
 
109  Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1992) 2 SCC 202, pp 204-206. See 
also, Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Guj 9; Suresh Lohiya v. 
State of Maharashtra, (1996) 10 SCC 397; M Prabhakar Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, 
AIR 2006 AP 386;  
110  AIR 1997 SC 2040. See also, Animal and Environment Legal Defence Fund v. Union of 
India, AIR 1997 SC 1071. 
111  Id. at p. 2047. 
112 AIR 2000 SC 3751. 
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raised. However, the rehabilitation of tribal people ousted from their habitat 
was a serious problem. The Supreme Court insisted that the tribal should be 
given better land at an equal measurement. At the same time, the major 
obstacle in the case of the resettlement of the tribal people is the non-
enforcement and rampant corruption. Whatever may the laws, only a few are 
implemented and even among the ones that are implemented only a very few 
benefits reach the tribal people.  
 An important development in this regard is the enactment of the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of 
Forest Rights) Act, 2007. This Act explicitly identifies the community-based 
conservation as a legitimate right. The Act also has specific provisions for 
empowering those who hold forest rights, checking activities detrimental to 
the forest and biodiversity. 113 The forest people and the forest have 
inalienable linkages and having regard to the symbiotic relationship between 
the tribal people and forests, the primary task of all agencies responsible for 
forest management should be to associate the tribal people closely in 
promotion, regeneration and development of forests. The Act also focuses on 
the need to give special attention to the alternative sources of domestic 
energy on a subsidized basis to reduce the pressure on the existing forest 
areas. The holders of customary rights and concessions in forest are 
motivated to identify themselves with the protection, conservation and 
development of forests from which they derive out their livelihood and 
benefit. This would in return demand that they must keep the biodiversity 
intact.  
 
113 The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest 
Rights) Act, 2007, Section 5. 
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 Similarly, the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is enacted in 
pursuance to Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India114 and is the first of 
its kind providing for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants. It is 
interesting to note here that the Act was enacted at a time when there was no 
much discussion about the climate change. Hunting of Wild Animals 
specified in the Schedules under the Act is prohibited115unless the animal has 
become dangerous to human life or is disabled or diseased as to be beyond 
recovery or is required for education or research purposes. Further, the Act 
prohibits picking, uprooting, damaging, acquiring or collecting any specified 
plant116, from any forest land unless permitted by the concerned authority for 
certain definite purposes.  The Central and State Governments may by 
notification, declare any such area as sanctuary117or park118 if the idea is of 
adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geo-morphological or of natural 
significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild 
life or its environment. However, despite these provisions the situation is 
really panicky.119 More and more wild animals are being hunted and many 
 
114 The Constitution of India. Article 252 (1) says thus: “If it appears to the Legislatures of 
two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which 
Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles 249 
and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to 
that effect are passed by all the House of the Legislatures of those States, it shall be 
lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act 
so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted 
afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two 
Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State’ 
115 The Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 at Section 9. 
116 Id. at section 17A. 
117 Id. at section 18. 
118 Id. at section 35. 
119 The problems pertaining to the enforcement have been discussed by the courts in many 
cases. See for example, Chandamari Tea v. State of Assam, AIR 2000 Gau 13; 
Consumer Education and Research Society v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 975; 
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation v. Field Director Project Tiger and Conservator 
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are facing the threat of extinction.120 This clearly shows that the Wild life 
Act has not produced its desired results. 
5.2.5 Control of Pollution and Indian Environmental Law 
 Various statutes have been enacted in India aiming at controlling 
pollution. It is in fact one of the traditional responsibilities of a local body to 
ensure cleanliness of water and air in its territories. They can exercise 
regulatory control to prevent and abate nuisance from the water pools, which 
adversely affects agriculture.  Contaminated water supply, noxious 
vegetation, harmful dust and smoke or unsanitary conditions of buildings 
etc.,121 were of much concern to the local bodies and sanctions were imposed 
against persons who violated the regulations.122 Below given are some of the 
important legislative measures made for curtailing pollution. 
 The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act (also knows as 
the Water Act) was enacted in the year 1974. This development was invoked 
in the year 1974 during which period the country was in the path of 
industrialization and urbanization in pursuance of Article 252(1) of the 
Constitution of India for enforcing effluent standards for factories 
discharging pollutants123 into water bodies. Pollution of streams, rivers and 
 
of Forests, AIR 2000 Mad 163; Tarun Bharat Singh, Alwar v. Union of India, AIR 
1992 SC 514 etc.  
120  Groombridge, B., and Jenkins, M.D., (2002): The World Atlas on Biodiversity, United 
Nations Environment Programme and World Conservation Monitoring Centre. available 
at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/world-atlas-biodiversity-_92.html (accessed on 
16/02/2009). 
121 Though the control of pollution encompasses many issues this Chapter only covers the 
Water Act and the Air Act within in its ambit. 
122 Supra n. 92 at p.159. 
123 Section 2(e) of Water Act says thus,  “Pollution means such contamination of water or 
such alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of water or such 
discharge of any sewage or trade effluent or of any other liquid, gaseous or solid 
substance into water (whether directly or indirectly) as may, or is likely to, create a 
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other water bodies reduced the quality of vegetation and other living 
creatures in water. Such consequences had far reaching impact on the 
society. The authorities created under the Water Act had the responsibility of 
implementing this duty assigned to them.124 Prior to the amendment in the 
year 1988, the enforcement under Water Act was through criminal 
prosecutions initiated by the Boards. After the Amendment, the Board may 
close a defaulting industrial plant or withdraw its supply of power or water. 
However, the discretion to give or not to give consent for the discharge of 
trade effluents is vested in the Pollution Control Boards. No doubt, such a 
regulatory power is the most potent weapon in the attempt to control of the 
pollution. The power to withdraw consent, when conditions are violated is 
also treated as an effective measure under the Act. However, the 
conglomeration of too many powers in the Board seems to reduce the 
effectiveness of the Board with respect to its various powers.  
Another legislation that has to read along with the Water Act is the 
Water (Prevention and Control of pollution) Cess Act, 1977. The Cess Act 
creates certain economic incentives for pollution control through a 
differential tax structure with high rates applicable to polluting units and to 
pay increased cess for water consumption.125 However, both these 
legislations have also been not very ineffective to prevent water pollution 
and as a result India’s water bodies are being increasingly polluted. The 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report in the year 2011 on the subject 
 
nuisance or render such water harmful or injurious to public health or safety, or to 
domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other legitimate uses, or to the life and 
health of animals or plants or of aquatic organisms.” 
124 The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.See Chapter IV also. 
125 Shyam Divan and Armin Roasencranz (2008): Environmental Law and Policy in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at p. 61. 
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make it very clear that this statute has been a futile attempt for all these 
years.126 
 Similarly, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act127 (also 
known as the Air Act) was enacted by the Parliament in the year 1981 to 
implement the decisions taken at the Stockholm Declaration. The Air Act 
provides for prevention, control and abatement of air pollution with a 
broader approach for the preservation of natural resources on the earth 
including the preservation of quality of air and the establishment of the Air 
Pollution Control Boards to carry out its objectives. It says that ‘emission’ 
means any solid or liquid or gaseous substance coming out of any chimney, 
duct or flue or any other outlet.128 The Authorities created under the Act viz., 
Central Air Pollution Board or State Air Pollution Control Board are 
authorized to lay down standards for emission of air pollutants into the 
atmosphere from industrial plants, automobiles or from any other source not 
being a ship or an aircraft. The Boards are empowered to issue directions to 
the persons violating the law and also lodge complains against such persons 
before a competent court of law.129 The air Act also stipulates that all 
industries operating within the designated ‘air pollution control areas’130 
must obtain consent from the State Boards. Though the 1987 amendment to 
the Air Act strengthened the enforcement mechanisms, particularly by 
 
126  Bharat Lal Seth (2011): “Audit of India's Water Bodies Confirms their Polluted Status,” 
Down To Earth (December 26 2011), available at: http://www.downtoearth.org.in/ 
content/audit-indias-water-bodies-confirms-their-polluted-status (accessed on 23/11/ 2012). 
127 Along with the Air (Prevention and Control of pollution) Rules, 1982 and Air 
(Prevention and Control of pollution-Union Territory) Rules, 1983. 
128  The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, Section 2(j). 
129  Ibid. See also, Chapter II of Act.  
130  Id. at section 19. 
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increasing the penalties for violation, even today it remains to be an 
ineffective tool for reducing the emission in many respects.131    
 Further to implement the decisions of the Stockholm Conference, in 
so far as they relate to the protection and improvement of the human 
environment and the prevention of hazards to human beings, other living 
creatures, plants and property, the Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the EPA) was enacted in the year 1986.132 The EPA is an 
umbrella legislation that provides a framework for the central government 
for the coordination of activities of various authorities created under the 
special legislations such as the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 
1981 and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. The 
EPA is a comprehensive legislation empowering the central government to 
take measures to protect and improve the quality of environment by 
constituting an authority133, which was non-existent under the previous 
legislations. This feature distinguishes the EPA from other laws. Further, the 
Act empowers134the Central government to make rules for carrying out the 
purposes of the Act. By invoking these powers, the Central Government has 
constituted several authorities such as the Environment Pollution (Prevention 
and Control) Authority, Loss of Ecology (Prevention and Payment of 
Compensation) Authority, Environment Impact Assessment Authority etc; 
with different terms of references to lessen the pollution load and also 
 
131 Chetan Chauhan, (2012): “India Tops China in Air Pollution Level Increase”, 
Hindustan Times (November 30, 2012), available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/ 
India-news/NewDelhi/India-tops-China-in-air-pollution-level-increase/Article1-
966208.aspx (accessed on 24/11/2012). 
132  The Environmental Protection Act, 1986. The Preamble.  
133  Id. at section 3 (3). 
134  Id. at section 25. 
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suggest viable options to avoid the impact of restrictions imposed to protect 
and improve the environment.  
 Under the rule making power, the central government, has also made 
rules and regulations covering the biological diversity135and the Ozone Rules136, 
giving the Act, a status of umbrella legislation. The Ozone Rules are relating to 
the control of ozone depletion137 and provide for the prohibition of new 
investments with ozone depleting substances138, regulation of sale, purchase, use 
of ozone depleting substances and the control of production139 and the 
consumption of ozone depleting substances. There is also the regulation of 
import, export and sale of products made with or containing ozone –depleting 
substances.140 These regulations are also on recovery and destruction of ozone 
depleting substances and on manufacture, import and export of compressors.141  
 
 
135 The Environment Impact Assessment Regulation, 2006, makes mandatory for the 
proponent of the project, under paragraph 6 read with appendix II, to point out 
categorically about the threat to biodiversity and energy conservation. 
136  The Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation band Control) Rules 2000.  
137 Id. at Rule 2 (d) reads thus: Consumption with respect to any ozone depleting substance 
means the amount of that substance produced in India in addition to that amount 
imported, less the amount exported; Rule 2 (f) reads thus: calculated level of 
consumption shall be determined by adding together calculated levels of production and 
imports and subtracting calculated level of exports. 
138 Id. at Rule 3(1) reads thus: “No person shall produce or cause to produce any ozone 
depleting substance after the date specified in column (5) of schedule 5, unless he is 
registered with the authority specified in column (4) of that schedule.  
139 Id. at Rule 2(i) reads thus: ‘Ozone depleting substance means the ozone depleting 
substances specified in column (2) of schedule I, whether existing by itself or in a 
mixture, excluding any such substance or mixture (blend) which is manufactured 
product other than a container used for the transportation or storage of such substance. 
140 Id. at Rule 10(1) reads thus: “No person shall import or cause to import any product 
specified in column (2) of schedule VII which are made with or contain ozone depleting 
substances specified in column (3) after the date specified in column (4) of that 
Schedule unless he obtains a licence issued by that authority. 
141 Id. at Rule 12 (1) reads thus: “No person shall manufacture, import or export 
compressors after the date specified in column (5) of Schedule V unless he is registered 
with the authority specified in column (4) of that Schedule.  
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5.3 Fairness Divide and India’s Environmental Degradation 
 Despite this large number of laws and policies and the presence of an 
active judiciary, India’s environment is still under threat. The state has failed 
miserably in implementing these laws and policies.  As M.C. Mehta says, 
“There is no excuse good enough, no obstacle obtrusive enough, and no 
circumstance restrictive enough to exonerate the government from failing to 
perform its statutory duty to arrest the environmental decline.”142 Out of the 
three branches of the government, viz; the legislature, the judiciary and the 
executive, it is the executive branch that is main culprit by ‘passively 
allowing or actively contributing’143 to the environmental tragedy in India.   
 Though there are many reasons for the failure of the executive 
branch, the issue of corruption stands out as the most threatening. According 
to the Transparency International, India is on the top of the list of the ‘most 
corrupt’ nations.144  The plethora of bureaucratic rules and regulations (in 
other words red tapism) provides ample scope for the executive branch to be 
corrupt.145  Though corruption exists in every country, the situation in India 
is different. As observed by the Centre for Science and Environment, 
“Experiences from abroad…have something to teach us.  The United States, 
Japan and South Korea are among the most dynamic countries in the world, 
but their higher political echelons are riddled with corrupt practices.  What 
 
142  M.C. Mehta, (2006):  The Accountability Principle: Legal Solutions to Break Corruptions 
impact on India’s Environment”, Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation, 21: 141, at p. 
141. 
143  Id. at p. 142. 
144  R.B. Jain and P.S. Bawa, (2003): “National Integrity Systems: Country Study Report: 
India”, Transparency International. According to Transparency International’s 2005 
World Corruption Index, India scored only a 2.9 out of 10 (10 being least corrupt). 
145  See also, Asian Development Bank, (2004): “Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the 
Pacific”, Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Fighting Corruption in Twenty-One 
Asian and Pacific Countries.  
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differentiates these countries from India is that once a politician is enmeshed 
in a corruption scandal, regardless of whether that politician is a president or 
prime minister, he/she pays a price.”146 However, this has not been the 
practice in India. Here the corrupt person are protected by all possible means. 
 Corruption has its huge impact on rendering the social minimum to 
the needy. It is the antithesis of human rights and constitutional freedoms.  It 
also has its impact in making the system unfair. Corruption in environmental 
decision making processes directly encourage the spread of pollution and the 
liquidation of natural resources, but at the cost of the nature itself. It can be 
easily said that corruption has the most direct impact on fairness because for 
those who have the resources to bribe, corruption involves only a 
‘transaction cost’, but for the poor who cannot afford the ‘transaction cost’ 
corruption is tantamount to oppression and violence. 147 
 Corruption is largely becoming the greatest challenge in the fight 
against climate change also. The efforts of offsetting the effects of climate 
change involve huge expenses, which according to some estimates would be 
almost equal to US $ 700 billion by the year 2020. Most of these funds, 
according to experts, would flow through new and uncoordinated 
channels.148 The risks of corruption are also high because of the level of 
complexity, uncertainty and novelty that surrounds climate issues. Early 
evidence presented by the Transparency International suggests that there are 
 
146  Centre for Science and Environment, (1999): “The Citizens' Fifth Report: National 
Overview”, at p. 391. 
147  Id. at p. 392. 
148  Transparency International, (2011): Global Corruption Report and Climate Change, 
London: Earthscan, at p. xxvi. 
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many regulatory grey zones and loopholes that are at the risk of being 
exploited by the corrupt interests.149 
In India also, the climate change is becoming a new haven for the 
corrupt. An example is the Kyoto protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism. As discussed earlier in this thesis, India is one of the highest 
beneficiaries of CDM by gaining almost 20 percent of the global CDM 
projects. In this context, it is observed that, some business interests and civil 
society groups have been quietly lobbying with the government in recent 
years to unduly take advantage of important climate related financial 
opportunities.150 
Corruption in climate change that is offsetting the fair procedures 
also challenges the idea of justice. Since it is the indigenous and rural poor 
communities in remote locations, the urban poor living in precarious 
settlements, and displaced persons who require resettlement etc., who bear 
the brunt of the effects of climate change; they are meant to be the main 
beneficiaries of adaptive action; and yet they are usually the most 
marginalized voices in the political system. And the main reason is 
corruption. This starkly highlights the need for a fair, transparent and 
accountable climate governance. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 ‘Therefore I am convinced that acting on climate change is a national 
propriety; we need to act, for our own sake, not because of the sake of 
anyone else. We need an aggressive domestic agenda that addresses the 
 
149  Ibid. 
150 Sudhir Chella Rajan (2011): “Vested or Public Interest: The Case of India”, in 
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Climate Change, London: 
Earthscan, at p 56. 
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vulnerabilities, the climate change may pose, an agenda-that produces 
substantive policy action in the short as well as the medium term.”151 But, 
such an aggressive domestic agenda continues to be a myth. The 
environmental laws and regulations that would help the climate change 
mitigation, largely remains as an ineffective tool in that direction. The issues 
such as, ambiguity in the legislative power under the Indian Constitution, 
corruption, lack of awareness among the general public, lack of coordination 
etc. create a fairness divide in the efforts of mitigating the effects of climate 
change. The system also has failed in taking the social minimum to the 
various sub-national groups, who bear the brunt of the effects of climate 
change as noted above. The basic procedural requirements such as 
Environmental Impact Assessment and public participation in the 
environmental decision-making processes are not followed at all.  
This fairness divide that exist in environmental and climate change 
actions in India can be better illustrated with the example of the case of the 
displaced tribal people of Narmada valley Project where even after more 
than two decades the displaced people are yet not rehabilitated.152 As, Mehta 
says; “The truth is that the environment is not the government's priority.  The 
poor are not a priority.  Our international commitments are not a priority. 
 
151 Ramesh, Jairam (2012): “Forword”, in Navroz K. Dubash (ed.) Climate Change and 
India: Development, Politics and Governance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, at 
p.xx. 
152  Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India; AIR 2000 SC 3751. In this case, the 
Supreme Court ordered that the tribals who are displaced for the developmental 
activities shall be provided with lands of quality at least equal to that of lands previously 
occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. 
Even after ten years of the decision, over 200,000 Narmada Dam Oustees are still to be 
rehabilitated. It has become a crime that goes unpunished for the last 25 Years. See also, 
Devinder Sharma, (2010): “Over 200,000 Narmada Dam Oustees Still To Be 
Rehabilitated: A Crime That Goes Unpunished For 25 Years”, Counter Currents, (26 
June 2010), available at http://www.countercurrents.org/dsharma260610.htm (accessed 
on 26/10/2012).  
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Our public health is not a priority. Our fundamental rights are not a priority. 
Instead our leadership is narrowly focused on rapid, unsustainable 
developmental programmes, on expansion of nuclear energy, on exploitation 
of resources, and on building unviable large-scale dams.”153 
 
 
153  Id. at pp. 142-43. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
There will come a time when the Earth grows sick, and when it 
does, a tribe will gather from all the cultures of the world who 
believe in deeds and not the words. They will work to heal it and 
they will be known as the ‘Warriors of the Rainbow’.1 
 
This prophecy of the Canadian First People became true finally, but only in 
part. The earth has grown sick, but no tribe, as stated in the prophecy, emerged. 
None of the contemporary specialised organs or agencies created, at the 
international level; with a duty to act against the climate change and the 
environmental degradation resemble such a tribe. If they were, they would have 
been more proactive in resolving these problems.  This chapter intend to explain 
this point, by drawing together the analysis made in the preceding chapters of 
the thesis.   
In the previous chapters, the claims and demands of the developing and 
least developed countries to build GERR and GCCRR on the foundations of 
Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) and respective capabilities 
has been discussed. The fact that majority of these countries have been under 
colonial governance until a few decades ago, and most of their resources were 
looted by their colonial rulers, are sufficient reasons for considering their 
 
1  Prophecy of Canadian First Nation’s People, quoted in, Kumi Naidoo,(2011): “Forword”, in 
Transparency International, (2011): Global Corruption Report and Climate Change, London: 
Earthscan, at p. xiv. 
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demands as fair. They argue that the environmental degradation in their 
territories was/is due to the lack of economic development, rather than the 
presence of any developmental activities based on industrial revolution. The 
hard reality, like the ever mounting population and the expansion of agricultural 
land add to the agony. For the same reason, their desire to advance their 
economic development through rapid industrialisation and poverty eradication is 
rightful and justified. The fact that the GHG emissions from these developing 
and least developed countries are from the sustenance activities rather than  any 
‘luxury’ and ‘life style choices’ would also corroborate this stand.  At the same 
time, it remains a fact that the climate change is an apocalypse in the making, 
which if happens would be disastrous for the entire globe that includes both the 
so-called developing and the least developed countries. It is definite that the 
various sub-national groups in these countries would fall prey to the 
vulnerability before anyone else and would face the horrendous devastation than 
ever before. The reparation might incur them enormous cost that would certainly 
go beyond their affordable limits. If such a tragedy happens, their priority shall 
change, and thereafter, the economic development would definitely be not the 
focus, but disaster management would be.  
 Similarly, the constricted stand taken by the developed countries that the 
environmental degradation and the consequential climate change is a global 
problem and unless there is an equal and ‘common responsibility’ to fix it, they 
would not accept any absolute and binding emission reduction targets has 
proved the scenario more complicated. Further, their resistance and lack of 
motivation in transferring the Environmentally Sustainable Technology (EST) 
and financial resources to the global needy also contribute to the growing 
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anxiety and concern of the developing and the least developed countries. Thus, 
the fact that these powerful economies are attempting to use the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms, designed for reducing the aggregate global GHG emissions, with 
an ulterior objective to gain preferably, the economic profits to the 
environmental profits is really condemning. It is pertinent to note here that, only 
for the reason that they are the major source of global environmental 
degradation based on their past and present anthropogenic GHG emissions; the 
developed countries are increasingly bound by the rule of differentiated 
responsibilities.  
 Scientific evidence proves beyond doubt that the phenomenon of climate 
change would hit the entire globe, developed, developing and least developed 
countries irrespective of their economic might. The lack of cooperation currently 
existing amongst the countries in laying down a solid and effective GCCRR that 
would actually reduce the GHG emission to a level that earth’s sinks could 
neutralise, is highly unjust and unfair.  It is an equally reproachful fact that each 
of these countries frames the environmental policies according to its own self-
interest and in a manner absolutely insensitive to the interest of the planet. The 
changing notions of the practice of environmental colonialism and the new 
configuration of geopolitical alliance have infact brought about substantial 
modifications to the concept of fairness in the global environmental law. In this 
backdrop, the study that seeks to analyse the Global Environment Regulatory 
Regime (GERR) and Global Climate Change Regulatory Regime (GCCRR) 




(i) What is the meaning of the term ‘fairness’ and how effectively, it has 
been reflected and practised in the international environmental law? 
How far a deeper understanding of the concept of fairness would 
help in identifying and resolving the various issues pertaining to 
GERR and GCCRR? 
(ii) Whether the contemporary GERR in general and GCCRR in specific, 
has been fair enough to meet the varying needs and demands of a 
wide range of stakeholders including the developed, developing and 
least developed states, geographically alienated states, various sub-
national groups etc.? 
(i) What are India’s Climate Change Policies and Strategies and how far 
these unique policies and strategies have been effectively negotiated 
at the international law making forums particularly in the backdrop 
of a fairness divide that exists in the contemporary international law 
making process? 
The work sought to answer these questions by analysing the Indian legal and 
policy experiences relating to environmental protection and climate change 
actions in the context of GERR and GCCRR, through a doctrinal study based on 
an interdisciplinary research. This research built on the premises of ‘politics of 
law’ makes the following findings. 
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Research Question 1: What is the meaning of the term ‘fairness’ and how 
effectively, it has been reflected and practised in the international environmental 
law? How far a deeper understanding of the concept of fairness would help in 
identifying and resolving the various issues pertaining to GERR and GCCRR? 
 The philosophical investigation into the concept of fairness and its 
importance in properly understanding and effectively resolving the various 
issues pertaining to GERR and GCCRR as done in chapter 1 of this thesis was 
highly challenging.  The study concluded that fairness (which is often 
synonymously used with terms like justice, equity etc.) has always been a 
prerequisite of any good legal system throughout the world and during all ages. 
Fairness is important in analysing the quality and effectiveness of both domestic 
and international law. At the same time, the study evidenced that the term is 
highly abstract. For different schools of law and different scholars it meant 
differently. For some of them fairness was important in its distributive 
perspective, but for a few others it was important from the substantive and 
procedural viewpoint. Several other scholars analysed the concept of fairness 
from its corrective functional angle. For some of them, obeying the command of 
the sovereign’ were fair but for others the same ‘command of the sovereign’ was 
required to be in consonance with a higher standard to be called as fair.  For 
Aristotle, it was the quality of being impartial that was fair. However, H.L.A. 
Hart, the legal positivist, assumes that equity is subjective and arbitrary and 
different from the legal justice, which is objective and reasonable. He asserts 
that fairness is fundamentally important in two circumstances; firstly in the case 
of distributive justice and secondly in the case of corrective justice. For him, it 
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was important to treat like cases alike and impartiality and consistency were 
fundamental to the concept of fairness.   
 For naturalists like Lon L. Fuller, any law to be called as fair should 
contain essentially the inner morality of law. According to him, the presence of 
eight elements2 in a legal system indicates its unfairness.  He further argues that 
any legal system to be called as fair needs to satisfy these eight conditions. At 
the same time, for Utilitarian like Bentham, the greatest happiness of greatest 
number of people, with less friction and minimum waste was fairness. For John 
Rawls, ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought’ and his difference principle is one of the most influential theories of 
justice. According to him, there are two fundamental principles of justice, viz; (i) 
every individual in a just society has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of 
basic liberties at par with others in the society, and (ii) the social and economic 
inequalities must satisfy two conditions; firstly, the equality of opportunity is a 
condition precedent for any system to be called as fair, and secondly, that they 
must be to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of the society. 
Further, Robert Nozick in his entitlement theory holds that a distribution is just 
and fair, if everyone is entitled to the goods that he currently possesses. 
According to him, just distribution flows from the free exchange of goods 
originally acquired and then successively transferred by legitimate means. If the 
 
2  (i) The lack of rules or law, which leads to ad-hoc and inconsistent adjudication; (ii) Failure to 
publicize or make known the rules of law; (iii) Unclear or obscure legislation that is 
impossible to understand; (iv) Retroactive legislation; (v) Contradictions in the law; (vi) 
Demands that are beyond the power of the subjects and the ruled; (vii) Unstable legislation 
(like the daily or frequent revision of laws); and (viii) Divergence between 
adjudication/administration and legislation. 
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goods are unjustly acquired or transferred, a principle of rectification of those 
violations operates.  
 Hence, the thesis also concludes that, similar to municipal law, fairness 
is also very crucial in analysing the international law, mainly due to three 
reasons. Firstly, the international community consists of nations that are 
competing for resources and those resources are scarce and limited. Secondly, 
the nature and scope of international law has been changed considerably and 
particularly, in the recent past with the advent of globalisation. From the soft law 
model, it has moved to the command and control model. The international law is 
no more mere positive morality and is increasingly becoming enforceable. 
Despite the allegations of violating the sovereignty of states, and being a source 
of democracy deficit, these command and control model is gaining strength than 
ever before. Further, it has been well explained under the multilateral regime of 
the WTO. Thirdly, the rich and powerful states of the international community 
exercise their supremacy in the making of international law. This conclusion is 
also supported by Thomas M. Franck who says that the international law has 
entered a post-ontological age, an era in which, it is no longer necessary to 
defend the status of international law as a law, but where the vital task is to 
analyse its fairness. While attempting to answer the question, ‘is international 
law fair?’ he invokes a broad notion of fairness that encompasses two distinct 
and sometimes competing values; procedural fairness and substantive fairness in 
which the former expresses the idea that ‘for a system of rules to be fair, it must 
be firmly rooted in a framework of formal requirements about how those rules 
are made, interpreted and applied’.  
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 Further, the study also concludes that the fairness is questionable in 
GERR and GCCRR, which are two species of international legal regimes, 
particularly considering the fact that the natural resources, including the 
atmospheric sinks, are scarce and limited. At the same time the competition for 
acquiring these resources turn out to be gruesome very often. The study also 
supports the view that, since the natural resources were not initially owned by 
some one in particular, any act of unjust acquisition, say for example through 
force, taints the title and is subject to rectification. In this context, the historical 
pollution of the developed countries ought to be rectified and thus the principle 
of CBDR is fair. Further, the research also finds that the GERR or the GCCRR 
could be called as fair only if it overcomes the naturally arbitrary circumstances, 
such as geographic location of an island or coastal country, by taking the social 
minimum rule to these countries. It is also concluded that a GERR or GCCRR 
that does not consider the interests of all the stakeholders viz., the developed, the 
developing and the underdeveloped countries, and the various classes or groups 
of people living in those countries, could not be fair. In essence, the research 
concludes that the contemporary GERR and GCCRR are not as flat as it is 
claims to be and questions of fairness are loud and clear while the answers are 
not. 
Research Question 2: Whether the contemporary GERR in general and GCCRR 
in specific, has been fair enough to meet the varying needs and demands of a 
wide range of stakeholders including the developed, developing and least 




 Having found that fairness is equally important for both the domestic and 
international law with the GERR and GCCRR are taken as examples, the study 
proceeded to the actual practices under these regimes. The pertinent question 
was that whether GERR and GCCRR are fair enough in meeting the varying 
needs and demands of a range of stakeholders including the developed, the 
developing and the least developed states, geographically alienated states and 
various sub-national groups?  This question has been discussed in detail in 
chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis.  A deeper analysis into the nature of GERR and 
GCCRR proves the fact that these regimes have become increasingly complex 
and technical for the reason that the environmental considerations are invariably 
coupled with the various other social issues such as development, poverty, 
human rights, technology, international trade etc. In this regard, it is significant 
to note that the GERR is no more laying down merely normative standards but 
certainly demonstrates the vital implications of environmental degradation and 
the need for a prompt responsive action by the member countries.  
As stated earlier, one of the major issues of fairness in the making of 
GCCRR is the intensity of growing non-cooperation that exists amongst the 
multiple stakeholders. As a result, the club model of international politics, along 
with its merits and demerits, slow down or halts the negotiations very often. For 
instance, the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in the year 1997 but came into 
force only in the year 2005 undoubtedly, substantiates this point. It is certain 
that the elongated break was the direct result of the lack of cooperation from the 
various clubs of developed countries against the inclusion of the binding targets. 
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Looking at a practical perspective, this delay is not only unfair to the developing 
countries but also to the global environment as a whole. The same trend was 
also evident in the Doha Conference of Parties convened in the month of 
December 2012.  The developed countries vehemently resisted the extension of 
the Kyoto Protocol beyond the year 2012 i.e., for the second commitment period 
from the year 2013 to 2020 (also known as KP2). Eventually, though the 
Protocol was extended, it could be called as an incremental victory because 
amongst the developed countries only a few countries viz., the EU, Australia, 
Switzerland, and Norway agreed for KP2.  Thus, the end result in terms of an 
impact on environment could be stated to be a meagre 15 percent of the total 
developed country emissions. 
Another significant issue is the absence of mutual trust and commitment 
to the subject matter that ought to have been there across the globe. The Annex I 
parties’ targets under the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period 
illustrates this point very well.  Even considering the fact that the period was of 
considerably shorter duration (2008-2012), the failure to comply with the target 
requirement cannot be justified. Hence, this procedural lapse in maintaining the 
adequate accounting standards for the GHG emissions is indisputably an issue of 
fairness and equity. The combination of the very modest environmental impact 
and the fact that some Annex I parties are not on track to meet their targets may 
appear to give credence to this view.  Although the GCCRR ensures universal 
participation, in reality, a small group of some 15 large emitters are bound by 
the commitments under the current GCCRR.  
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The patterns of fairness divide are evident from the very outset viz., the 
dialogue or drafting phase of the international documents. As can be seen in the 
Stockholm Declaration that while it was being drafted, the developed countries 
argued that the Draft Declaration be adopted “without any amendments, in order 
not to imperil the fragile consensus achieved in the pre-conference 
consultations.” This is particularly important, keeping in view the allegation 
made by many developing countries that they were not consulted at any stage of 
the drafting of the Declaration. Similarly, it is interesting to note that the final 
draft of the Rio Declaration was also adopted without any sort of meaningful 
negotiations despite the criticism that some of the developing countries were not 
even consulted in the process. In an international legal system that is based on 
the fundamental principle of sovereign equality of nations, such a non-
participatory process without giving any room for the constructive negotiation to 
the member countries is absolutely erroneous and grossly undemocratic.  
It is also an accepted fact that even during the drafting of these 
multilateral treaties many genuine concerns raised by the developing countries 
were not incorporated in the final text. For example, during the negotiation 
stages of article 3 of the Stockholm Declaration the developing countries argued 
that the degradation of the environment in the developing countries is primarily 
because of the low prices fixed and paid for their products by the developed 
countries. Thus, the developing countries claim that they are forced to do 
activities amounting to the over-exploitation of the natural resources to outweigh 
the unfair practices including the low pricing adopted by the developed 
countries. Correspondingly, during the negotiation of article 3 of the UNFCCC, 
the developing countries wanted the developed countries to take the leadership 
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based on their respective contribution to the environmental degradation in the 
past.  However, this demand was not accepted and it contradicted article 7 of the 
Rio Declaration, which assigned a leadership role to the developed countries. 
Another striking finding that is revealed through this research is that 
even the Security Council of the United Nations is slowly gaining jurisdiction in 
the environmental disputes. The Security Council of the United Nations, which 
comprises the victor states of World War-II as permanent members having veto 
power, is one of the primary organs of the United Nations whose main task is to 
deal with the matters of war and peace. Though the Security Council is generally 
not involved in the decision making process in the disputes relating to 
environmental matters, there were particular exceptions too. For example, when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council held the former liable on various 
grounds including the damage to the environment. It may also be noted here that 
the Security Council is conferred with very wide powers and its decisions are 
binding on the member States. Now, considering the following facts, any 
concern pertaining to fairness is justified when approached from the perspective 
of a less-industrialised State.  
(i) The permanent members of the Security Council are heavily 
industrialised States whose per capita GHG emission rates are higher 
than that of other States. 
(ii) These Permanent Members have Veto Power in the UN Security 
Council; 
(iii) The decisions of the Security Council are binding on all States; and  
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(iv) Most importantly, the Security Council has slowly started gaining 
momentum in effectively addressing the issues of environmental 
protection. 
Given an indication of the growth of International environmental law, where the 
UN Security Council will also have a major stake in international environmental 
law making, it surely raises certain fundamental questions about the standards of 
fairness. It is more important than ever before in the light of the fact that the 
need of the hour is to protect the interests of the less industrialised, developing 
or least developed countries. Hence, the research has identified a major concern 
of fairness in the working of the present international environmental law from 
the perspective of the non-permanent and non-members of the UN Security 
Council.    
Another issue of fairness in the GERR is the option of the flexible rule of 
forum shopping available to the developed countries. The GERR at present 
provides many Issue Specific Regulatory Regimes (hereinafter referred to as 
ISRRs).  The GCCRR is only one of them. Thus, the ISRRs are so complex and 
involve many sub-regulatory regimes focusing on various sub-issues. For 
instance, the GCCRR though prima facie appears to be core-issue focused, it 
includes many sub-issue regimes such as the Clean Development Mechanism, 
Joint Implementation, Tradable Allowances etc. This gives the regime, a 
character that is complex and complicated in every respect. To ensure an 
effective functioning within this regime, any state would require an advanced 
technical knowledge and scientific support with it. But unfortunately, majority 
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of the developing and least developed countries lack such know-how and 
technological advancements.  
Another example that renders support to this finding is the Plant Genetic 
Resources Regime, which is closely connected to various other ISRRs such as 
the Global Intellectual Property Regime, International Trade Regime, 
International Human Rights Regime etc. Each of these regimes also consists of a 
judicial forum to resolve the disputes, and some of them may also attempt to 
resolve the related environmental disputes. The various international forums 
having jurisdiction in environmental matters include the: (i) International Court 
of Justice, (ii) International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; (iii) World Bank 
Administrative Tribunal (iv) European Court of Justice (v) Dispute Resolution 
Body under the WTO (vi) European Patent Office (vii) European 
Court/Commission of Human Rights (viii) Inter American Commission on 
Human Rights and numerous other tribunals or forums established under the 
various multilateral or bilateral treaties and under the respective national courts. 
This would invariably give a wider scope and freedom for the art of forum 
shopping being practiced by the developed countries. 
Yet another major challenge to fairness in GERR and GCCRR is 
globalization, which offers both opportunities as well as challenges to the 
principle of sustainable development. The interdependence that is the result of 
globalization offers new opportunities to trade; investment capital flows and 
advances in technology, including the information technology. This, if properly 
used could be beneficial for the growth of the world economy, development and 
the improvement of living standards of the people around the world.  However, 
275 
globalization is not always equitable. The best example would be the recent 
consultation of US to the WTO/DSB against India’s stipulation to use ‘thin film 
cells made in India’ in the solar energy projects in India. The US, which lost the 
trade prospects from the Indian market because of such a restriction in the 
domestic level, claimed that this was against the rules of free trade, viz., the 
Principle of National Treatment under the GATT Agreement. Similarly, it is an 
accepted fact that the new international patent regime under the TRIPS also 
poses as an obstacle in the transfer of Environmentally Sustainable Technologies 
(also known as the ESTs). Hence, it can be undoubtedly stated that the 
contemporary GERR and the GCCRR has not been fair enough to meet the 
varying needs and demands of a range of stakeholders including the developed, 
developing and the least developed states, geographically alienated states and 
the various other sub-national groups. 
Research Question 3: What are India’s Climate Change Policies and Strategies 
and how far these unique policies and strategies have been effectively 
negotiated at the international law making forums particularly in the backdrop 
of a fairness divide that exists in the contemporary international law making 
process? 
 Contrary to the common perception that the developing countries are 
only the rule takers rather than the rule makers in the international system vis-a-
vis the developed world, the present study concludes that India has been a major 
international force ever since the inception of the climate change negotiations. It 
has played a constructive role in building up the international climate change 
regime, its norms, rules and institutions. It has also played a key role in the 
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international climate negotiations over the last two decades by exercising an 
influential voice and acting as a defender of the global south, both as a coalition 
builder and as an aggressive protector of its own interests. India is also 
considered to be an important producer of ideas in setting out the international 
law on climate change and has assumed the role of a blocking power in many 
multilateral treaty negotiations.  To a great extent, India has been successful in 
defending the unfair strategies of the developed countries and in making them 
responsible for the environmental degradation and damage being caused by their 
acts.  
India’s foreign policy on climate change also witnessed major shifts 
during the period. The original policy (1998-2006) that was based on the 
historical pollution and high per capita emission of the industrialised countries 
stated that the requirements of corrective fairness demanded that the 
industrialised countries should be held responsible for the emission reduction 
and not the developing countries. Throughout that phase, India’s main 
contention was that poverty was the main hindrance for the economic 
development and it strongly opposed the ‘Common Responsibility’ argument of 
the North and instead advocated for CBDR.  Thereafter, between the year 2007 
and 2009, India gradually started modifying its domestic policy for reducing the 
emission. But at the same time, India was not ready to make any changes in her 
foreign policy.  It was after 2009 and during the COP at Copenhagen, India was 
ready to change its foreign policy by shifting its stand to per capita plus. 
According to the then Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, 
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India “…want to be aggressive on domestic obligation and want to be pro-active 
on international obligation.”3  
 At the same time, the domestic policy regime in India pertaining to 
climate change is gradually becoming problematic instead of being aggressive. 
Though the constitution of India recognizes the state’s responsibility to protect 
the environment, it has been placed under the head of Directive Principles of 
State Policy and the Fundamental Duties, which are non-justiciable. The 
research has also identified a contradiction between the forest policy in India 
and the Forest Act, 1927. When the former emphasised on conservation, the 
latter has been premised on the state monopoly over forests.  Despite the fact 
that there exist a plethora of judgments by the Indian Supreme Court declaring 
the right to clean environment to be a part of the Right to Life under article 21 
and hence enforceable, practically speaking, Indian Government has miserably 
failed in taking the ‘social minimum’ to the masses. The main reason for such a 
failure is that judiciary in India do not have its own enforcement division and it 
relies on the executive branch for the said purpose of implementation of its 
directions. At the same time, it is also a hard reality that the executive branch in 
India is not free from the clutches of corruption and bureaucratic delays and that 
itself has become one of the major challenges for an effective environmental 
protection and climate change actions in India.  As a result, the various policies 
promulgated by the government with regard to environment and climate change 
have also been often criticized for its lack of vision and unfairness.  
 
 
3  Ramesh, Jairam (2009): Parliamentary Debates on Climate Change Pre-Copenhagen, Lok 
Sabha, (Session XV-III, 19th November-18th December, 2009). 
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6.1 The Way Forward 
 Having found that a ‘Fairness Divide’ actually exists in the 
contemporary GERR and GCCRR, it is imperative to state that the main reason 
for the exasperation of the developing and the least developed countries rests in 
their incapacity to perform effectively at the multilateral venues. Most of these 
countries do not have the sufficient knowledge about the technical and subject 
specific international regimes that exist today. For ensuing fairness in the 
working of the global legal system, the first priority should be given for 
generating awareness amongst these states about the significance of the current 
multilateral legal and policy framework and the need for an effective 
participation in the international law making process. At the same time, the very 
fact that many of them have adequate technical resources and human expertise 
in conducting sufficiently constructive research in the area of climate change 
and environmental protection and are also able to send their experts as a part of 
the delegations to the multilateral venues should not be ignored. Hence, giving 
them an effective opportunity of representation and participation would 
definitely improve the degree of support coming from the developing and least 
developed countries. 
 In the same way, imminent steps are to be taken for the resurrection of 
mutual trust and cooperation, as it is an indispensable requirement that the states 
must move ahead in a spirit of compromise on issues of universal claims. 
Though the assertions of the developing countries based on the principles of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities may look 
fair and reasonable, it is also an indisputable fact that these principles can no 
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longer be the policy driver, if the planet has to be saved from the perils of 
climate change. The principle of sustainable development must be imbedded in 
the multilateral negotiations on climate change and environmental protection. 
The developing countries should also adopt a stand that the principles of 
intellectual property or international trade law should be used as an effective 
mechanism for transferring Environmentally Sustainable Technologies instead 
of creating hurdles in the implementation of mutually advantageous policies 
while trying to defend their scrupulous self interests. This has to be further 
supported by the flexible standards taken and commonly accepted by the 
developed countries regarding the concept of international transfer of 
technology from the economically advanced countries to the less advanced 
regions and the least developed countries. 
 With regard to India, the standards of fairness simply does not mean the 
demands put up in the negotiations before the multilateral forums, but the 
acceptance and the practice of the same by the international community in 
consonance with India’s unique social, cultural and economic needs. This would 
definitely bring in positive changes in the cultural normative shelters and would 
act as a ground for individual emancipation for all the developing countries 
including India. However, the protection of environment and climate action 
throws up innumerable challenges for any developing nation and hence, viable 
administrative and legislative norms and strategies do play an essential role in 
creating a concord between the environmental values and the developmental 
needs of the state. In this background, it is essential that the concurrences and 
contradictions existing in the area of the principle of universalism vis-a vis 
cultural relativism should be given a harmonious interpretation to prevent 
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further harm to the global environment. Thus, it is necessary that the external 
policies of the state should be formulated in tune with the hopes and aspirations 
of the present and the future generations. It is suggested here that in re-
determining the scope of the powers and functions of the various organs of the 
government, the Constitution of India may be amended to include a positive 
duty on the part of the State for protecting the environment and a concurrent 
negative duty to refrain from taking any steps that would adversely affect the 
environment. A further change may be introduced by a constitutional 
amendment to the VII th Schedule to the effect that the subject matter of 
environment and its protection are specifically included in the List I i.e., the 
Union List as against the present system of  reading it into all the entries alike. 
Correspondingly, given the decentralised perspective of Indian polity, the anti-
corruption laws should be strengthened and vigorously implemented for an 
effective climate action. There has to be a consensus created for legislating an 
effective anti-corruption law in India with specific reference to the 
environmental corruption. Most importantly, the awareness among the various 
stakeholders including the central government, the state governments, the 
various local bodies and the community in general that the protection and 
improvement of environment is a mandate of every institution of public 
governance and that it stands supported by the law of humanity is the crucial 
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